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THE SOU'l'H AFRICAN LAW OF DOMICILE OF NATURAL PERSONS
I GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The concept. The concept of domicile plays an important role in the choice
of the governing territorial system of law in the South .African conflict of laws
(private international laW') 1 in relRtion to the ascertainment of 'inte:rnationa.l
jurisdiction I of a foreign court the judgment of which is sought recognitio n and
possibly enforcement, and in the delimitation of the curial" area - the establishment
of jurisdiction ratione dornicilii or through the defendant I s being an inco1a
of a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (an issue
which ma:y be t and it is submitted, should be regarded not only as pe.rt of the South
2 
Africo.n law of civil procedure but also of its conflict of laws). It is also of
si¢ficence in other branches or sub-branches of law, in particular taxation and
. . t. 
3)
1mrn1.gra 1.on. 
No effort will be made to e:x:plore the Roman law on the subject, albeit that
•d omicile' is derived from . 1 dorniciliurn 1 , home, a place of re5j_dence, a dwelling.
Suffice it to sey that that legal system distinguished between origo, a citizenohip
by birth of the urban community, o bt<rined from the place of which a person's fat.her
or, if he were illegitimate, his mother t was a citizen, and domicilium, re.sidcnce
coupled with the intention of sta_ying permanently in the urban territory. One could
· 4) · 
. 
· 5) 
be .innocent of a domicilium I which was of most sign:i.ficance in jurisdiction •. In the
event of a person 1 s origo and domicilium being in· diffe1·en t ple.ces, according to 
Savigny 
6
\he legal system obtaining in the area of origo prevailed. Obscurity veils
most other choice-of-law rules, so far as they could arise after the Constitution of
' 7) 
Caracalla of AD 212, under which Roman citizenship was extenc.ed to peregrini.
\-/hen the post-glossators drew a distinction .between statuta realia and statuta
personalia (real and personal local legal rules), the latter being governed by the
domiciliary law of the propositus, detailed solutions for the ascertainment of domicile
had to be teased out of the Roma;_ texts. The 11ersorta.l law, governing such matters
as the matrimonial proprietary regime, aeyccts of capacity to perform an uct in law
(juristic act, Rechtrweschaft: acte juridiriue),and intestate succession to movables,
was universally recognized in the western Europe of the era of the Roman-Dutch Jaw as
be:i.n13 the lex domicilii of the propositus.
Regrettably, the old authorities in their analysis of domicile hardly distin­
guished themsel veB by reflecting legal acumen or foreseeing_ and trying to cope with
unsolved problems. And not infrequently they prove unrealistic or out of keeping with
modern notioru,. In the result numerous of the technical rules are ff) from clear.
In hardly exaggerated terms that learned judge, Shippard J, once said that 'th0 question
r_ 
of domicil 
\ 
is confef3sedly the most difficult t<> decide in the whole range of juris-
prudence 1 ; and . 9) . fifty years later Selke J l'iHwailed the fact that the I principles are
t 
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complicated, some of them are far from cleur t and often prove to be difficult of 
application in a given set of facts'. Guidance and assistance, especially on points 
on which the .old writers are silent, ambiguous or contradictory, can frequently be 
found in English law, for, in the words of Inn�s dJ;•[ t]he principles regulating 
domicile; founded as they are upon the civil law, have been developed in England and in 
Holland upon very similar lines'. But circumspection must be observed, not only
bec�use some of the differences "in rules of BUbstantive law between the two legal 
systems, such. as those relating to parent and chLld, necessarily lead to divergencies in 
rules of domicile; but also because certain English decisions, notably on the meaning 
of the requirements of animus non revertendi for losn of a domicile and of animus 
manendi for the acquisition of a domicile of choice, display so unrealistic an attitude 
as to warrant their being scrupulously avoided. 
�. 11)
tribunals have seen the danger signals. 
Fortunately there are signs that our 
Continental legal systems, as far as can be ascertained, have not exercisedaily 
persuasive influence on the· decisions of our courts. Of course, most countries 
outside the orbit of the Englioh common law s'IJitched allegiance from the individualistic 
lex do�icilii to the emotiona.J.ly appealing lex pa.triae as the personal law in the 
era of nationalism that was heralded by the rise of Napoleon and waxed in the second 
JJart of the nineteenth century; though it does not follow that these lands have no 
concept of domicile. But even with those States, such as Denmark, Norway, the Argentilie, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, that still espouse the domiciliary connecting factor pointing 
to the personal 1 aw, there is no uniformity as to the meaning of domicile. By and . 
. 12) 
large 'habitual residence'· is meant, a less demanding test thru1 that. applied by ll.nglo-
.Aruerican or South African law. It is e_ notion invoked by. �he legi1�lature in s 3�is 
of the Wills Act 195.3
3
for two of the. testing laws for the formal validity of a will - the 
law of the testator's habitual residence at the time of execution of the will or his 
death.- As the statute also invokes the testator'.s domiciliary law at execution or 
death as alternative testing laws, it clearly is distinguishing between . habitual 
residence and domi�ilc !,
4
) Sometimes in Continental laws ·merely 'ordinary residence' is 
called for:
5
)outside the Ane-lo-American and Roman-Dutch legal- orbits, I there seems to 
be a tendency for domicile to mean the principal, non-transitory location of the indivi­
dual - his geographical "centre o'f gravity11' ; 6 )
'[D]oinicile only mean.s home.' Thia definition, taken out of context, from a 
judgment of an eminent South Afric� judge Fis what the li:cyman understands by the 
concept. · It is, however, not only dis_tressingly nude but also unfinished, for it does 
not take account of the circum.stances under which the law assiV')s a domicile to a 
r,ronositus in a country or Hrea in which he does not have his home. More accurate Wld 
yet hardly satL�fyine; is: 1 D.omicile means ••• the country which is considered by the 
Footnotes on page 81 
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18) 
permanent home.' Concidering a number of attempted definitions,. law to be a person I s 
including the famous 
19) 
. 
. 20) 
Code 10, lf0(39).7 LordCranwo-rth concluded: · 'In fact, none of them 
is, properJ.y speaking, a definition, They are all illustrations in which those who have 
made them have sought to rival one another by endeavuuring,as far as they can,by some 
epigrammatic neatness or ele�ance of expression to gloss over the fact that,after all� 
they ,rre endeavouring to explcin something clE.cr"um per obscurum 1 • In truth, ao Jessel 
MR once said;\�n absolute definition is unattainab le: for we D.re concerned with an 
abstraction, a 'legal relation between a person and a place, created by the law and 
not by the person, a.."ld designed al together to serve the law I s purposes 1 !2 )0liver 
Wendell Holmes J's elegant formulation runs: 
23
)
1 
• • •  what the law means by domicile is one technically pre-eminent 
headquarters, which as a result either of fact or fiction every person
is compelled to have in order that by aid of it certain rights and
duties which have been attached to it by the law mey be determined.'
Unavoidably, however, this description is vague. So is that of Dicey & Morris: 
24
)
'(l) A person is, in general, domiciled in the country in which he is 
considered by English law to have his permanent home. 
'(2) A person may sometimes be domiciled in a cou�try although he does 
not have his permanent home in it. 1 
]for does the .American Restatement of the Conflict of Laws Second fare ,3l1;J better: 
1 Domicil is a place, usually a person's home, t o  which the rules of 
Conflict of Laws sometimes accord detera1inative significance becnuse 
of the person's identification with that place. 1 25) 
'Home is the place where a person dwells and which is the center of his 
domestic, social and civil life. 1 26) 
None of the definition.s of the Roman-Dutch writers assists, for they all essay to 
define domicile of choice only, voluntarily acquired by residence coupled with the 
animus manendi 1 whereas there sre also two domiciles by operation of law, those of 
origin and dependence. 
The 'countrv' or area of domicile . [run on] 
. --;, The space comprehended by a man's domicile may be of significance. Basically, 
so far as choice of law goes, one searches, in the words of Dicey & Morris,
27
/or I the
whole of a territory subject under one sovereign to one body of law 1 • For. this 
territory they assign the traditional though ambiguous English word I country 1• Hore 
exact are the Latin 'territorium legis 1 , the Roman-Dutch 1 rechtskring' and the German 
1 Rechtsgebiet 1 •
28
).But the only English equi val.en ts of theBe terms that have been suggestec·
'la\•I district' and 'law area•, do not run trippingly on the tongue and have not gained 
wide o.cceptance. Faute de mieux, reference shall have to be made t o  I country•. But 
. 29) in the 'application of law in space•, to use Cardozo's phrase, the boundaries of such 
a country may vary with the issues of which the court may be seised. In a federation 
there are two overlapping systems of law, State and federal, and the country which is 
:footnotes on pnges 81; 82 
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sought will depend on the systern involvetf'�
) 
Nor is this possibility confined to a 
federation. If it be asked: Is South Africa one country or several countries in this 
sense? the answer can only be, it depends on the circumstances. Provincial councils, 
except possibly through the exercise of implied ancillary powerJ,
1
)cannot legislate on 
private law. The central legislature has been busy wiping out the inherited pre-Union 
differences in this area1 though some obstinately remai?
)
and there is the occasiontl 
statute that provides for speciru. rules of private law in a particular province.
33
)->
al h h . th . . 1 t '� . 3
4) . 
Further, t oug in eory there is on y one common law of Sou ·h J-i,J.r2ca, some disagree-
ment exists among the seven provincial divisions of the Supreme Court as to what it is 
□·n various topics.
35
)True, in theory the Appellate Division will have the last word 1 · but
decades may pa.ss beforo the right car-din the lottery of litigation falls, and by then 
new inter-divisionaJ.. differences of view will have emerged that may well not be resolvc,tl 
because of the judicial attHude to stfl!'c decisis as between provincial divisions: 
none is bound by the decisions of another. The areas of the provincial divisions with 
their satellite local divisions thus constitute rechtsY..rinD�n that in the case of the 
Cape do not have boundaries that coincide with �hose of the province. 
Large tracts of private la"', however, are identical th roughout the Republic� Por 
il-istance, it. is se'ttled that succession to movables of a deceased who. died intestate - - - . - 36-) - .. · -- · · - · · . · 
ls governed by the law of his last domicile. In principle there would appear no need 
to look at each province or area of_a provincial division as a separate 'country'. 
Say A, hitherto domiciled all his life in England� settles in South Africa under such 
circumstances that it can be said he is domiciled in the Republic as a whole but not 
in any particular province or the area of any particular provincial division. He 
subsequently dies intestate in Johannesburg. What 1aw governs the succession to his 
movable estate? The answer surely is the law of South Africa wherein at the time 
of his death he was domiciled. 
Thus, depending on the nature of the issue, 'country' for purposes of 
choice of law cou1d mean the whole of South Africa or a province or the 
area of a particular division of the Supreme Court. · And a similar attitude should be 
taken to domicile in an overseas 'country' to which our choice-of�law rule points. 
'l'hese possibilities are illustrated by the three choice-of-law 
provisions resting on domicile emanating from our leg2slature. In terms of s 1(2) of 
the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 19L�9
31) marriage entered into by a male domiciled 
in the Republic that CQuld not be.solemnized there is void and of no effect. P.epublic;-wide 
domicile is also found in the choice-of-law rules of· the Matrimonial Causes jurisdiction
- - . 38) 
. 
39) . 
Act 1939 t that schizophrenic enactment., Section 1(3) says: . 1 Any issue in proceedings 
relating to an action referred to in subsection (lA) shall be determined in accordanc-a· 
with the law that would be applicable if both parties were domiciled in the Republic 
Footnotes on page 82 
- 5 -
at the time of the proceedings.' (Section l (lA) creates a ne1·1 r,:round of divorce 
jurisdi.cti.on: the defendant husband i.s 11ot domiciled in South Africa:, the plaintiff 
·,vife hc!S been ordinarily resident there for a year immediately preceding the inotitution
of proceedings and iinmediately before the marriage was either a South African citizen
01' domiciled· in South Africo. ) But sect.ion G o.f the statute· provides inter alia that 
a diviBion hearing a divorce action urider juriso.iction conferred bJ s 1 or ii or, armed 
with such jurisdiction, determ:i.ning the spouses' property rights under s S J must apply 
the practice and law of the division of the Supreme Court in the area of which the 
husband is or was domiciled, as the case mey be. (Presumably s 6 is not intended to 
cover the ground of s 1(3) �
0
\1he jurisdictional. requirements un;er s 1(1) arc: (�) the 
plaintiff wife has been ord:i.narily resident in the court's area for a year immediately 
preceding the institution cf proceedings; and (�)(i) at that date her husband was
domiciled in South Africa or (i i) he has deserted her and departed from South Africa 
and immediately before the desertion was domiciled there or (iii) he has been deported 
and immediately before deportation was domiciled in South Africa. Section 4 gives 
competency to a· court v:i th jurisdiction under s l to he1)r a counterclaim for divorce 
by the husband.) 
What is a cour_t to do that is trying to comply with s 6 only to find that the 
hucbano. is not or wa.s not domicile d in any di vision but only in South Africa as a 
whole? 'fhe 6t1ggestion has been made that it will apply its own law and practice: 1 )'1.'he
primary object of the remedial let;islat ion, to 111iden jurisdictional grounds, cannot be 
allowed to be frustrated by a minor difficulty of this ty:pe. 
But now as we move from choice of law to jurisdiction thG cloud begi ns to grow 
from the size of a wan' s hand to menacinG proportions. Sa::l that A, our irnmig.rant who 
has a domicile only in South Africa as a whole, Wi6hes to sue bis wife in this country 
42) 
for divorce. He cannot· find a competent court, as the 1939 Act does not cater for him
in an action :;.n convention - a nice example of· discrimination against males - and 
1+3) 
every division of the Supreme Court will insist on domicile within its area. Would
the High Court of England assume jurisdiction on the ground that de.,,pi te his 
departure anirno non revertendi and settlement in South Africa, his L"nglish domicile of 
origin has revived2 This would involve the court's holding that at one and the sa.-ne 
time a de cu ·jus can have different domiciles for different purposes. Poll elk con:;;idered 
that the English court would probably hol d itself c ompetent�
4)The matter would become 
even more complex if the English court ariplied tho domiciliary law to divorce. · Fortun­
ately, it applies English domestic law�
S)
But in other contexts it is not inconceivable 
that th is two-dimensional domiciliary problem could arise� 
.The situation in Austrnl.:ia affords an illustration o_f this. The Hatrimoni£:l 
Causes Act 1959·-1966 s 23(4) (5) (Com) states that a divorce action may be brought only 
by a person domiciled in Auotralia, and this legislation, read with the· Harriage Act 
Footnotes on pages 82, 83� 
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' 6 ( ) 
. . . . 46) 
t . 19 1 Com , has been claimed by Australian text-writers to  creute an Aus ral1.ru1
domicile by implication ruid un:i.ty of matrimonial 1.aw. This view was upheld by. 
47) Barry J in Lloyd v Lloyd t who found that the court of Victoria was competent to hear
the divorce action of a person domiciled in New Sou th Wales. \ihat if he, being a 
1 new Austrru.ian 1, were domiciled only in Australia as a whole and not in any particular 
State ( 1 country 1) therein? Barry J was sympathetically disposed to the assumption 
of jurisdiction:
8)
fut th�re would still remain the question of choice of law in other 
49)
contexts. It aro6e in the Supreme Court of South Australia in In re Benko, Ueceased t 
where the court was asked, for pu:t·pose:s of succession (where the law dif'fcrG from 
State to State), to hold that the deceased hud been domiciled within its area of 
jurisdiction on 5 August 1950. Although he had arrived from a displaced persons' 
camp in Germany in Melbourne, Victoria, on 25 April 1950 and had moved to Adelaide, 
Sou.th Australia, in June and lived there continuously until his death, Mitchell J
/ 
refused to find domicile in the State on the critical date, though he then had a 6ettled 
intention of living permanently in . .Australia. Commentators have suggested that Aw,tral­
ian courts in such circumstances should hold.that domicile is acquired in the State in
which· the de cu.jus makes his immediate headquarters
50
dr has his present domicile or
abode:
1)There is little prospect, however, of a South African c ourt's being prepar�d 
in similrir circumstances· to relax the test for acquisition of a domicile of choice. 
There certainly appears to be no authority for such an attitude. In short, to the
52) 
questiqn poaed by a leading Amer�can conflicts writer1 'does domicil bear� Eingle 
l!leaning? 1, the answer for South African law is Yes. 
The possibility remains of a propositus's being domiciled for purpose A (say
divorce jurisdiction) in _country X and for purpose B (say succession to mova:ble6 on 
intestacy) in country Y� Surely it is not one which we should shun. 
�plitting or consolidation of domiciliary areas by a foreign land, however, 
mcy have i nternationru. repercussion6 1 and cause grievous dilemmas. If H, hitherto 
domiciled from birth in Cape Town, emigrates to Australia and acquires a domicile 
there but not in any State therein, will his wife still be able to sue him for divorce 
in the Cape Provincial Division on the ground that he remaina domici led in the Cape? 
(It is assumed that unless H has acquired a domicile elsewhere he will retain his Cape 
domicile, despite his having left that country animo non revertendi.) · This was the 
issue that arose, with Rhodesia .substituted for. the Cape,in Smith v Smith:
3
)Goldin J 
gave no definite answer, as the Australian legislation and its interpretation had not 
been proved. He stres5ed, however, that foreign legislation could' not change our 
common-law rul.es of domicile. As will be shown, it is perfectly true that the cor,.necting 
factor of domicile for the ascertainment of 'international_ jurisdiction I must be 
characte:riz.ed by South African law aB the lex fori. But no change in the definition 
Footnotes on pages 83, 84 
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of domicile is effected by thE? Australian statute. The answer must lie in the 
natur,e of a 1 country' and that must depend on the legal rules of the foreign system 
involved. 54\1herefore, it i6 believed, the Rhodesian court did not have jurisdiction
t \ d . 'l 55) aua cour of ti1e ora1c1 e. ...... _ 
There is no South Afric;;i..Tl. authority on the effect on domicile of a change of 
borders of a State or its absorption in another State or its combination with another
State or other States to for-ma new State. It would appear in principle that the 
d .. · 1 . 1 di th do . . 1 f 
' · h di 1 
56
)om1.ci c, 1.nc u ng e m1.c1. e o origin, c angcs c.1.ccor ng y. 
It is necessary only to establish the,t the propoDi tus · has his permanent home 
within the particular country or orea, not at any porticular place therein. I.f it is 
established that he resides in Natal with the animus mrowndi, there is no need to go 
further end fix hif; domicile in Durban.
57
}He may, far in.stance, be fickle and alter his
affections from time to time wnonc; the resorts along the Natal coast .. NClturallJ, in 
. the vcIBt majority of instances the evidence does es-!:1iblif;h the acquisition of a 
permanent home in a 1,articular town or spot an.d such evidence is of value, for it will 
strengthen the contention that he has settled in the country or Hrea in ,1hich it is 
Bi tu ate. This reasoning may be taken a stage further. 'I'he propos:i.tus need 1iot hava 
a dwelling house or establishment of his own in the country or area in a I home', 
question. 
vehicle, a 
country or 
· 58) IJe may live in an hotel or lodgings, a boat, a motor-drawn caravc.!Jl or 
t t 59) · · bl d h' d · 1 k . t en or even a cave. He mey conce1.va y o is a1. y wo1.· in ano her
60) th h' h . ' -� . 61)m... th area 6r on . e 1.g 5eas as a. ma.rJ.ner or 1.n navc.u. service. J.ruc, .c
other
maj_ntenance of an establishment of his own rna.y be of evide-ntiary value, for it normaJ y 
strengthens the submission that the pror?si tus did acq_uire a domicile, as it shows 
the planting of deep roots; but the age, state of health and mm-ital status 
62)
propositus may be Buch that it could not be expected of him or her. 
Domicile is determined by South African law. frun on}· 
of the 
7 Like other connecting factors in the confiict of laws, domicile is assigned a 
meaning by the lex fo:1�i. Whether or no it exists ::in a particular country or area will 
be determined by South African lnw�
3)
This rule applies not only to the selection stage 
in choic:e of law, whore the lex domicilii may have to be ascertained 
6
± \f according to
South African law the de cujus was domicilnd in France,to allow French law to say he 
was not would be to abnndon our rules of choice of law; but also (obviously) to the 
issue whether a South African court has jurj.srliction ratione domicilii mid whether 
a f'oreign court has I inter.natiomtl competency' on this ba.sis 1 thus making its judgment 
d . f 't· d . ' � ds b ,,; t · (T th J f · 
65
)eserv1.ng o recogn.1 ion en 1 1.:r nee e, e1uorcemen · 1.n �ou l rica. 
That the lex fori chare.cte:rizes the connecting fador of domicile in all contexts 
appears to be the simple answer to a problem that some writers have found vexed: that 
of capacity to acqui,e a domicile. Sa:y a South African wife lives apart from her 
Footnotes on page 85 
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hu.sband in New York, by the law of which she can acquire a separate domicile. H 
, 66) • . t . , has been arguea by Graveson that there are Bl..X pcss:i.ble es ting laws of her capaci t:y.
He once favoured the law of the exie:ting ( 1 old') domicile I so if the facts were 
reversed, and it was a New York wife who was living in South Africa, she would be 
hold to have capacity to acquire a South African domicile. But this is manifestly 
unac.ceptable, for it denies· t he nature of domicile as a. connecting factor�
7) 
No more 
68) 
convincing is the statement of the High Court of Australia that capacity to acquire
· l . 69) . a domicile is governed by the aw of the alleged new domicile. Grave son now be lievcs 
that there may be different choice-of-lav1 rule□ applicable to different issues, such as 
the capacity to acquire a domicile of a married woman, a minor a.,d a..'1 insane person. 
But it is submitted that the alleged. problem is really n mirage - if the 5.s6ue of 
capacity ia considered to arise at all, .it is governed by the lex forJ;_, South African 
'JO) 
law. Quite another question is whether the propositus is a married woman or is a 
legitimate or illegitimate child: here the forum determines her or his status by :i.ts 
appropriate choice-of-lai,r rules and then applies the lex fori to decide on the domicile 
. 71)
of a person of that status. 
Rveryone hns at all ti.mes a domicile that will o::,erate in respect of choice oi' 
l,,.w and (save rossibly in �1xce;-,tional circumstances) in :res�,ect of domestic iuristlict:i.o�. 
The reservation in tlri.s suggested rule caters for the possibility raised in the
72) 
d:i.scusuion of Smith v Smith. Even then, this propo'sition mey well express only lex 
73) -- 74)-
ferenda, not lex lata. There is some authority,· as has been seen, in the Corpus Juri.s 
that a person can be without a domicile, such as one in i tincre who has qui i his 
. 7 5)previous �omiciliu� and intcnd.s fixing it elsewhere. 
'rhe quest.ion arises in two contexts in the Roman-Dutch institutionru. works. 'l'he 
first relates to the _y�abundus, unknovm to the Corpus Juris�
6
�ho. makes his first 
appearance in the writings of tho post-glossators - the commentators - of the Hiddlc 
77) Ages. He is one who has no certain domicile. The closest description of this nomad•
tramp, jolly swa.gman or 'Weary Willie' appeare; to be that of Boey: 
78)
t Vagabunden I is een ondui tsch woord, dat ecn d.olende en zwervcnde 
beteekent; men verstaat 1 er door de luye leediggangers, die zonder 
beroep of handwerk omzwerven, en agter 't Land loop en, zonder vast 
domitilium of vcrblyf •••• ' 
Of him little can be found in the Roman-Dutch texts. 
79) 
Ro den burg sa..,vs that a wife
does not follow. the domicile of her husband who is a vagabundus. There is an opinion 
in the Vervolg op de Hollantlsche Com;ul tatien
80dn to which our courts could pin a 
for0ative jurisdiction. lt states that a vagabundus keeps _his last domicile •. 
. 81) . Our case law is neutral. In his minority jud�rnent in �lason v Mason thippard J 
concJ.uded 'with much doubt m1cl hesitation' that the husband in the case �ms a vu6a­
bund.us. The po::,f_;ibili ty of there being such a creature was not rejected in E'x: 1n:,,rte 
Footnotes on page 85, 86 
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��?2tx !'1arte Sandbcr�
36r Ex parte G_2rdon?�ut in none of these decisions was a 
defin:Lte pronouncement made as in each instance it was held that in any event the 
husbund did not fit_ the description. If the v-agabundus eve:r · does make an appearance, 
the passage in the Vervolo: on de Hollandsche Consul tatien could dispose of ru:1:y 
problem concerning h:i.s domicile. 
The Gecond problem is concerned with other persons who have abandoned their 
domiciles, .such a.":,· the cl·assictl Roman law example of one en route to his new 
country of settlement. 'l.'hat very illustration io given in the Hollandsche Consultati:1i )
86) 
Merula also holds tha.t a per.son can be without aand he is left domicileless. 
87) 
domicile. J Voet by implic�1tion concurs T as he alludes to the Roman-law :rule without 
. 88) · 
suggesting that the position in his time was different. ·It has been pointed out, too, 
that Groenewegen in his Tr,::,.ct:,itus de levibus abrogati.;; et inusi t£itis in Hollandia 
doet, not list this o.s one of I1oman law rules no longer in operation. There is an 
intercstifrg passo.gc in the Hesrionsa ;uris electoralia of the celebrated seve:i1teentb -
century German jurist Benedict Carpzoviuf
9
1.n which it is stated that one who abandons 
hie. domicile of origin a.nimo et facto without acquiring a d
".
micilc of choice is by a 
fiction deemed to retain his domicile of origin. Thi"' view, however, does not appear 
90)
to have been taken by the Roman-Dutch writers. 
Ad iu1_, cons ti tuendurn, however, an intoJ.erablc situation will arise if a person
in modern South African law could be found to be without a domicile. The lex dcmicilii 
is the operative law in a number of situations, such as succe5sion to movable6 on 
intestacy, capacity_ gen er-ally, several circumstances in the law of wills and the 
matrimonial pro:p:r'ietary regime in the absence of an antenuptial contract. It might 
just be feasible for a legal order to .allow a person to be wJthout a domicile foi·
juI"isdictional purposes, for normru.ly at least there .would be some alternative ground 
of competency - though the situation of a. man seeking a divorce will be impossible •. 
It cannot be, hov:ever, that this prospect be allowed to present itself with choice of
91) 
law. For a.s Beale puts it: 
'Many legru. r elation.s are bru;ed on domicil 1 and many le/jal obligations 
rest upon it.... /1. domicil foI" everyone is therefore part of th c legal 
scheme. Wheth0r 1 . therefore, one actually has a home or not, it is 
essential to the le>gal order that he should have a domicilj no one can 
_be without a domicil. E•rnn a �psy, a trmnp or an outcast, has a domicil t 
however homeless and Vi'l.grant he may be in fact.' 
A legal system that espouses the domiciliary law as the personal law cannot 
92)
permit a. lacuna. of this character. There must be some rule that fulfils a gap-filling 
function. Our. law must in this regard, be like EngJ.ish law, of' which a German jurfot 
93' 
has said; 1ho man witho-ut a oha.dow and no Englishman without a domicile.• /;nd in real 
life·there can be no Peter Pan who can divest himself of his snadow. The Vervolg 
mentioned one residuary rule relating to the· vaGabundus and Carpzovius another relating
Footnotes on pages 86, 87 
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to the continuance of the domicile of origin, and it wi11 be argued that this solution 
' al J. d d d ' . 
94
) should be um.vers ly app .l.e as a vacate by Sav1gny - the continuance of the last
domicile whether it was of origin, choice or dependence (the latter with reservations 
to be dealt with later), that haB been abandoned, uutil it is replaced by a domicile 
of choice or dependence. 
-Ho ?er.son can· s1.mul tc::..neousl;y have more than one operattve domicile for the same5) - f run O!ll pur1Jose. _ .. ) 
--;- \fore it not necessary to cover the exceptional situation considered in the 
discussion of Smit!:; v Smith,
9
'i>t is believed that the last four words could be elimin­
ated from this suggested rule; though it must be conceded that on the authoritie(; the 
proposition mi�ht then only state jus constituendum, not jus constitutum. 
In the Romsn law the doubts of early jurists were eventually dispelled and it 
was .:iccepted that a person coul:d have more theJl 
. 97/ Bar, he indifferently selected several p laces
one domicile if, to use the words of 
as centres of his activity'. 
98lt has
d d
. . . 
. 
99) 
been conten e , however, that only one domicile was passibie for one purpose. 
l00J . ·. -
The Roman rule was accepted by the Homan-Dutch writers. ,Jome of them, none the
less, ·.-,ere aware of the problems of choice of law and jurisdiction that c:ouJ.d ensue •. 
Choice of law would be insoluble without a subsidiary rule operating wi1cre two or more 
· 101) 
concurrent domiciliary la�rs obtain. Van der KeeGsel simply jettisons the lex domicilii
for testing capacity to contract in this event, applying the lex loci contractus. In
f . t t t . t -'-] 
. 102 > 
t· ds t ·. · a ca..se o 1.n es a e succession o mov,..u, .es, J Voef con en tha each movable is
governed by the law of the place where it is found according to the desi gn of the 
deceased or is regarded as being at one domicile or i:illother. . If the. decease<l Is design 
is not ·clear, it would be governed by the law of the area of domicile :in which he was 
living with his fa'Tlily at his death. But what if there were none? 
'J'.he internal jurisdictional prob lem is not .so acute, for, save for the remote 
possibi1i ty of internatfonal recognition of the 
matter much if two or more South Africim courts 
even here some of the old writers are troubled. 
judgment being denied, it does not. . 
. . - . i
. 103) . 
have concurrent Jur1.sdict on. Yet 
104). · · 105). · - ·_ 
True, Faber and Merula say that._ the 
proposi tus with two domiciles can be sued in either. The domicile of origin is :plumped 
· . .. 106) 107) 
for by Schomaker. Wes el looks to the place where the proposi tus has settled the major
part of his property and in. which he is accustome;:d to resort more frequently and for 
longer periods - a solution that strike.s so s harply at the notion of 1lilimus manendi 
as to make suspect the practicability of a dual domicile. Others say he must be sued 
- . . 108)
where he and bis family reside at the time. 
Presumab ly the same attitude �ould have been taken to domicile as a test of 
international. competency had the old writers considered the matter, for there is no 
reason in principle for any difference in approacho 
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On two occasions obiter· dicta have fallen from the lips of South African 
109) 
judges, opposed to the possibility of the existence of mor-e than one domicile. · Sut 
recently iri � v Ei10J
1
�Je Appellate Division refused to commit itself. Not much 
significance need be attached to this avoidance of a pronouncement, for. the facts did 
not call for one. 
A solution h�E been propounded by 
J Voet.11'fnvoked in aid are eight South 
t , 111) , .a Sou h African writer following that of 
American civil codeJ
1
Jdmitting multi1,1le 
domiciles I where frequently a provision is to be found .similar to that of Voet I s, that 
in a matter having a speciel connection with one of. tho domiciles it alone· operates. 
However·, closer examination reveals that at least in the bulk of these countrieG the
114) 
concept of animus man<md:i. is less strinBent than in our law; and the persuasive force 
of their statutory provisions must be slight indeed. The rule proposed is· that multiple 
domiciles are possible in South African law, that domicile then bei ng selected in a 
particular ins:tance in which the event or transaction occurred or in all the circum-
Btances must he taken as having occurred. If, for instance, D. father had two domici.leti 
at the time of the birth ·of his legitimate child, the. domicile of or·igin of the ch:Ud 
is where the father Irias or must be regarded as having been at his birth. To det ermine 
which of the domiciliary laws of a deceased applies to the distribution of his .ir,ovubles 
on intestacy, recourse must be had to the place of domicile where he died or muBt be 
regarded as having died. 
The proposed rule receives slender support among the institutional writers and . . . 
depends ultimately on a fiction. Say the father was present at the birth of his chiid, 
or the· deceased died, in a foreif.,ll country on a holide.y yisit. . · 
. 
ll5) VQ.11 de:r ·Keessel hrew
in his cards in a•case of contracting in•none of the places where the d e  cuius was 
domiciled.· 
Even if the possibility of a multitude of domiciles be conceded in d eference 
to the old writers, heart can be taken from the realization that it is a very remote 
possibility in  the light of our notion of animus manendi. In eve ry insta�ce of an 
indifferen.t selection of' several places as centres of the activity of the E��tus, 
it will be found that he has not lost bis previous domicile as the animus non revertendi 
is missing, and he has not acquired a domicile of choice elsewhere, for he has not the 
reguisi te animus manendi - 'a fixed and d eliberate intention to abandon his previous--
116) domicile, c1nd to settle permanently in the country of choice'. 
II TtlE DOMICILE OF ORIGIN
(a) General nrinci:1les. In understandable exasperation, Shippard J once
described the expression· ' do mi cilium orir.;inis' as a 'bc1rbarous phrase ••• which con-
f . d . • ' b . 
. 
"'-h I ll 7) h. h If } d . uses plac e of· omicil . with place of ir... • . But t oug le .ccor ing to Ronn.i..'l usage 1 
th.is collocation of words is contradictory, as theBe expressions indicated two differrmt, 
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118) 
independent grounds of subjection', in modern usage 'domicile or origin' has acquired
a precise, technical meaning. It is the domic ile of dependence that is assigned a 
h t• h i's bo�n. 119)person at t e irne e  
Mere fortuitous birth in a country or on a journey does not e�tablish a domicile 
of origin in the place of birth� 206n the other hand, as will appear., a person may have 
a domicile of o·rigin in a country where he has never been. The domicile of origin that a 
121) 
child is assigned when.born is his father's domicile at the time if he was legitimate 
122) • 123) . 
and his mother's if he was illegitimate or legitimate posthumous. three minor
spacial cases are thos e of a post-divorce legitimate child: his domicile of origin 
will be that of his father at birth unless the court awards in advance the (sole) 
. . . 124) 
guar<liansn1p or (it is submitted) the (sole) custody of the child, when born, to his 
. 125) 
mother or to a third person - here, it is believed, the domicile of origin will be 
that of his mother or the thirdperson at his birth; of a posthumous or illegitimate 
child whose mother dies before his birth: his domicile of origin is the last domicile 
of his mother; end of a posthumous or illegitimate chiid of whom. the. guardianship (or, 
it is submitted, tutorship) has been awarded·by the court. before his birth to a person 
other than his mother: here it is d ifficult to think of any answer other than that the 
126)
domicile of origin is the guardian's (tutor's) domicile at the birth of the child •. 
:Further problems are raised by the legitimated or adopted child and the found.ling. 
'I'he ·view has been put f'orwa:fcf
7
�at the· legitimated child I s domicile of origln should be 
assigned retrospectively to that of his father's domicile at the time of the child's 
birth if the act of legitimation is retrospective to then, as, it· seems cl ea.r • with 
128). . . · 129)
lef�i timatio 11er subserJllens matrimonium in South African law. This appears sound. 
130) But the rHasoning should not be applied, as it has been contended, to a child born of 
a putative marriage, simply because, so it appears , the ·court I s pronouncement of 
legitimacy is declaratory and not constitutive of the status of the child. Very likely 
. 131) . · . . 
the mother is the natural guardian of the child ' from its birth, and if this 1.s so, 
it would be a strange thing to assign the father I s domicile at the birth of the child 
as his domicile of origin. 
It would be most convenient if ·the domicile of origin of an adopted cr.ild were 
to be that of his adoptive parent or parents at the time of adoption, which is specifically 
provided for by legislation in three Australian Statos1;
3
�d for .that domicile to be 
deemed to have existed from the child 1 s birth until his adoption. tor while sometimes 
it is clear what the domicile of origin of a child was immediately prior to his 
adoption,;. thus, for instance, where an orphan is &dopted by a relative - in many instances 
the child adopted is an illegitimate babe in arrns 1 of whose purentage the adoptive 
parents Hr e unaware mid of which evidence may be available only with gTeat difficulty, 
. t 1 . 
133) . 
• i i h. d if a al • But the Children's .Act conta1ns no express provis on n t 1.s case an on a
proper Cbns truction will be seen to make the adoption order constitutive and non­
retrospective in effect. It must follow that the adopted child follows as domicile 
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of dependence the a.or.iicile of his adoptive parents from the time of a.doJ)tion.
Up to then he retaina aJ.1 his previous domiciles, and consequently his domicile of 
· · · " d
l34)"'h" . lt . d" ff" lt. f f b t. · 11 1·• orig1.n 1s unc11f.t!l.ge • ... 1.s may resu in i · 1.cu His o proo , u , as 1-n (\e seen, 
in case of need to ascertain a domicile the court wi11 grasp virtually at anything 
as a _!abula in nanfr.ss,io; nnd if pushed to the point will scy that his domicile of 
origin :in hi.S first known domicile. lJS)
,. 136) No nr J.llv.orthy ha::3 awakened in £:outh 'Africa to find a new-born infant iD his
bed and been concerned with hir:-1 domici.le; no child has been found by the porter of 
the Naz3reth House in a prrun outside the front door on his opening the building in the 
morning 1 and subsequently posed domiciliary :problems for the courts. But the posGibil:ity 
exists. It iB generally acc8pted that a foundling has his domicile of origin in the 
country in which he is found 
11?.J so too a child, not strictly a foundling because he
· 138) 
is riot abandoned, but whose parentage is veiled in mystery. 'l'here ma;y I however, be
evidence to the contrary effcict,foT ·instance, where a small child babbling in Swedish is dis­
·covered as a stowaway on a ship that has Just put in to a South African port from Stockholm.·
One thing may be said with confidence cif the domicile of origin, that it continues 
until it is abandoned animo et fact6;
9
i� auality it shares with the domicile of choice. ------ . 
The mystery is. whether in 01.:r law 1 as· in Eng·li�h law, it is always late;1t., ready to 
fi.11 a void where the de cujus has ;Lost. his Jlrevious domicile and not replaced it with 
a domicile of choice or d'ependence. 
140) · - . 
It has been seen, the vagabu11dus
. 
excepted, that the probable Roman-Dutch rule w�s
that he who abandoned his domicile was ·1eft domiclleless, and this apparently Biplied as 
h t b d t f th. d · . · 1 . f.. · · 
141
) -1: d t f t' cl • • 1 f h . muc, ·o a an onrnen o e om1c1 .e o, origin as auan onmen · o · ne ,om1.c1 e· o c �o).ce.
The domicile 0f origin had no gap-fillin[; function and the concept was of valve primar­
ily in fixing the first domicile and possibly secondarily (end very much so), in all 
probability being more difficult · to discro-d in the eyes of the court. 
It was submitted in the first section· of- thiG article that the notion of a 1J0rson 
without a domicile is not to be endured and that our courts E;hould boldly go for a 
universal. ruJ.a of the continuance of the la'5t domicile, be it of origin, choice or 
dependence, that has been abandoned, until it is replaced by a domicile of choice or 
dependence - the Roman-Dutch position, apparently I with that odd creature; the _vaga-
bundus� But that is not what ol.i.r trial courts have done hj_therto: they have a<loptEed 
the Englfoh law rule of the revival of the domicile of origin. (The Appellate Division 
has not as yet pronounced. on the matter.) The upshot is the emergence of two 8.Ssoc.i.ated 
principles of the domicile of origin, the second of _which, it is submitted, is um-1arrro1t• 
ed: (�) it persists, even though abandoned a.r.iimo et facto_, until replaced by either a. 
. 142) · · -domicile of choice or- a domicile of dependence;- -l�) :Lt .re_vives on the loss of a
domicile of choice or dependence without the simultaneous acquisition of a ne,,_, domicile 
Footnotes on pages 89, 90 
143) of choice or dependence. 
\{hence does the Enclish rule of the r£�vival of' the domicile of origin derive? 
In 1820 Sir John Leach V-C�
4
taiing himself on ci vi.lian writers, found egainst the 
rule, holdine; that there is no difference :i.n pr:l.nciple bett..:een a domicile o:f origin 
and one of choice i11 respect of loss or reacquisition, and that any abandoned domicile 
continues until replnced by a newly 
l�S)
uired on6) , unleS,'3 the party die in ibn��
toward a..ri intended domicil'. Burge t-uid Story, however, 1-!110 shortly thereafter wrote 
their le.:,ding works on the conflict of laws, and the latter of \vhom had a mark<➔d. · - · 147) 
:influence on E..'nglish judge.s 1 subscribed to the two principles set out above. The _ -
148) 
House- of Lords set tlcd the matter on these lines in the great csse of Udny v �ldny, 
elc,cting in favour of the revival of the domicile of odgln • .Although it WoE:; a 
149) 
Scottish appeal, it has never bei.'ln doubted that it holds goods for English law. Lord 
150) 
Hatherley LC reu.soned thus: As a. domicj.le of chcice can be acquired so it mu.E:t be able 
to be abandoned 1 and though a man cannot, fo1· civil r·ea�,ons, be left without a domicil, 
no such dif.ficul ty arises if it be simply held that the original dt1micil revive,; 1 � To 
Lord West.bury I as the domicil of origin is the creo.ture of lm-J, and in.dependent of the
will of the party, it would b<� inconsistent wi t.ri the principles on which it it, by lav1 
cr�ated and ascribed, to suppose that it is capable of being by the mere act; of· the 
party entir-'ely · obli tcrateq and exting,1.tishBd. It re-vi vea and exist:5 -�henever there is
no other domidl •• u I lSI,.Jhus, :so Lord Chelmsford put it, it 1 ,tlways remains, a.e it 
152)
were, in raserve ••• '. 
In the United States it wa
)
r; generally accepted that a domicile persists u!'l.til
153 
superseded by a new domicile. 'l'his, it wa.s argued, waf_; more appropriate to a land 
in which there was continual movement fr.om one constitutive State to another� It has been 
seen that the Roman-Dutch writers were pr0pa1·ed_to leave a person without a domidle. 
Only with a va(:abundu� is there_any authority for the continuance of the last domicile, 
and one hat, to turn to the German jurist CaTpzovius for a mention of the continuance 
154) 
of an abandoned domicile of origin� Of the oi vi.lians only Savigny can be found to 
express a preferenc(-l for the genen.J. .rule accepted in Arnerioa, the continuance of the 
last domicile. \-!hen the matter finally ca.me up for crisp decision before a South
-. 155) 
.. 
African court in·Ex pe.rte Donelly it was felt-that, it-being necessary that a person
e1.lways have a domicile, an election had to be made between the English and AJnerican- - 156) 
principles. It has been argued, holN'ever, tha-.t both are equally arbitrary and that
any gap ·snould be filled with the present residence or if there be none the-last-known
157) -
residence. Apparently - though this is not c1early stated - the choice-of-law rule
invoking; the lex domici.lj.i is to be so supplanted. But for this there is no warrcint.
Furthermore 1 the application of the law of the last�known residence is also arbitY-ary.
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True, in the abr;ence of any other evidence the cou:rt will in appropriate circumstances 
find th,� d�_j_�:2_ to h,we been domi.ciled there, .but this is a nis aller of evidcntiary 
law. It is very unl:ikely trw.t this proposal to invoke the presen.t resicl.ence will 
meet 1-,1ith judicifl  accept,mce and it will be assumed that our judges will find them­
selvea co111pe11Eid to follow either the pa.th of the Americnns or that of the. J3riton..s. 
Th(! problem before Ma1;;:on J in Done 111: had not h,:1d to be .squarely f,�ccd before,-T5B)-but there wero a nurnbe;r of. c.,bi ter die:!£ in fuvour of the doctrine of Ent�lish law I which 
Mason J, in an. interesting piece of judicial law-making, adopted as pnrt of our legal 
system. The lcm-ned judGc� while sensible of the 'rna,ny art,,uments of convenience in 
favo1J.r of the persistence or the domicile of. choice 1 especially in countries like the 
United States and the Union' t concluded that they could not 'prevail against the 
objectione; to adoJJt.ing on a qur.,stian of international law [sic] an i11tcrrrctation 
· 159) 
differing from the rest of· the Empire'. 
1 1,nwre there are defir.i te l(:!gal decisions or particular statutes 
dealing with the subject, these naturally bind the loctl tribunal, 
but where .such definite compul..,don is abnent 1 it is most important 
thnt these questions sho1;i].d, as far· as possible be dealt with on 
principles which a.re generally accepted amongst civilized nations. 
1 1'he diff'icul ties of any o the:c course may well be illustrated by the 
present ca.se,. Jf in South Africa the l'lJle be adopted tha.t the domicila 
of choice persists nob,dthstanding aba.TJ.donment, whilst a diffm:·ent rule 
prevails in other countries, our courts would attribute to· the plointi.ff 1 s 
husband one don:icile, and other courts would attribute to him another 
domicile, 'l'he r·esul t would be that a divorce pronounced in .thiG case 
would be reg;:Jrded as inva1ld in EnglGnd, and the ,'life man:·ying again ir: 
England might be convicted of bigamy. 
'Or if the 5Uccesaion to the husband's property were being decided, 
his movable property would. be distributed and be liable to taxation 
in different ways in accordance with the acddcmt oi" situation.•· 160) 
These sentiments are understandable in the context of the time and place. Buts 
despite our continued close economic links with Britain and the considerable immigration 
from that country i they seem. qua.int today no1r1 that the Republic is out of the Common­
wealth. If the Amer·ican doctrine is more convenient, as Ma.son J thought, and if iri 
geneni.l it produces less 2rbitrary and more equitable and soci.tl.ly ju�tifinble relmlts i 
which it will be argued i.s the case, the time hs.s come to gfve DoneJ.J.y its quietus. 
Fortunately the rule it expounds has not been pronounced on by the Appellate Divi5ion 
161) 
·or been applied in any other reported case, though admittedly it. ma3 have been invoked
in many unreported suits.
162) 
The English rule has been the subjec� of cor ..siderable criticism because it so 
frequently leads to eccentric consequences - a domicile in a country the links with 
which may have be com� superannuated or are slir;ht, and which may never have been seen. 
. . . Lw · 
It was found to be I undesirable ' by the Fri vate Ir.ternationel./Commi ttee of England, 
which proposed the rule I A cfomicile, whether of origin or of choice, .sh;;ll continue 
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163) 
until a.."lother domicile iB acquired', which W<J.S taken over into the abortive 
'I-- Domicile Bills of 1958 (s 7) and 1959 (s 2) in the form 'A pP-rson
1 13 domicile i.n MY 
country continue5 until he o.cquirea a domicile in another country (but no longer) 1• 
The rule of F..ni:;lish law w2,s formulated on the premiss, sometimes expressed bul 
mostly tacit, th3.t the average m,:.1.n has an abiding relationship with his domicile. 
If an abandoned domicilP. of choice is held to continue until replaced by the acquisi tton 
f , . - f , 
. 
J L , d 
164)
o · a new a.omicile o cnoice, se.ys Lorn Rather .ey C 1.n !LE . .,,"'.:, · 
'on�: is driven to the absurdity of asserting a perBon to be domiciled 
in a country . .-Jhich he has resolutely forsaken and cast off, simply 
because he may (perhaps for years) be deliberati.ng before he settles 
him.self elsewhere. vJhy e,hould not the dom:i.cil of origin cast on him 
by no choice of bis own, and changed for a time, be the state to 1'1ILich 
he naturally falls back when his first choice has been abandoned animo 
et facto, end whilst he is deliberating; before he makes a second choice. I 
The ::.illswer to the query is that the d.omicHe of origin micht long before have 
been forsa.kenj indeed1 be:ing a.cquired without any volition on the pnrt of the propositus, 
it could be a country with whj_ch at no time_ did he have any tie at all. Assume A had 
been born ln Natal, his father's domicile at the time being in Scotland, and that a year
later his fa.tber becaine dorr1iciled in !fatal. If sixty years after A leaves Nai;al with 
the intention of seeking some new place in_whi.ch to settle in his yE;ars of retiremc·nt, 
a,ccording to the law of England his Scottish dom:i.cile c,f crigi n revives and its 1aw 
becomes his personal la1 , though he may never have visited the countr,r. If he wishes 
to obtain a divorce, he must resort to the courts there; if he dies intestate, his 
movable estate is distribut ed according to its legal rulf'B, of which.he is profoundly 
165) 
and happily ignorant. In this f1:lI' from outre illustration the proposi tus ma_y have 
quit the country of his domicile of choice, but his pocial links remain infinitely 
stronger with tt than with the country of his domicile of origin. And the low should, 
I" 
� maintain ets far as poSsible I the ratior1al J·ustification for .domicile· . .-. t}1e n.eed 
\ . -
to ensure conformity by the individual to a social pattern, to the pattern of Jau and - · 166) 
morals of the society in which he has made his hcme 1 • 
In his rnuch-c.ri ticized judgment in 1..lint:t..tUJ v .Attorne:,-General.. Lord Macnaghten 
· 
d th · · 
16 7 
\ [ I" th d h t.... t d f t" d t d dissue is warning: • • • .in ese ays, w en 1ae en ency o 11e e uca e an 
leisured cla..'H::;es is to become cosmopolitan • • • you must look very narro1•1ly into the 
nature of the residence suggested as a domic ile of choic(i before you deprive a man 
of his native domicile.� 
The result he arrived at was by no. means satisfactory. Yet attachment to the 
domicile of origin rney have been broadly true of mid-Victorian Eritons - or at least 
Englishmen--: who on landing on foreign shores in sem-ch of better opportunities in 
life often looked forward to their ultimate return to their native land. There is a 
saying of the French that they do not emigrate - they merely tra.vel. Possibly it had 
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168)
more th:m a germ of trutli when applied to the Englishman of a hundred yeaJ..'6 ago. 
'Once a.n Englishman, al�rn.ys an :Englishrn;:!lt. '
16Ut though h� and his offspring mey for
long have continue-d to .speak of England. as 'home', it was an expression that finally 
came to b8 mere habit, possibly unconsci0u1:,ly ingn:iined because of· the irri tntion it 
cauned in the brea.sts of those with a longer South African a11cestry. 'It is a well­
known fact• 1 said Humpff JA i11 his dissf'nting judgment in Eilon v EilJ:.�
)
that thousands -- � 
of first-generation emignmt.s from the 50-callad old countrfos maintain family and 
culturf.l! relationships with their domicile of oricin, having at the same time the inten­
tion to live indefinitely in their new country. 1 
That mroiy home.:;ick immigrants return whence they came is undeniable J and very 
likely the figures are higher today with assisted pRssages and officially encouraged 
immigratlon than at certain other recent times, say behteen the two lforld Wars. It 
L71} 
rnay be that an emj_nent le(?;al scholar went rather far. in saying that • [ t]he archaic and
feudal idEa that a man belongs to the land to ;,•hich his ,mcestor.s belonged has long 
. lost its meanirig in en age of migratory populations•. But basically the condemnation 
is sound 1 and pRrticula.rly so in the ce.sE.• of a single State in the politica.l sense,. 
such ac; the United States and South Africa, that constitutes several countries 01· 
a:reG.s for choj_ce of law or domestic jurisdiction, .::.:nd where State or provincial or 
other local loyal ties are not strong, ties of life are often with more th,rn om� 
territorial area. and movement within the land is frequent.
172)
- An· adaptation of the illustration already given will shm-,1 the heights of unrePJ.ity
_. which the English rule can reach. Let us say that A leaves Nata.1. in order to settle 
:j.n Rhodesia, where his daughter, his only child, lives with her husband. He decidf;S 
before r;oinG to Rhodesia, which has accepted him aB .:m immigrant, to go to t1auri tius 
for a ten-day holiday •. On tha.t ish.nd he dies. His last. domicile according to Engl:L.sh 
law is in Scotland, and it is the law of that country that governs the order of intes­
tate succession to his movables, al  of which arc in South Africa or Rhodesia. 
It is not denied that the J\Jllerican rule can aJ.so produce socially untenable 
consequences. This could happen, for instance, if the propositus had lived for m,-rny
years with the animus mmiendi in his domicile of origin, then settled in a new country, 
decided after a few week□.that he preferred life in the 1 old country• and died en route 
there. But such ,m unfortun�.te working-out of the /unerican rule \muld 8.PT)ear to be 
less likely than in the caee of the English rule. There is, of course, the out1£t of 
saying that while in general the rule of the continuance of the last domicile applies, 
it will give way to the revival of the domicile of orif;,'1.n rule if this will prodtice . 
a result more in accord with social realities. 'fhir:: · apparently takes the suggestion 
of cert,iin American juristB of a variable domicile a stage_ further, for they are 
thinking primarily of different juridical contexta, such as taxation, divorc0 and 
. t t 
' 173) . 't . ' . ' d' ' ' in es ate succession. 13ut there has been an elastl.ci y in American jurJ_s 1.ct1.ons in
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adi!l}Jting domiciliary rules to different situations, as shown QY their gradual 
extension of the circumstances in 1.vhich a wife has the ca11acity to acquire her own
- 17/4) dorr.ic:D.e. On balance, however, it i:s felt th':l.t the suggestion must be rejected.
Not only will the enunciation of the propcscd rule demand of the courts o. law-creating; 
jurisdiction of a scope they will almost certainly not assume, but :i. t 111ill result in
a number of irist..-mces of unc.er·tainty as to a person•.s dorr.icile, with their attendant 
expErndj_turc on legul advJce and posuibly litic;atimh Better certitude here at the
expense of an occasiona.1 unfortunate result • 
There is also another situation in which the solution of the United States seelilS
to produce a whimsical re[.';ult: that of the deportoe J exemplified by Donelly,
or pen,on leaving with nn exit permit�
75)
As will be seen,it is generally accepted that
on departing from cur shores he loses his domicile of choice in this country, for the 
o.nium.s revertendi ·cannot be carrj_er.l into effect \�j_i;hout transgressing thfl law. But
.;hile it may appear odd that a deportee, until he acquires n neb.r domicile, retains his
-laBt domicile of choice, albeit he canr:ot acquil'e it ani.mo et facto, it must be
remembered that if the rule of }:ngltsh law is applied the same result mcy follow, for
his domicile of origin m9.J have been in that very country. Both ru.l"'s ce1n in pocuJ..:Lar-
176) 
circumstances evoke str2IJge rurnwers�· &s with one� 1.,•ho i•1ould :se.t foot on the e;round of
his country of lc1.st domicile of choice or of origin at the risk of his liberty or even
life, like the German refugee during the Nazj_ regime. But mwh a price will occasiona11:
be demanded by a. fiction necessary for the legal ord.er o It ca.n only be hop1,d that the
courts will take a generous attitude to the interpretation of the animus manendJ., for
which a plea. will be made, because this will reduce the ranks of those sui juris but with
attributed domiciles.
The adoption of th(: American rule could help· a South African wife whose husband
has a foreig11 domicile of origin a.11d who ha6 abandoned her without acquiring a domicile
elsewhere. At common la\.J she would have to sue him for divorce in the court of his
present domicile. But admittedly her·po.sition has been progressively i8J_Jroved under
_ 177) 
the Mr::.triinonial C (j.uses Jurisdiction .Ar,t 1939 ,under which, ,.:is has been seen, she is
enabled to bring a. divorce action in South Africa if her hu5bund is not domiciled
there a11d it w;;i.s her pre-nuptial country of domiciJ.e ·or citizenship; or if her husb,:md
has deserted and left the cc-iintry, or has been - deported 1 and i:nmediateJ.y before the
deser· tion or tleportation was domiciled there.
'I'he difficulties over the recognition of Sou th African divorce decrees and judg­
ments relating to succession t�dvert�d to by Mason J in �_parte Donelly do not seem
so gr.ave today. First, they would be reco01ized in the United States if its doctrine
were invoked but possibly not if t,he .En!;].ish one 1-H�re. . Secondly, in the CJni ted
- 178) 
Kingdom under recent legislation a South African divorce would be recognized where the
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Americal1 rule was applied. Thirdly, our le{!;islature has boldly and. wisely shown 
that it is not prepared to o.11.ow the proBpect of 'limp:i.ng marriages' to deter it 
from extending divorce ,iuris!Jict.ion beyond the court of the present domicile or 
not.ional domicile in the interer.;b..1 of jus-tice to \•liver; - witness the General. L,w 
.Amendment Act 1968; 7Ji:tch amended the Matrimonial Cnu.ses JuriBdictio·n Act 193§8fJ 
allo\i a ple.intiff �rife to sue for divorce in ar.y di vision if her pre-nuptiru domtcile 
or citizenship was South African. Ji'inally, in many Continentc,l systerna 1 wedded to 
. 181)the national -law governing status, the judgnHmts would in no cCGe be recognized. 
. . 182) 
As to the theorcticu.l objection of Lord Hathcrlcy in Udny,. that the 1:m(�rican
doctrine flies in the face of the principle that a domicile of choice cannot exif;t
if it is abandoned, the answer is that it is as question-begging as Goodrich' B 
183)
objection to the English doctrine, that it is irreconcilable with the principle that 
a domicile once acquired is retf.:ined until v. new domicile is secured. The fallacy 
lies in the· elevation to basic principles, with which all subsidiary rules must comply, 
of prepositions that in i'eality are not �_!'iori, but a r,ot;;teriori [(meralizationB 
from existing rules of law. 
In the result then I a �;trong case can he made for the continua.nee of the last 
domicile until i ta replacement by· a new one, rather tha.,. the domicile of origin clC �ing
in subsidio. As, however, it is by no means clear in which direction our courts will 
ultimately go , in whc.:t followa account will have to be taken of both posnibiltties. 
· (b) Loss of dom·icile of o:r-ir,in. · Abandonment of a domicile of origin, through
loss of reside.nee coupled with the animu.s non revertendi 1 muet be proved on t:.L b2J.ance 
of Jffobabili ties�·
34
) The old au thori_t_i_e_s_s_p_e_tIB: o_· f_a_p_r_e_s-umption in favour of its 
185) .. . 
7 
ex:i.sh:nce. South African cnse law holds that the burden of proof is on him ,�ha alleges 
. · 186) 
otherwise and that in case of doubt the domicile of origin will be taken to continue.
Such statements perhaps should not be- given much weight· bec&use it is also said of a. 
domicile of choice that he who cl.ieges a change from the previous domicile must prove 
it nnd that the domicile of choice i� 1n·esut.1ed to continue in the absence of pxoof of� 
187) 
such change, which will not lightly be concluded. re.t the im_pression remains on an
anelysis of the South Africa1 . decisions that there h<1s becm some infection of the
iwpoasibly rigo1:•ous and untenable approach token· by the English and Scottish courts, 
Lav1 
referred to by- the English Private International/Committee as •serious defectE ••• 
188) 
hard to defend'. There i so it will be shown, in practice· the .domicile of origin has
proved remarkably tenacious, .. ' Jts character mo;:-e enduring, its hold stronger, and 
1B9) 
less eru::ily shaken off'. A leading English writer has concluded that 'almost over-
190) 
whelming evidence is r�quired' to shed the domicile of origin cmcJ. th�t there ).f: an 
'abnormal reluctance of the courts ••• to find an intention in favour of ito abandon­
. t• 191)men • 
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192) 
t [T]he court 1, st.id Innes CJ in Webber v Vlebber:_, 1 must :Ln each case be satiE;fied
that the per.fion for whom cl. domicile of choice is being claimed, del:i bera.tely decided 
!2....i'�i i;e u.1 his home in the old count!:1. and to mr,lrn his permanent home in the ne�,. 1
In the co:r.mon run of cases, as �ppears from this q_uotation� the- decision whether a 
domicile of origin has been lost is bound up with the o.ssociated que-stion whether a 
new domicile of choice hr.,lB been acqyi.red. 'i'o decide l'!hether there is en abscncci of 
§L'iimu� :revertendi, it ifl insufficient to look at a vague intention to return in 
abstracto; it mu.st be te,sted against the strength of the roots in the new country. 
The norm is that 
'.!.'he 
1 [ t] he choice of n. new domicile ••• invo1ves the ab�nd�:mment of'. the 
old one; and 'the prominence given to this rrE;pect of the matter by 
the courts hrn3 resul t€d in a dem.,.:md for strict· proof of an intention 
to give. up "'the old home and to acquire the new'. 193) 
) d t . ·, . ' f . 
. . a t · ' d' l 
94
)n,?_an onment of he aonn.cJ..J.f, o or:i.g::rn me;;:.ms _ .e})cff• ure an:imo non rever i.e.n l.• 
Of course, th_e t\�o requj_rements may not. come into existence Gimultemco1.1sly but until 
they co-exist abandonment does not t;';;ke place. Animo non revert£:ndi is not tlw s,:,.,mt1 
thing as sirie animo nw.JHmdi., One does not aGk afresh, Hc1.s the departed propo�i t!� 
tht� animur; ma.nendi in the old country?,with al1 the difficulty of :proof that involyes. 
. 195) 
'l'he touchstone is the ponitive resolve not to return j_n orde:.r· to rernain.,rn.ibject to the
· - 196) 
possi_bili ty of a ,change of mind on the contingency of e111 unforeseen event. . In a
sense, it is the obverse of the tent of the e.cquisi tion of nn :mimus manendi. '.i:'he 
matter ;�ill be adverted to again in the treatment of the loss of a domici1e of choice. 
·Exceptionally it is clear that the propositus has quit his domicile of ol"i gin 
and the only problem is whether· he h,'-is acouired a domicile of choice elsewhere. Thin 
i97) . -
is what ha1Jpened in Le;z:: v Le:v I s 1'xecu1:ors, an important deciBion, p;:-,Tticularly on the
acqu iGi tion of a domicile of choice t the facts o 1' whi(;h may conveniently be stated .,1t 
this stage: 
En£land was Ley 1 s country oi domicile of origin. There he was born 
in 1880. J,.,,.c:, early as .the age of 11v, when he commenced hj_s apprent:iceship 
as a stone-r;1,;,,,,on, he fo.rmuJ.ated the intention of• emigr"-ting to South 
Afriea, where wages for such an artisan were much higher •. In 1899 Ley 
finished his i:,pprenticeship and .s.hortly thereafter bece.r.ie eng"'"ged to his 
future- wife. He sailed unmarried for Ca.pe Town in 1903. For' over three 
years he worked in southern Africa, mostly in Cape Town, at other tit11cs 
in the Orange River Colony. He informed friends that he intended to 
stay in south:'orn Af:rica. In 1905 Ley caught � ship to England. in order 
to marry his fiWlCE:e. ·Lnmost immediately on dise1nbarking he booked a 
single return passage to Cr.;pe 'I'own. 'l'he couple ,>'ere mar!'ied in r::ng.land, 
where they spent_ t.hc1ir honeymoon v.nd Ley practically hie la.st penny. L2te.r 
in 1905 Ley left for Cape Tmm without hiG wife, because he could not afford 
her fare, and al.so bec�use he could move more easily alone around the 
country from one job to onother. The arrangement wes that he would .send 
for his wife as soon as he could afford her fare. 1'he hapless ?1rs Ley had 
to wait until 1910; and by 1909 Ley had settled in Pretoria. \./here he had 
worked between his return to the Cupe late in 1905 and 1909 was not clear. 
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One wi tncss did state thut he h;;;,.d s.?-en Ley freq_uently in Cape Town 
durj_nc 1905-6. 
'rhe cr:i.tic/;JJ_· i68Ue wat, LcJ' .s demi cile at. the time of his marricl.SG, GO 
that Uw matrimonial proprietary re'girne could be established. 
On the score of the relinquishment o.f the English domicile of origin, Centlivres . 
198)
CJ, delivering the juclr;ment of the court, said: 
• .•• [I] t i1., cle�,u- on aJ.l the e.vi<lence that at no time after leaving
F.:Ugland for South J;frica in <January 190.3 did Ley contemplate returning 
to England for the purpose of remaining there. \·/hen he left England in
1903 he intended to abandon his Ene;lish domicile ir-rcvocably and to settle
in South Africa and the on1y question is whether he _in fa.ct acquired a
domicile of choice in the Cape- Colony. 1 
A. si111ilar deciGion should hc.i.ve been but was not reached on the facts of another
em-lier leading case on. domicile, espcciru_ly the domicile of' choice, Johnson v 
199) 
Johrn:;oE, where again the · crucial question was the aocertotinment of the domicile of 
the pr6,;,o::dtus at the t:i.me of m.B marriage in order to settle the lo_w govcrnins its 
p;t'oprietary consequences;
In 1879, ot the ag1; of 12, Johnson rau a.way from Sweqcn, his native 
country of domicile, and. became a cabin-boy on a Bhip. J<'or short periods
at the B.ges of 13 1>ncl 16 he visited his home in Sweden. From the e,ge of 
16 to 21 he first l·JOrkcd in a coal mine i.n Scotland ar11.l thereafter became 
a sailor once more, visiting the United States for the first time at the
age of 19. ',lh'cm 21 yer:,rs of age he ;,, ent to Swnden to qualify for h:i.G 
master's and captain's certificates; which hi� gai11ed two years later. He 
then obta:i.ned employment in the State of Nel:! Jersey, in the United St.ates, 
where he took up residence in a flat. A year later he 1�rote to the fut!lre 
11.rs Johntwn a.sking her to corne to America w:L th ci. view to eventual ma.Lrirnony. 
She arrived in NovGmber l.891. 'J!he couple married in the State of Ne,v ·
York in June 1892. In January that ye;rr Johnson had made u declaration
to become a naturru.i:,,ed citizen of the Un::i.ted States. Some six week.s 
after ·his. marriage Jor.:nson met with an accident, lo.st his job in New ,Jersey 
and left thnt State, never to return to it. J\t the tirnc of hi6 marrj.age
he I would have gone any�1here in .A.'Ylerica to improve his prospects 1• 200) 
Whil� Stratford JI\., the sole dissenticnt member of the cou.rt, had li ttlc tlifficul t·-; 
in concluding that Johnson had proved that he had lost his Swedish domicile of ori2,"ii/-Ol) 
and considered that the only real problem was whether he had acquired a domicile of 
choice in New Jersey at the time of the marriage2,
0
1:.\1e majority decided that he hcd not
established that his domicile of orie;in was not .still operative. Their reasonin[;
can hardly be considered satisfactory. De Villiers CtT
?
,it is true, expressed difficulty 
iu believing that at the date of marriage Johnson '_had mt�de up his mincl to m1-:.ke his 
203) . 
permanent home in America 1 • The evidence und his letters showed he had alW.:lYS b;;en 
204) . 205) 
and still was attached to Sweden. The lem-ned judge then e.sked: 'Do these facts
clearly prove that he had decided to remain permanently in Jersey City? The case y/ould 
have been much stronger if it had been possible for him, which it wa5 not 1 to obtain a 
domicile in the United States of PJJle1·ica. 1 This fatally :-reakens the previous conclusion 
of the retention of' mentc1l links with Sweden. F'or the fact that the establishment of 
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a domicile in the United States as a whole would not have been enough to fix the 
area of domicile to settle the law governing the ma.tri.moniel J>ropri.etary regime can 
hardly t:..ffect the resolution of the questi.on of the abn:ndonment of the S\,ed:i.Gh · 
106)
domicile.· That seems clea:dy to have been established on a bal.r.:nce of prob;;bilities 
and the court should then have had to put i ta mind to tlw issue considered vital by 
Stratford JA. 
207)
2013) 
'l.'hc latest Appellate Division decision, � v f�1on, wns really concernecl, with 
an aller::;ed abandonment of a domicile of choice in IErael � but it was of a type that 
has beP.n called a 1 \,ell-settled domicile of choice I and there a similar reluctm1ce to 
find. abandonment is shown. On the· facts, which.do not lend themt.:ielve.s kindly to 
simple statement 1 the majorj_ty three judges of appeal could not find 'proved that the 
de cuiu.s had a.t· the r�levant time a fixed and cl.eliberate intention to abandon his 
- . 209) 
previous domicile.'. Tb.er� are; however, two. striking f.,tatemcmts iri the dissenting 
. 21.0) 
judgments that expross what .is believed to be the correct view. Hump ff JA Gs:tid that 
there was no need. for . 1 a desire to turn om,• s back on the country of origin or to sever 
all connections with that country or a de.stre never to return there 1 • And Wil1iwnson 
JA 2kJ{a that I the inq_uiry does no:t involve •.• a sc:r.upulous and solicitous investigation 
as to 11h0the:r perho.ps in the Juture he might _not in certain circur1mtances decide to 
remove h:i.:3 permanent home to Israel'. 
Cn the associated qiatter of the meaning of a;.--iirimB manendi Williamso n Jf. 
considered that Ii t has become desirable to check th;:� cour,se which our courts h:..we 
been taking in regard to the development of this topic� fl.re we to continue to ta};:e 
the course plotted, for instance, by the Houf3e of Lo:.cdc i.n the case of '.iinan� v 
Attorne:y-General [1901+ J AC 28?: •• ?' Equally the question ca.Tl be posed in relation 
to loss of the domicile of origin - the animus non revertendi. 
- · An examination• of Wina..-i::; -that hc:ts had· so baneful an effect in this country also
on the judicial formulation of nnimus monendi, is now called ·for� . .· 
. . . . . . · , on;,he. cpmplet_ion of ,his educationBorn in l 8 23 in the D ni te d ,'}ta tes, W.1.nan,� was in business taere 
continuousl;r to 1850. Hter that he e.pparently never sG:,1 the country· 
again. For the foll.O\dng nine years he was resident -in Russia, employed 
by the Government there to equip railWrtJS a.rid IMi.ke �1.n1boats in antici­
pation of the Crime,m War ?,_gainst England.  'l'here. he married _a Bri ti�h 
subject. On his doctor-' s advice in 1860 · he began to winter in F,nclru1d 
for his heal th I s sake� For the next decade he· sncnt four months of the 
winter in Brighton 1 where he ha.d hired two ho1.1.se; · that he joined structur­
ally, �..nd the rest of the year iu Russia. From 1870 to 1883 he spent 
ovel' half the year in Imglc.nd or Sc6tlai1d and the balcince in Russia 2nd 
Germany • .From 1883 to 1893 his yetu: was divided between England, Scol:.land 
and Germa..'1y. The l�st four. years of his life he lived entirely in England. 
'I'he manner of his residence for the. last 37 years of hfo life pointed strongly 
to the acquisition of a domicile of choice in :England. 'l'here was no hesitation en the 
212) 
. 
part of five judges in the lower courts in arrivinE; at this conclusion. Nor was
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Lord Lindley, the dissenting 1 a�, 1-ord, in any doubL ''IVhere was Hr Winans' home -
his sett.led permanent home? He had one .md only one, and that one was in this 
country; cmd long before he diod I ,am satisfied. th.at he had Lri.ven up all serious 
idea of returning to his native country. He wns an American citizen permanently 
213)
settled in thin country. 1 
Lord Macnaµ,;hten '-"as not so satisfied. Aft�r warning himself, as we have seen, 
of the 11eed to look closely at the nature of residence in the!'3e cosmopol·itt:ill days, 
he found no direct evidence of \•/in ans' .s intention.· Thus he felt compelled to a careful 
dissection of W:i.nans 1 s modo of life, his projec-ts and his hopes. In the lapidary 
style for which he is justly famed, Lo.rd Hacnaghteu found that the deceased had hud 
.three aims. · The first _was the care of his health. 'He nursed 8.nd tended it with 
wonderful devotion. . He tool,;: his temper1:!.ture several times a dey. He h::Jd regular U.mt>s 
for taking hin teriiperature and l'egular times for taking his various waters end medi;.. 
2l/i) .. 
cines. 1 This ,of course, did not signify. 'i'he second· t'ias the construction of Bpindle-
shapcd boats, c_alled I cigar-ships 1, which would not pitch or roll, wciultl _restore to 
.the United States the world's c�.rryini:; trade cmd insure her a.gain.st loss in a naval 
.engagement with .Britain. On this project very L:u·ge sums were r-;pent right up to his 
death.· The third ,'1as the acq�isition of a property in Baltimore for the con­
struction of these ships e.nd in which '.•!i.nans would dwell as supervisor of .the scheme. 
That property he secured only in the dyins days of his life and that was why he had 
not moved bad: to the United State.s. Lord !"lagnaghtcn was 1un.;.ble to come to the 
conclusion that l•:r Winans ever formed a fixed· and sett1ed purpose of abandoning hie 
.American domicil and scttJ.j_ng finally in lJigland. I think that up to the veq• last 
he had an expectation or hope of returning to America and seeing his grand schemes 
215) 
inaugurated.' But why did this m.m, of wealth beyond the dreams of avarice, never 
return to his beloved land of birth? 
. . as
S�nce Lord HalBbury in.a typical laconic 
speech announced simply that/he could not infer \�inans's intention from the evidence,
the Crown.had not proved a change of domicile of origin, in fact Lord Macnaghten's 
views established the la•� of bngland.. Winons' 5 visfono.ry optimism wao allowed to
prevail over the facts oi' his life, and the course vrn.s finally set for future exam:Lr:a.-
tion in great detail 1 at heavy expense, of every trivial detail in a. man I s life to 216) 
establish his true intention, with all the concomitant uncertainty for leeal advisers. 
In the words of Cheshirl;
7
Jhich apply equally to loss of a domicile as to its acquisi-
tion, 'one of the defects of English law is that the evidence adduced in a disputed 
case of domicile is often both voluminous and difficult to assess. This is due to 
the over-scrupulous manner in which the court5 attempt to discover a man's-exact 
intention. The tendency is to investigate his actual state of mind, rather th,m to 
rest content with the natural inference of his long-continued residence in a given 
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218)
An even horsher reception has met the unanimous decision of the House of Lords 
in ED.msay v L.-i.ve:r-pool Roya]. Infirm�u-],
19
J1uch fortunately docG not appear to have had
an ir!lpact on our court.5. It is worth ,malysis aa a warning. 
George Bowif..:-, a work-shy .Scotsman of 'inert character', i�as born in 
GL;s(;Ot·J in 18L15, his domicile of orj_gin being in Scotlroid. Up to the 
a5e ·of .3? he w,::..s employed as a commerd.ld traveJ.J.er, but work did not 
app<::a1 to him, and he did not perform it for the rest of the �5 yef.rs 
of his life. In 1892 h� went. to Liverpool to live on the bounty of 
his brother. On the latter's death in 1912 Bowie moved into his houE;a, 
and there he re Bided, a sister steyin13 1�i th him up to 1920, when she 
died, u:i,til hi1:, death in 1927. 
'fhirty-six years continuous existence in Encland immediately before his demise 
wa.8 not enough to secure for Boviie the loss of his <lond.cile of origin in Scotland; 
not the facts that he hcid not set foot in that country for the whole period,· had .said 
on. several occa.B:Lons that he refused to do BO, hnd declined to attend his mother I s 
funeral there and had arra.nged for his own burial in Liverpool. On the positive side 
tht�re wa.s only an oft-repeated statement that he \-1as proud to be a Glaswegian and 
that he had left a holograph will, vaJ.id in form according to .Scots lm.r if' that wa.s 
the lex ul timi dornicilii but not by Enclish law,by which he had bequeathed the bulk of his 
o.ssets to certain infirmarien in Glasgow and which concluded 'These infirmary legacies
( to be anamous [sic] 1 s,w a Glasgow r:wn)'. But to quote Lloyd- JoneB J in the recent-- �220) 
ca.se of '.l'urc-zak v 'l\l�ak, of another: Eropositus, his 'lachrymose and nostalgic referen•-
ces to his native country [wc�re] ••• purely tran,sient'. It is almost with a sense of 
disbelief that one reads in th0 speech of the Scottish lord of appeal in ordini,,ry, Lord
22l) 
Macmillan: 'I doubt if there was ever a case in which the court has been asked to 
infer the acquisition of a domicil of choice from such fJlender evidence of intention 
as is relied on in this case.' 
t1hy was Bowie held not to have lost his Scottish law: of domicile? In essence 
not because he had cmy real desire to return home - that silllJJlY could not be said -
but negatively, heca,use the reason for his remaining in Englan.d was that his source 
of supply came from there. Motive was fillowed to distort intention. On the facts, 
it was as strong on il1ustration of animus non revertendi as could be loo·ked for. 
There was not even a vae;uc wish to return. And. a I fond hope'. or,· in Sto:ry I s wordr:;, 
. 222) 
a' floating intention 1, as o}friosed to a I definite intention 1 to go back,' ought not to 4 
. 223) , . 
be sufficient to justify retention of the domicil-e of oriein .•• 1• By 1 fond hope 1
is meant something that does not square with the facts of a man's life that point to 
his acquisition of a domicile of choice in a foreign country. There has been a string 
of United Kingdom cases, mostly Irish (is it signifl.cant that the Irish emigrated in 
such large numbers from their inhospits.ble land frcm the (7'cat famine of the late 
224) 
J.81tOs?)1 that give the correct guidance. Doucet v Geoghegan appears to be first of 
these: 
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A rlc.l.fJ born in France 1 his country of domicile of origin. He lived 
there until t1w age of ·27 t wh(m he went as a hosie:r to England, where 
he mr,rried twice, and made hJs will i.n English form. On numerous 
occasions, ho'lrnver, 11e had stt1ted that he intended to return to. }ranee 
when ·he had made his fortune. 
It wa.s held th2,t A had lost his domtciJ.e of origin in 1''.ran.ce and acquired a domicile 
of choice in Ene;lmid. 
'He is reported to have t,uid, that when he had made his fortune he 
would e;o back to £'.£.��- A man who suys that i.s J.ike a mar1 trho expects 
ta reach the horizon.... Nothing c1:,.n be -imagined more indefinite than 
such doclarations. They c�mnot oub1eigh the factn of the tei:;tntor I s 
life.' 225) 
- . 226) 
ri:he Irish case of DaviB v Adair 1s an �vcn L1orc striking illuctration of w·hat 
is conceived to be the true a1iproach; whi. ch will achieve the renl _purpose of domicile, 
namely, the close a..o;sociation of a proposi tus with a. law district. It p<:i.sses the 
test we1  set by an i\rnerican judge, did he I identify himself w.i th the commuuity? 1 
227)
The de cujus left Bng-ltmd for the United Statw ut the age of 2.5, and. 
reroaincd there until his death 40 years later. He twice mri.rried /1.mericn.n 
women. At ;Jll times, however, he refused to be a United Stoter3 citizen. 
He hNd bought property in that country, but some years before his de.1th 
sold mo.st of it. Two years before hie; death he bought a prO}Je.rty in 
England. Often he had expre.ssed the desi1�e of returning to Eng.land. 
�- It wns hdd that ho had lost his Fng,:li.sh domicile of origin. 
This is the attitude that should be taken by .our courts, t-,s. it wae by Stratford 
228) 
JA in Job.nson� The animu::, 1:1imendi is 1 not merely that latent intention which prettv 
229) 
cencn,J.ly exists a..s a sort of natur1:1J. feeling of 11ponting for his native home 111 * 
Further aspects o:f. the question will be discussed in the unnJ.ysis of the loss of a 
domicile of choice. 
1herc are BTatifying dicta indi�ating that South Afric<-m judges do not lo0k 
unsympathetically at an al.legation of a loss of doIBicilc :i.n one area of the Republic 
coupled w-i th its repla.ceruent by a domicile of choiCf? in another urea of the State. 
A� e:irlv as the beginning of t_he century, before even the emergence of Union, Eason J 
said�
3
P�ere in South Africa - a new country - where circumstances alter very rapid.ly1 
the stronf; presumption a.sainst a change of domicile which W<'.{S demanded by the circum-· 
stances of prior -periods aTJ.d different countries, does not exist to· ari.ything like the 
same extent, It is a mutt.er of common knowledge that :in South Africa a man readily 
moves his home from one Sta.te to another, and <luring even a comparatively limited 
231)
period may have acquired several domiciles.' In the words of De Villiers AJA� 
1 • • •  when the competitioli is between t\'/o · domiciles, both within the a..rnbit of one and
the.same kingdom or countl'y, the presumption in favour of the retention of the 
domicile of origin is less strong than when one 9f the two is a1together foreigc ••• 1• 
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A domicile o� choice is acquired by rm 
i.nde:pcndent person \1ith capacity to acquire it, a:nimo et facto, that is by actu.al
. . l 
. .., . 23 2) 
-·-·-. 
--
. . 
l 
.,, . . 
lawful residence couplHrl Wl. th t 10 a .. '1.J.mus mernmu1.. As ,,nth u donaci e o.i: on.gin,
it is l.or;t only if both f,,ctum imd-r;.��::---:�; to exist f 33,flms a person mnJ be 
absent from his domic:i.le of choice, yet. so long ns he rcte.:i.nz the m1imus r-evcrtendj_, 
in the hyperbolic phrase, 1 ctinrn oer mi11e mmos 1 ;1�d has not lost ·;1is prio��!�;nicile. 
. lpst 
· 
Conversely, even though he ha.sf the eni:ms rn1:1.nen di he rotci.ns his dord.cile oo long 
. 235) 236)
as he :retains h:i.s residence. He_ muct be without resiuence · animo non revertendi. 
Acquisition of a domicile of choice is proved on a b.:u.llilc�, o:f probab:i.liti:s,
237
) 
,...-·· . . · 238) ...
the or.us of proof beint; on· him who aJ.leges a. chrmgo fr.om the� previous do,r,1.ciJ.e . 
239) 
�J1ere is said to be a presuir1 1tion a[;ainst a c:h:mge of the domicile of choice, 
difficult to rebut, thougb, as vii th the domicile of orJ.E;J.u, eQ.sier. with competition
240) 
between two alleged domiciles in th,,, same 1,olitical unit, particul:=1:r-ly so, il. \•.'ould 
7.40 
_i:;eem, where the one alleged to h!J.Ve been. a.cq_uired 'tlas the domicile of origin. 
The acquisi t:ion of H domicile of choice presupposes the loss of a 1,rcvi<.1us 
domicile, which may be a domicile of choice, a domicile of origin or a domicile 
which a formerly dependent person has not lost an:i.mo et facto on becoming .independent. 
'l'he reluctance of the courts to find an c1bnndonment th2,t was observed in the .,maly.sia 
of the domicile of origin is repeated, though perhaps not to the same degTee, \1i th 
242)
a domicile of choice, in particular a 'well-established I one� •stronger evidenci; is 
generolly required to establ:i.sh a change from a domicile of origin than from a 
domicile of choice 11 said Hil;Lin ,J in Lewis v �€:3tbut there ca.'1 h.;-:i.rdly- be much 
difference between a dom.i.cile of origin and a domicile of choice which endured so 
long and became so firmly established as the defendant I s 'tii twa tersri;JJ.1d domicile. 1 
What was said of the loss of 0 domicile of origin applie�� mu ta tis mutondis. here. 
One dictum goes beyond the high-�;,ater mark and causes a flood that drm-m3 the 
pre.sent domicile. It fell frorr. l•J'ur:-ray J in Mason G01� v Estate Naso.u Gornoi::: 
2114
)
1 ['l']here must be proof of the deJciberate e.nd perm,ment abandonment 
of the settlm:ient.. •• It must be shown positively ••• that when 
lea vine the- country of the domicile of choice or at some point_ of 
time thereafter the indi vi-duol formed the def:ini te intention of 
never returning thereto for the purpose of again making his home 
and settling there. 1 
The wor-d 'permanent' in the first sentence is undesirable, but it can be 
given a limited rne::min6, as will be seen in the discussion of animus manendi. From 
that discussion 1 however, and from what was saj_j of the loss of the domicile of origin, 
it will appear that the word 'never' towardG the end of the second 5fmtence is 
245) · . 246� unacceptable. Better is the subsequent state.men t of the 1-earned judge: It bas not 
been prov1;:d tl';at he definitely decided not to return to the 1'ransvnal as his 
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permanent home.'· 1 Animus non revcrtendi I must not be given too drastic a 
connotation or else no one will be able to lose his domicile. 
· Even at this -stage, however, be,fore one actual_ly comes to c1nirnus manendi,
one has to strugg.le with the J.anguage used· by the court to get precision in tr.e
expression of their views. The·resolutiori of the various dicta striving to achieve 
clarity calls for the gifts of a genius in linguistics� i-.t lawyer-like Noam Chomsky, and' ·. 
247) 
of which the wri tei- i,s entirely devoid. In Ley v !:,_�y 1_,s Executorr-; the court ·cited. 
248)
with approval the well-known dictum of Bramwell B in J\.ttorney-General v Pot tinge:i:_. 
The question wus whether Sir Henry Pottinger, born in Ireland, but who had lived. 
for many years ili India, · had <lied domiciled in England. . Bramwell i3 conceded that 
he contemplated the posr:.;ibili ty of returning to India; however, he dismissed it: 
1 But is it to - be said that a contingent intention of that kind 
defeats the intention \✓hich is necessary to accompany the factum 
in order to establish a domicile? Most aic:suredly not. There iG 
not a man who has not . contingent intentions to· do something that 
would be very much to his benefit if the occasion .,rises. But if 
every .such intention or e>..--prest1ion of opinion J)revented a man having 
a fixed domicile, no mfill would ever have a domicile at all except his 
domicile of origin.' 
In Ley the application of these words· to the lo Gs of a domicile· did no:t e_rise 
for, as hfis been seen, the c ourt concluded that the ;.;ror,ositus in leaving England in 
J�uary 1903 had _1 intended to abandon his English domicile irrevocably and to Gettle 
in South Africa' and at no time thereafter did he 'contemplate returnine to England . 
249) 
for the r,urpo.se of remai.ning there'. But Bramwell B's words did come up for cor1sidera.-
t. · . 1:•·J •�·1 
iso)Th · ·t . 'd th t th b th . ,. 1.on in ,:,J ... on v .t'...L.on.. ere again i is .sa1- a· ere can· e e animus manen�a.
although the E_ropositus has not .1 excluded from his mind all possibility that in 
· · 251). -
future he might leave the couI!try 1 and even though 1 it :i.s contingent upon an unforr:,-
. - - · 252) 
seen [sic] event'. This can only mean that there can be a loss of the previous
domicile even though the de cuius is of a mind that he might return to it on the 
happening of a vague possibility. 1 A contemplation of any certain or foreseellble 
[.sic] future event', said Potgieter A}j��n the occurrence of which residence in.· 
. . 254) · · . . . .  
that [sc the new] country would cease, excludes such an intention [animus manenci.i]. 1 
As· the problem is o0 intimately bound up with the acquisition of the animus manendi, 
further discussion must be postponed. _Provisionally, however, one may conclude that 
the prev-iou.s domicile - 1-rhatever type it be - is abandoned even if. the nropositus 
intends going back to it on the chance happening of an unrealistic event, such es 
255) · . -winning the I jackpot' on the hor.se-raceo and collecb.ng at least R200 000 in winnings
or, as was seen in the discussion -of the loss of the domicil� of origin, making a 
fortune when he is ·working as an artisan o;r is eking out a living a.5 a small shop- . 
. 2.56) .. · 
keeper. In Howard v Howard the court held that H .had ac·quired a domicile of choice 
in Rhodesia, al though it found that he had thoughts 'at times of stress to 
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escape from the_ strife and burdens of life to a place of peace and tranquillity 1 
and retu_rn to Australia and buy a boat in which he would_ rorun the world. ' -'l'his 
type of wishful thinking does not ••• affect the evidence that he had decided to 
257) .
make Rhodesia his home;' Xt is abandon_ed, 1 too, if his attitude is that he might
decide fo go back on the hap1)ening of a realistic event, such o.S the death of his
father in -the previous domicile and the family business there then requiring his
services. But it is not abandoned, according to -the case law, if he· actually intends
going back on the hapt>ening of a realistic .event, even though its likelihood is remote.--
258) - . _ 
This is_what happened in 0 1 Mant v O'Nant which,_ however unpalatable a nev-our tri-e 
decision leaves in the mouth of one seeking for ,� J.egal solution that smacks of 
do.m-to-ear-th common sense, must be considered as corr-ectly decided: 
O's drimicil� of origin· was in South Africa t where he was born t but 
it wa.s · riot in the area of. _the cou rt, the Witwatersrand Local Di visiono 
In 193l� he settled in that area. At the beginning of 19L1-6, up to �,hich 
time he had spent all his ·years in South Africa, he decided that he 
could r10 longer tolerate living with his 1·life and made up his mind to 
em igrate in order to leave h�r. He �ent to Southern Rhodesia in January 
1946 • having received a permit admitting him as a permnnent resident, 
and took up emplQyment of a permanent nature in Bulawayo, His wife 
having traced hiir1 there, 0 left his job and went ·to.Salisbury, where he 
found other-employment. Some time later he went to Durban - whether to 
avoid his wife or on a holiday visit is not clear. Aftet' 0 had- stayed. six
weeks his �:ife located him_ there, whereupon he immediately decided to 
-return to Southern Rhodesia. He obtained Government employment; of a
temporary nature but with the prospect of its becoming permanent -
actually, he was considering a permanent position that had been offered
to him. 0 stated that he had a complete desir� aiid intention to continue
re.sid:i.ng in Southern Rhodesia. The court found, however, that the
probabilities were 'that th� intention.· of the - respondent to · u ve for· ever
in Rhodesia was subject to the qualification that his wife must be no­
where near him, and always at the- back of his mind he seems to have had
the intention that if° she did follow him he.· would be prepared to leave
any country to which he h�d gone'. 259)
O'Mant, who, like the_ protagonist in Fr_ancis Thompson's The Hound of Heaven, 
was prepared .in order to avoid his wife to lead an existence fleeing_· •down the 
arches of-the years •• ." /Across the margent of the world ••• ', was held by Clayden J 
not to have acquired a domicile of choice in Rhodesia and to have st:ill ret�ned 
his Witwatersrruid domicile of choice. It appears from the - judgment, which is· not 
at aJJ. specific on the point, that the court did not· find that the Witwatersrand 
domicile of choice had been abandoned and that, because no new domicile of choice 
had been acquired, t he old one must be taken bya fiction to continue .- .On th.e con­
trary, the -ratio seems to ·be that the ·(-litwatersrand domicile had not been abandoned. 
That can only have been on the ground tha.t if necessi i;;y drove O would have been 
> 
p:repared to returi1 to the_ Witwatersrand to avoid hi� wife. 
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The case shows how frequently the question-of the existence of the animus
non revertendi is wrapped up with the ·question of the acquisition of the animus 
. . 
manendi, for both may depend on the same factual situation. Occasio11ally, however, 
as happened with the loss of the domicile of origin in Lev's case, it may be clear 
that the domicile of choice has been abandoned and the problem maJ revolve purely 
around the animus manendi in the alleged new country of domicile of choice. 
(b) The factual element - residence. 1 Residence I has not the techn.ical 
meaning attached to it in the other bra.�ches of law such as the law of jurisdiction. 
· . 260) 
It signifies habitual lawful physical presence, not merely casually or as a traveller. 
No minimuro period of presence must be satisfied before a ·domicile 0£ choice_ can be 
- 261) -
acquired. On the other hand, residence, no matter for how long, does not lead to 
262) 
the acquisition of· a domicile of choice in the absence of the animus mnnendi. · The 
263) 
.Roman law - rule of. ten years I residence in certain circumstanQ,_es producing automatically 
. 264). . 
. a new domicile of choice did not apply in Roman-Dutch times and certainly does not 
�pply in modern law. The length of the residence, however, may be material in deciding 
. _ ,265) whether there is an animus manendi. 1 Residence_ in a country is important as a ground 
from which to infer intention, but is not 1 however long continued, a conclusive proof 
_ 266) · 
[ 
., 
of domicile.' _ Again, 1 iJn the absence of any circumstances to the contrary ;i.t is 
not an unreasoni;.ble inference that if a man has lived for a long time_ in a particular 
country he intends.to go on living there. And the longer the residence continues 
267} . - -
the stronger ••• the inference becomes. t But all will depend on the circumstances_.
Even very long continued l'esidence may not yield a domicile, for 1 the residence must 
_ 268) 
answer a qualitative as well as a quantitative test'. 
The residence must be that of the de cujus personally. It cannot be of a 
vicarious nature. A husband is unable to acquire a domicile through the residence 
- - 269)
· - _ 
· 
of his wife alone. _ Further 1 there must be an actual taking up of 'permanent' 
. . • _ - 270)
residence in pursuance of the animus. - In Jooste v Jooste the defendant, whose. 
domicile of origin was in the Transvaal, was held to have acquired a domicile of 
choice in Natal. Some years later he made up his mind to settle in the Transvaal 
again. It was held that his temporary appearances there were not enough - for him to -
271) -
lose his Natal domicile, for, as Selke J said, 'at this time he was residing in
Natal, and remained physically present here ••• at all times save on the occasion
or occasions on which he went to the Transvaal solely for the temporary purposes
of visitingt or of taking his belongings t or of fetching plaintiff [his wife] and the
child to Natal. It seems clear that he never went there to begin his permanent
residence, for at all relevant times he had his timber-cutting contracts still running
in Natal, and these nece.ssi tated his return to attend to .them and carry them on •• �.
It strikes me as bein g, at the most, conduct preparatory to his taking up residence
there.•
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On the other �d, the moment such 1 perinanent 1 residence has been taken up 
272) 
in pursuance of the animus a domicile is acquired and it does not signify· that almost 
immediately thereafter the pronositus left his new domicile for a temporary purpose. . 
273) 
'l"his may be illustrated by a· cel.ebrated. American decision, � v Tennant: · 
There was a family farm, part in West Virginia - the home farm - and 
part in Fenn.syl vania, hitherto let. W, previously farming on his 01-m 
elsewhere in West Virginia 1 sold his farm there and arranged with his
family to · talce over the Peru1syl vania part of the farn.i.ly farm. He moved 
with his wife. and household g�ods into the house there. The sa�e evening, 
the bouse proving damp and his wife feeling ill, It/ and Mrs W. went to 
spend the night with the family in the mansion house on the home farm, 
intendi� to return to the Pennsylvanian farm house the next morning. 
In-fact W did not do so  as he had to look after his ill wife, though he 
did go daily to that farm in order to feed his stock. . A fortnight later 
W him6elf took ill and died in the mansion house. His last domicile was 
held to be in Pennsylvania, the court finding he had settled in the 
farm house there. 
Of course, it does not follow that the concurrence of the two elements, factum 
and animus, to produce a domicile of choice necessitates both having come into exis­
tence at the same time. Coincidence is requisite but not contemporaneity in origin. 
Whereas nn emigrant from England to South Africa may formulate an intention to settle 
here before he is physically able to acquire a residence by setting foot on the soil 
of this country, a political refugee may well acquire a residence _before he acquires 
274) 275) 
the animus manendi. ln Story 1 s words, an 'intention of permanent residence may often 
be ingrafted upon an inhabitancy originally taken for :a special or fugitive purpose'. 
Williamson JA stated the possibility in a striking passage in his dissenting judgment 
276) 
in Eilon v Eilon:. --
'I can find nothing strange or -0dd in the respondent's coming to so 
like the C�e and his-mode.and conditions of life there that, like 
many another before and since, he gradually became enamoured of it. 
Is it not, after all, that Cape of which. Sir Francis Drake wrote, in 
1580 1 11i t is the. most stately thing and the fairest Cape we saw· in 
the whole circumfere_nce of ·the earth" (Richard Hackluyt English VoJages 
of Discovery vol 8 p 74)? 
. 'It is not required, nor is it 
date a leyman should come to-a 
abandon his previous dooicile. 
subconscious development of the 
that ."thi.s place is my. home and 
i t11 • •· 
to be expected, that at _some particular 
fixed and settled intention to st� and 
It is· usually an almost unperceived or 
mind, culminating in the general attitude 
I have no present intention of leaving 
(c) The mental element - animus manendi. .This requirement, ·for the analysis
of which so• many mental gyrations and contortions are c _alled for, should ,strici;ly 
speaking, be examined separately from the residential requirement, but· in practice 
f'or evidentiary reasons it is frequently impossible to keep the two apart •. · More­
over, as has been shown, the. determination of the existence of the animus manendi is 
very often bound-up with the logically anterior query, whether the previous domicile 
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has been lost. 
If an allegation is made of the existence of a domicile of choice at a 
particular time, such as the institution of divorce proceedings, it is not strictly 
necessary to show the animus at that time; if it can be proved that it and residence 
coexisted previously, and the residence remains, then the domicile of choice will 
. 277) 
have continued, not having been lost animo et facto. 
A layman would be an 
278) 
exceptional person �rere he to know the· technical meaning of that concept. What then, 
The intention is not that of acquiring a domi.cile. 
is meant by the animus maneridi2 The starting point is the famous passag� in 
Justinian's Code 10.40(39).7:
••• in eodem loco singulos habere domicilium non ambig:i.tur 1 ubi 
auis larem rerumcue ac for tuna.rum suarum surrnnam cons ti tui t, · unde 
rursus non sit discessurus, si nihil avocet, unde cum profectus 
est, peregrinari videtur 1 auod si rediit, pereuinari iam destitit. 1 
This definition, stressinr; the negative side of the intention, is repeated 
· 280) ;281) . 
almo5t word for word in passages in Vinnius, J Voet (5.1.92) tmd other civil-law
writers�
8
7t1sewhere (5.1.94) Voet put it more succinctly; (run oaj 
;) 
279) 
--➔) 1 • • •  proprie dictum domicilium est 1 ouod quis sibi constituit animo inde 
1ITT 
non discedendi, si non aliud avocet. 1 Similar passages are found in Van Leeuwen's
284) · 285)
Censura Forensis and Schrassert I s Consul tatien. 
Some definitions are couched in apparently extreme positive terms. Voet 5.1.98 
286
says a domicile of choice cannot be acquired 'sine pronosito illic uernetuo rnorruidi'. 
Other writers speak in similar vein: the slightly. earlier Brunneman 1 with bis . 1 animus
. . . 287) . 2832 . 289) 290) 
ibidem permanendi 1 ·and animus 'ibi perpetuo mansurus 1 ; ;:;.chomaker and Carpzovius, 
with their 1 propositum illic per?ietuo morandi'; Schrassert, with his animus 'ibidem 
1 J 11 
perpetuo permanendi institutam 1 - like Voet, he manages., without apparently finding 
·anything untoward in it, to define domicile in terms of both the negative and positive 
aspects. Similarly one finds opinions such as 'omme aldaar voorts altijd te verblij-
1 292). · h ' h" ·t· d r·· 't' 
293t . t· f ' t ·t· ven • · -r.oenius I owever I in is posi i ve e ini ion m""""es no men ion o an in en icn
to remain for ever. He-states that a domicile.is acquired_when·a person •syn vaste 
WooninGe heeft geetabilieert, met intentie om daar te blijven 1 • 
Then· there are authors who manage, without any pretence of critical self� 
exall\inat ion 1 in one and the same breath to use both the negative tmd positive defini­
tions. Van Leeuwen, whose negatively couched passage in Censura Forensis has been
·. 294) · 
quoted, in Het Roomsch.Hollandsch Recht says: 
'Ik seg een vaste woonplaatf,, om datniet het enkel verblyven van yernand, 
het welk dikmaals maar voor een tyd. geschied .... maar- het. vaste voornemen 
om daar te_ zyu en blyven, sander ruening van wederkeren, yemands woon­
plaats maakt. •· 
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Donellus speaks of the intention 1 ut ibi perpetuo constitat, non temporis caussa: 
nisi aliquid inde a11o_cet'. 'flus type of definition is well brought out ill two 
296) 
passages in Vrornan.s I s Trac taat de faro co mneten ti, the first of which states that 
a person acquires a domicile of choice in a place in which he resides 1 met de 
weininge om. aldaar al tijd te blyven, ten sy hy door op-komende 6aken daar van da.an 
word geroepen 1 • With all these writers it may be said that the gloss they put on 
the intention to reside permanently places them in· the negative camp. That was how 
297) 
Rumpff JA read this passage of Vromruis in ��• 
Still, there remains an apparent world of difference between residence with the 
preBent intention not to depart unless something untoward befalls, and residence with 
the intention of remaining for ever. The few examples given by the Roman-Dutch . 
298) 
jurists do not clarify matters much, for, following Roman law precedent, they cite 
clear cases of the non-acquisition of a domicile of  choice I where the propositus 
obviously regarded his residence as temporary, such as the student studying in another 
299) 300) · 301) . 
country, the officer stationed abroad, the merchant overseas on a business trip, the 
· . 
politician at the seat of government, the emissary and consular official, the advocate 
303)
. · 304)
who appears elsewhere� the ·mariner on a journey to India, the woman fleeing to another. 305) 
country ta avoid a pestilence in her country of domicile •. 
The Roman-Dutch authorities can hardly be said to have distinguished them.selves 
as jurists in their analysis of animus manendi. None, it seems, used his imagination 
to think out various combinations of facts that could bring the question to a knife. 
edge. All that can be said in their favour is that they spoke in such contradictory 
or vague terlIIS as. to leave an inheri�a nce that was not damnosa 1 that could be moulded 
by- our courts into a workable, realistic and equitable set of rules as far as this 
can be achieved in so flui
.
d a sphere. Instead of seizing this opportunity, the 
306) 
Appellate Division in Johnson encoiled our judges with Lord Macnaghten•s views in 
Winans, that have proved as leech-like as the old man who twisted his legs around 
the neck of Sinbad the Sailor on his fifth voyage. 
307) 
The relevant passage of De Villiers CJ in Johnson runs thus:. 
1 ••• [I]t is sufficient for our purposes to adopt the question framed 
by- LordMacnaghten in Winans v Attorney-General [1904] AC 287 [at 292]: 
11[T]he question which your Lordships have to consider must, I think 1 be 
this: Has it been proved 1with perfect clearness and satisfaction to 
yourselves I that Mr 'n'inans had at the time of his death formed a I fixed 
and settled purpose' -.•a determination' - 'a final and deliberate 
intention' - to abandon his American domicile and settle in England? 11 
That is in accord with our own law as laid down by Voet (5.1.98} and 
others 7 who require a proposi tum illic perpetuo morandi. Voet I s :oeroetuo 
morandi brings us back to the sacpe difficulty which there is in deter­
mining what exactly constitutes a permanent home. BUt I agree with West­
lake in para 264 (Private Internatio'nal Law) when he says that as a result 
of the English cases 1'the intention necessary for acquiring a domicile of 
choice excludes.all contemplation of any event on the occurrence of which
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the residence would cease11 ;
08
�his statement satisfied the. test of 
Voe t I s pro:;-:osi tum illic perpetuo mor andi ( cf Holl ands che Consul tatien 
III(2) cons 317 (really 217)). 
'The question then which I have to put to myself in the present 
instance is the following: 11Has it been proved with perfect clearness 
and satisfaction to myself that Johnson had formed a fixed .and settled 
purpose, a determination� a final and deliberate intention to abandon· 
his Swedish domicile and settle in the State of New Jersey?'" 
The many Roman-Dutch passages setting out. the much more liberal negative test 
of a person's intending to remain resident un1ess something untoward happens to cause 
him to leave might just ru, well not have existed, so far as this passage is concerned. 
Nor was the slightest attempt made to reco�cile Voet's endorsement of this test in 
5.1.92 and 94 with his 'propositum illic perr,etuo morandi' in 5.1.98. Such unscientif­
ic an exposition of the historic. sources of law should not be allowed to hobble the 
'
courts in the future until such time as the legislature feels compelled to intervene. 
It has been seeJ
0
£lat De Villiers CJ was not satisfied that Johnson had abandoned 
310) 
his Swedish domicile of origin. He went on to hold in a passage that is apparently
obiter because it dealt with a matter that could not have affected the decision as to 
Johnson I s domicile already arrived at 1 that Johnson was not d·omiciled in New Jersey 
because he did not make it his permanent home. Had he been offered a better post 
immediately before or after marriage in the adjoining State of New York 1 he would not 
have·hesitated for·a single moment' to accept it. '••• I cannot doubt that he would 
have gone anywhere in America to improve his prospects •••• I cannot have any doubt, 
upon the evidence, that there was nothing at any time so attractive to him in the 
State of New Jersey or that his prospects in that State were of such a nature 1 that 
he had me.de up his mind to settle for good in that State.' 
Stratford JA found that Johnson had quit his Swedish domicile of o�igin, a.s 
his break with his homeland was complete except for the probable hope in his mind 
of making a fortune or accumulating a competency enabling him to return there, which 
had. to be di6regarded. Thus as far as his judgment is concerned not only is this 
pronouncement part of the ratio decidendi but also the decision that had to  be made 
whether Johnson had acquired a domicile of choice in New Jersey at the time of his 
marriage. Stratford J A did not actually state, as did De Villiers CJ�- that Johnson 
would have gone anywhere in.the United States to improve his prospects. But he 
spoke of his 'ready willingness' to be blown b;I the winds of fortune, which comes to 
· 311) · 312) 
the sarne thing. The critical passage runs: 
'As to the respondent's ambition to find a wider scope for his energies, 
that ambition surely must inspire a very great number of men in lowly 
walks of life and especially those who are sufficiently venturesome to
become emigrants.· If much im portance is attached to aspirations of this 
kind, it will be difficult to assign a domicile of choice to any emigrant 
of the working-man. type, for in the case of each of them we must assume 
a ready willingness to leave one locality for anot her which offers better· 
and more re�unerative employment. A 6 tate of mind of �hat kind, much more 
prevalent in the lowly than in the well-t.o-do 1 should not, in my view, 
avoid the acquisition of a domicile.• 
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The learned judge invoked in aid a much-quoted passage from the speech
· 313) 
of Lord i-lestbury in Udny v Udny: Domicil of choice is a conclusion or inference 
which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief 
residen:e. in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to reside there 
for an unlimited time o •• 'l'here must be a residence· ••• not for a limited period 
or particular purpose t but general and indefinite in its future contemplation.' 
B t th h . t ld f, d f . t 1 t t . Am • ' · d · t · 
314
)u oug i wou in avour l.n a eas ce r ain erican Juris J.c ions, 
Stratford JA 1 s decision, for all its air of reality, cannot be regarded as reflecting 
South African law. No subsequent decision of a trial court or the Appellate Division 
has suggested that it should be. 
The judgment of De Villiers CJ in Johnson Cal sed great difficulty to Clayden J 
315) 
in the court a quo in Ley1 s case. The learned judge held that Ley had abandoned his
domicile of origin and by the time of his marriage had settled in the Cape Colony ., 
But he had not excluded one of the other colonies of southern Africa as his eventual· 
home. 'Where opportunity best presented itself the1•e be would ha-..e gone, and in fact 
later he did so.t The nature of Ley•s intention thus did not satisfy De Villiers CJ's 
test based on �Jestloke I based on Lord Macnaghten, of excluding I all contemplation of 
any event on the occurrence of which the residence would cease'. Though Clayden J 
would have preferred to hold that an emigrant acquired a domicile where he f:i.rst 
settled, he reluctantly felt compelled to apply the rigorous test and held that Ley 
· had not acquired a. Cape domicile of choice.
The Appellate Division reversed the decision. It would appear to have rejected
Clayden J's view of the evidence that Ley was willing to go anywhere where there was
an opportunity of better work. His visits to the Orange River Colony, said Centlivres
316) 
CJ,were of a temporary nature. On a balance of probabilities it had been proved that
Ley had intended to settle (as the Appellate Division understood the meaning of that
word) in the Cape Colony. As regards the view of Clayden J that Ley had not been
shown to have excluded as his home one of the other colonies, it is not necessary·'to
prove that the de 
he might emigrate 
Baron Bramwell in 
cujus has excluded from his mind all possibility that in the future
317) the statement 
to another country'. Centlivres CJ then cited with approval/of 
· . 318) 
Attornev-General V Pottinger, already quoted, tbat a contingent 
intention cannot prevent the emergence of an animus man·endi, though he took pains to 
. · 319) 
state that there was no evidence of such a contingent intention on the evidence. Then
he had to dispose of the phrase I excludes all contemplation• used in Johnson 1 s case. 
320) · · 321)
This he did in a passage since invoked twice by the Appellate Division with approval: 
'As I understand the expression, it means that if the state of mind 
of the de cuius is something like this, "I may settle here permanently 
and anyhow I'll stay for a time; b�t· perhaps I'll move to another country" 
the intention required to establish a domicile is not present. But if 
his state of mind is like this, "I shall settle here 11 , that is enou£1l 1 
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even though it is not proved that if he had been asked 11Will you 
never move elsewhere?" ,he might not have said something like, "Well, 
never is a long day.·. Who knowEi? I might ruove if I change my mind 
or if circumstances were· to change. 11 .r,ny doubt actually present 
in his mind as to whether he will move or not will according to 
Westlake' s statement exclude the intention to settle permanently, 
but the possibility that, if the idea of a move in the future had 
been su ggested to him, he might not have at once scouted it does not 
runount to contemplation of an event on which the residence would 
cease. It is only the former that has to be disproved by the person 
alleging u change of domicile.' 
Th. f. · h - .32l) · is l ne piece of omespun prose has certainly gone some wey towards expounding
a liberal view of the requisite intention, but it has not cleared up all problems � 
_ 323) 
not that it was intended to do so._ Nor did the court advert to the negative definition 
324) 
of the old writers. '11he objection has been raised that the passage is difficult to 
reconcile with the learned Chief Justice 1 s previous statement that it is not necessary 
to prove that the de cujus excluded from his mind at the critical time that in the 
future he might emigrate to another country. The answer seems to be that the test 
of settling eil.viBaged is that of making one 1 s headquarters in the new country, to 
put down roots there, without comm itting oneself irrevocably to staying there for the 
rest of one's life. 
The latest word has been said by Potgieter AJA in delivering the majority 
- 325}
judgment in Eilon v Eilon. 'Excludes all contemplation', he repeated, •can never
mean and were never intended to meon that the de cujus has excluded from his wind ---
326) 
aJ.l possibility that in future he might leave the country.'· Contingency upon 'an 
327) 
unforeseen event• is in order. An intention to settle permanently is needed. 'A 
contemplation of any certain or foreseeable future event on  the occurrence of which 
residence in that country would cease, excludes _such an intention. If he [the 
propositus] entertains any doubt as to whether he will remain or not, intention to 
settle permanently is likewise excluded. That appears to be in accordance with our 
· 328) - - - 329) -common law-. ' The learned judge could not read Voet 5 .l. 98 or Vromans I 4 in any 
other sense. Again, the negative definitions of the old writers were not explored. 
A·respectful regret must be expressed that the chance composition of the court -
the rub of the judicial green - resulted in the judgment of Potgieter AJA being con­
curred in by Steyn CJ and Wessels JA, - leaving Williamson JA with· his more liberal views 
supported only by Rumpf! JA in_ a special concurring judgment. While �/illiamson JA 
d.id not profess to state the final word, he· did open up new vistas. The apposite
. . 3�)
passage in his judgment merits citation in exten.so:
. 'The tendency of English judges not to follow too rigidly in all 
cases the very narrow interpretation of the requirement· of pe_rmanent 
residence formulated as a result of the Winans case can be illustrated 
from a quotation from the judgment in the well�known case of Gulbenkian 
v Gulbenkian [1937] · 4 All ER 618 • •.. Langton J ••• _ at 626 · came to 
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the conclusion u . that • • • the • • • use of the word "indefinite 11 
was justified.... "In .other words, the intention mU:st be a present 
one to reside permanently, but it does not mean
.
that 6UCh intention
must necessarily be irrevocable in character. 11 
1 It is interesting to note that the legal system which most closely 
follows the English principles of private international law ,viz the 
American law, does not seem to have followed that law in its apparent 
deviation about the time of the \·Jinans case. For instance I Story -· 
Conflict of Laws ch III § 46 states his eighth rule in regard to the 
acquisition of a new dom1cil as follows: 11 If a person has actually 
removed to aTJ.other place, with an intention of remaining there for an 
indefinite time and as a place of fixed present domicil, notwithstanding 
that· he may entertain a floating intention to return at some future 
period. 11 The more modern American Restatement of the Law 1 Confllct of 
� [First] ch 2 §g_ 18-20 indicates no deperture from Story's statement. 
1 In the light of this but comparatively brief examination that it has 
been possible to give to the matter in this case and in the absence of 
full argument, it may be neither desirable nor possible to attempt to 
formulate in a completely positiire and satisfactory form the exact 
. meaning to be attributed under Roman-Dutch law to the phrasertperpetuo 
morandi II or "perpetuo mane.ndi"; but I am at any rate convinced that by 
the use of that phrase Voet neither contemplated nor anticipated the 
str.ic t and rig-ld interpretation involved in the deci�ions of the courts 
of England in such cases as Moorhouse v Lord (1863) 10 HLC [272 at] 286331)
and Winans I case. • • • I think that the phraseology used • • • by Langton 
J ••• can be accepted as doing no violence to the principles of our own 
law •. It may not solve all aspects of the problem relating to the necessary 
intention which may have arisen as a result of this court's approval of 
what I consider the unrealistic approach (and what Cheshire has· termed 
the 11aatigmatic11 approach) of the later Victorian English· judges, but in 
time we may evolve or develop the principles w1th greater clarity., •• 
I think the inquiry is whether, on a balance of probabilities, the 
appellant showed that in October 1962 the respondent then had a present 
intention to reside permanently in South Africa in the sense that he had 
no intention of limiting the period of such residence;· the inquiry does 
not involve, in my view, a scrupulous and solicitous investigation �s to 
whether perh aps in the future he might not in certain circumstances decide 
to remove his permanent home to Israer. 1 . 
The requirement to settle 'permanently I insisted on by the Appellate Division 
need not give rise to difficulty, if 1 permanent 1 is given its true signification 
as being in contrast· to 'tempore.ry1• The Sr...orter Oxford Enf,1.ish Dictionary defines 
it as • 1 as ting or designed to last indefinitely without change; enduring ;persistent; 
. . 332) 
opp. to temporary'. It has. not the meaning of perpetual, 'forever, come what may 
1 � 
The animus manendi does not mean, as Lord Chelmsford said it did in Moorhouse v Lor�;
3) 
'no other idea than to continue there, without looking forward to any event, certain 
or uncertain, which �ight induce him to change his residence'. It does not signify 
· 334) · ·. to 
what Mar tin Wolff interpreted it/signify in English law, 'animus semper manendi ••o
the will to "live and die11 in 
. 335) 
thought it did in Johnson, to
[for] ••. the rest of [one's] 
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make up one's mind_ 1 to settlt! for good to remain 
days'. In the mid-niMteenth century a Scottish judge, 
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Lord Tullerton,pointed out that 'if in o�der to constitute a domicile, there were 
required an animus remanendi so permanent a.nd .so absolute, as to be independent of 
any possible change of �ircumstances, I do not understand how, in the constant,uncer-- -
_ - 336)
tainty and transition of_ all sublunary events, a domicile ever could be establi.shed'. 337) 
As McGregor J once so aptly put it, 1 we ought not to give the word "permanent" too 
drastic, too absolu tG a connotation; man is not a prescient being and cannot predicate 
an inflexible course of life•. 
Two types of mental intention are cle�ly insufficient in modern South African 
law to constitute the animus: to remain for a fixed period, say for six months on a 
.visit to a son or daughter; - and to remain until a particular limtted purpose is 
338) 
achieved, for instance 1 the completion of a particula:r piece of work, exemplified by 
the Roman-Dutch writers in the illu strations already alluded to. It must, in the 339) 
words of I,ord Westbury in Udny v �, - 1 be a residence not for a limited period or 
particular purpose, but general and indefinite in its future contemplation'� 
According to Eilon the animus can exist despite its'contingency 1 [sc dependency] 
upon 1an unforeseen event 1 • But there must not be the determination to. cease 
residence on the happening 'of any certain or foreseeable future event 1 • Semnn tic 
troubled waters .are now encountered and it is·necessary to bear in mind what Dr AL 
Goodhart has warned against, the tendency to dissect judicial dicta with the same razor� 
sharp scalpel that is used - for the wording of statutes. Scarman J has explained 340) 
why it is difficult to reconcile the dicta. 'Naturally enough in so subjective a 
field different judicial mind.8 concerned with different factual situations have chosen 
different language to describe the law. For the law is not an abatr_action: it lives 
only in its application, and its concepts derive colour and shape from the facts of' 
the particular ease in which they are studied, and to which they are appliede Thus 
the relationship of law and fact is a two-way one: each affects the other. 1 Suffice 
it to sa::J that I foreseeable_' does not mean foreseen at the one pole nor within the 
range of being imagined on the other. The occurrence must bear some relationship to 
reality. The law as it is believed to exist at present has already been adumbrated 
in the analysis of the loss of a domicile of choice and may l_it is suggested, be put
thus: The animus manendi calls for the intention to reside, of a permanent character, 
. 341) 
in tbe sense of without limitation of time, indefinite in duration. It will exist 
even if the propositus ha5 the present intention of leaving - perhaps for the previous 
country of domicile, being that of origin or choice, or an entirely new country -
on the remote cha.nee happening of a highly uncertain event, such as his winning a 
lottery with a very large prize,· or an obscure relation of great wealth dying in a 
foreign country and instituting him as heir, or his returning to his native Prussia 
·342)
if West Germany unites again with East Germany, or hi� making a fortune despite his
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343) 
work oeing of a character to render this the dimme6t of hopes. Ex.-hyoothesi,
the animus will exist if the present intention of the propositus is that he merel y 
344)
might leave on this contingency. 
It will not exist if the pro12o
,
.situs has the present intention of leaving on
the occurrence of a feasible event,f-�uch as his being offered a more lucrative 
3li6) · 
position or making a better living, continued employment by and success of the 
b h f f · · th 
. 
t 
34 
7}h 
·
. · f ' 
. 
di . hi h b t ranc o a oreign company in e coun ry 1 us wi. e s scovering s w erea ou ·s, 
as in O'Mant, or the deuth of his brother in the domicile of origin, leaving the 
family business bereft of its guiding hand. But if his present intentiop is only 
that he might leave in such a situation the requirements for the· animus manendi 
wi'll still be satisfied • 
. The foregoing submi6sions 1 it is hoped, will have the effect that reflection 
on the meaning of animus manendi will no longer induce the conviction· that there is 
on display what the eminent jurist Rabel - with reference, admittedly, to ·
.
the 'British 
343) . 
doctrine 1 - castigated as • the prevalence of tendentious casuistry', albeit admittedly
£actual situations will always be found teetering on the edge between the one rule cir 
· . 349)
the other. 
(�) Domicile of choice of those without 'free will' to acouire orlose.adomici1e. 
Resid ence under some form of physical or mental constraint or which is precari.ous 
may not qualify as being of that voluntary natur e which allows for th e acquisition 
of an animus manendi'.
SO
)In the words of Gregorowski .r,5\ti]n order to create a new 
domicile you must not only have residence but you must have intention to remain 
permanently and indefinitely 1 and yo-iJ. must - alac have the power to carry out that 
intention'. This question arises particularl y in relation to persons in gaol 
(prisoners); members of the armed forces and others subject to compulsor y ordez-s; 
aiplomata, public servants and employees of foreign firms; immigrants, deportee6 and 
those subject to a deportation order; refugees, fugitives from justice and persons 
living abroad because of ill health. 
Prisoners. The generally· held view is that as a .
. 
pz-isoner is under legal
constraint he lacks the free will to acquire a domicile of choice and retains the 
domicile he had immediately prior to imprisonment, even though he is in gaol in another
352) . . 353) 
country. Dicey and Morris are not dogmatic, saying that this is the normal result since
even if residence can be considered to exist at the place of imprisonment, the prisoner 
is �unlikely to reside there permanently- or indefinitely-'. This explanation is of 
354) 
no help. Cheshire concludes from the English cases that 1 there is no doubt that a
prisoner, except perhaps one transported for· life, :re taina the domicil he possessed 
before his confinement'. Life tranaportation, however. is hardly- likely to. engage 
355) ·
the attention of our courts. Graveson, referring to one sentenced to gaol for life
Footnotes on pages 102, 103, 104, 105 
- 39 -
or a very long period in another country, says it is possible to 1brinB evidence 
of a resigned and settled intention on the part of the prisoner to make his home 
permanently in the new country, in which case a domicile of choice might be acquired' • · · 356) -
The majority decision in Ne11.er v Nefler, the only South African case in point, 
357) 
has been read to mean that life-long imprisonment confers domicile, but it is sub-
mitted that what the court reaJ.ly did was to assume divorce jurisdiction ad miseri­
cordim,1 w'ithout finally pronouncing on the issue of domicile. 
3513) 
The view was expressed in the sixth edition of Dicey that-there is no valid 
reason.why a prisoner cannot formulate the animus manendi and acquire a domicile of 
choice where and while he is being imprisoned. The liberal attitude taken in the 
past thirty- years by the courts to the acquisition of a domicile of choice by members 
of the armed forces and immigrants with temporp..ry residential permits gives support 
to this contention,but the proviso must be added that the propositus can continue to 
reside indefinitely after release, which would not be the case, for instance, if the 
implementation of a deportation order was simply awaiting that date or his very 
presence in the country was unlawful. The counter-argument cannot be addressed to
the animus aspect of the domicile of choice, it would appear. After all, if a 
359) 
convict can formulate the mental intention to desert his wife, there seems to be no 
reason why the attractions of the surroundings of his place of detention - sey Kroon-
stad in ,the Orange Free State as compared with his previous area of domicile -
sey P-retoria 
on his relea5e. 
- may not cause him to make up his mind to settle in the vicinity
Proof of intention could be supplied in many ways, such as his 
arranging for his family to move into a residence in the area n_pw, his purchasing - -'-rom
land there or his accepting an offer of employment there to date/the termination of 
360) 
his imprisonment. 
The argument contra t it seems, must rest on the involuntary nature of his 
. . . 361) 
present residence; and this seems to be the decisive factor in American law. But 
362) 
once it is held - as it must be - that a soldier or pol:i.cernan can acquire a domicile 
In of choice in the country in which he is stationed, the argt.1ment falls away. 
_363) 
truth the requirement of residence is satisfied by habitual lawful physical presence. 
By p?,l"ity of reasoning, a prisoner must be able to formulate the wiimus non 
revertendi to the domicile he had on entering gaol, without acquiring an animus reanendi 
in the different area in which he is confined. The court would then have to decide 
which of the two doctrines it wished to apply - the continuance of th e la.st domicile 
or the revival of the domicile of origin. 
Members of the armed forces and others subject to compulsory orders. In Roman 
law the rule appears to have been that in general a soldier acquired a domicile in 
the country in which he served, but that he might retain his previous domicile if he 
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364) 
owned immovables there or if his family resided there. But 'in view of the 
chru,ged concli tiorw of military service in mod.ern times the law of Rome is not a . 
365) 
useful guide to the law of South Africa on the point'. 
One thing is cle,;J.T about the domid.le of a member of the armed serviceB under 
conditions of serv:ice that do not allow for his re.e;ignation at will ( the latter embrac­
ing a possible pecutdary penalty):' a sold:i.ei
6
�6es not change his domicile simply by 
bein[� stationed, under h1.s GrJvernment' s orders, in a country other than his country
367) 
of origin and this .is so however long the service abroad may last•. At one time it 
was commonly claimed that a member of the armed forces, not being a free agent, that 
is, not being able voluntarily to decide on his place of residence, could not while 
such a member acquire a domicile of choice unywher e1 not where he was stationed 
because his residence there was compulsory, and not elsewhere because it was :erecariou.s, 
368) 
and that he retained his last domicile prior to entering the armed service. He 
could not even have an animus non revertendi, it appears. 
It is now settled law in South Afric11 that it is possible for a soldier, even 
in war time 1 to acquire a domicile of choice in a country in which he is not stationed. 
(The caveat must be added that the anj_mus manendi will be able lawfully to be carried 
369)
into effect.) 'i'his was established by the Appellate Division case of .Baker v Baker! 
B's marriage took place in 1936 in India, where he had served in the 
army for a number of yea:rs4 In 1938 Y:rs B went to England, and B followed 
in 1939. He then decided to resign his commission and settle in South 
Africa a.s a farmer, but · before he could take steps to this end he was 
recalled to· India, wax being imminent. His wife followed him there, but 
in 1941 went to Cape Tow-.a with all the family posse1:1sions, where she set 
up a home, and where J3 visited her for a few. weeks on leave in 1943 and 
l945. B illtended to make his home in the Cape on the termination of the 
war. At no time was he stationed in South Africa. 
It was held that B had acquired a domicile of choice in the Cape - semble, 
from 1943: 
1 During his leav� he was a free agent, enti t1ed to select and establish 
his home wherever in the world he pleased, outside the limits of enemy 
territory.••• When_ ••• he a:rrived in Cape Town he came as a settler, 
and none the less so because he knew that during the continuation of � 
hostilities he would.be obliged to be generally absent from his home. 1 J 7o) 
Baker's case has sometimes been read as authority for the proposit'ion that a 
soldier on active service can acquire a domicile in the country in which he is 
371) 
stationed. But there are not even clear-cut obiter dicta to this effect in the case. 
What can be said, however, is that there a:re statements which indicate that the 
372)
Appellate Division, when finally seised of the issue,· will come to this conclusion. 
The present position in this rega:rd, however, is not yet settled, and appears to 
differ in the v@rious divisions of the Supreme Court. 
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In the earliest Cape cases the decision was reached, though without full 
discussion of the authorities, that in principle there is nothing to prevent a 
373)
soldier acquiring a domicile of choice in the country in which he is stationed. 
· . 374) 
In Fozard v Fozard, fiowever, Gardiner J crone to tho opposite conclusion on the ground 
that a soldier is not a free agent for acquisition of a choice of a domicile, as he 
can be compelled at any time to remove from one pc:i.rt of the world to the other. But 
since then the Cape Court has come to the conviction that the earlier line of 
d . . . }75) . . . . . . . d 
d ecisions is corrcch . The pos1 tion was reviewed :u1 a convincing ju gment, base on 
principle and an analysis of the case law rather than an exploration of the old authori­
ties, of Ogilvie Thompson AJ in Nico l v Nico1.
376
)Dealing with the reasons advanced for
th d . ' . . d' )7?)-h -d d. id 
37B)e ec1s1on in Fozar s case, t e learne ju ge sa : 
'On principle the circumstance that the facturn of residence is 
liable to be terminated as the result of service orders to proceed 
elsewhere does not appear to me to be necessarily fatal to the 
acquisition of a domicile during the perio d of  service. Pending. 
any such order the servicemon intends to remain; and, should such 
order supervene, he - always postulating du·e proof - ex hypothesi 
intends to return.• 
The notorious Johnsonian dogmatism of exclusion of 'all contemplation of any 
event on the occurrence of which the residence would cease'. was •restricted to a 
contemplation of cessation of the residence by voluntary action'. This has rightly 
379) 
been applauded a.s a necessary gloss, on two grounds: first, that otherwise the concept
of domicile will become even more artificial with 0: widening gap between 'domicile' 
a:u.d 1 home' - if 1 a man has made his home in a place in the sense that he is settled 
there, with his family and goods about him, and means to stew there if he crul, the 
:eossibility of his being so able being not too remote, a sound legal policy should 
hol d him domiciled there'; and secondly, because 'destlake appeared to envisage not 
external and involuntary events but personal occurrences such as amassing a fortune 
or being restored to health. 
· . •. 380) . . 
It has also.been argued that if a soldier can acquire a domicile of choice in 
the country ir1 which he is � stationed, it follows virtual�y a fortiori that he 
can do so in the country in.which he� stationed,. for his service residence is an 
aid instead of an obstacle to the effectuation of his objective. This view can be 
supporte(4 provided in the process any notion is exorcised that the area ·of residence 
itself has to be fr.eely chosen in the sense that the 12ronositus voluntarily elected· 
originally to go there and is free to leave it at will. It has already been argued, 
in the analysis of the domicile of choice of a prisoner, that the residence require­
ment of the domicile is neutral, calling only for habitual lawful presence. The 
prospect of continuous presence in practice is much more likely in the country in 
which a soldier is stationed than in one wbich he visits only on furlough - indeed, 
Footnotes on page 106. 
the judicial attitude to the requirement of residence in pursuance of the animus 
is generous in the extreme in the last-mentioned situation. To hold that a service-
man cau acquire a domicile of choice only in the country in which he is not 6tationed 
could produce an extraordinary result. A, a serviceman, - hitherto d-.:,iniciled in 
country X t is stationed in country Y, where he buys a ho�6e in which his wife and 
children live and in which he stays when on leave. He has made up his mind to 
settle in Y.. If it is to be held that he cannot· acquire a domicile in the country 
in which he is stationed but only in a country in which he is not stationed, then 
if he is transferred to country Z without his changing his intentions as regards 
settling in Y, where his ·wife and children remain, he secures a domicile in Y as 
soon as he visit5 it on leave. -
The decision arrived at in Nicol was reached once more by the Cape Court in 
- 381) -
Ex parte ReadinGs. What makes the judgment of particular interest is that for the 
first time an attempt was - made to canvass the Roman-Dutch - writings on the subject. 
De Villiers AJ found two passages lending support to his view. The first, an 
opinion of Grotius 'dated 31 October 1613, and reported in 3 Holl. Cons. C. 196,. -
382)
deals_ specifically with the dowicile of a. soldier, one Johann van Cornput ••• 1• 
The learned acting judge is referring to what is generally known as the Rotterdamsche 
Derde -Deel of the Hollandsche Consul tatien (called by Voet I III.2 1 ). 
Now this opinion as translated by De Bruyn in his Opinions o! Grotius makes no 
allusi on to a soldier. Piercing its rather cryptic paragraphs as translated by De 
Bruyn together, what .was said was that one Johann van Cornput left his birthplace 
at Leeuwarden seventeen years before his death, carrying on in this period a partner­
ship business at Embden, but actually living in the lE-.st three yea:rs of his life with 
his family at Groningen. He did not return to his birthplace even when he 1had leave 
. to absent himself from hi.s partnership 1 • • He: was held to have - lost the domicile · at 
Leeuwarden and to have acquired one at Groning;en - not at Embden 'for although the 
business plrice of hi5 partnership was there t it was nevertheless stated that he him­
self had no residence in the place' (no 15). 
_De Villiers AJ, however, without making reference to the De Bruyn translation, 
gives the renderins that Johann van Cornput was a soldier, who did not return to his 
birthp lace even on leave, and who took up residence in Groningen 'without his company 
having been stationed there'� 
Reference to the original text shows that the translation of the learned acting 
judge· is clearly the correct one. De B
r
uyn' s error lies in his allocating the
meaning of 'partnership 1 · to the word 'Compagnie 1 . instead of the other. meaning, a 
company of soldiers. But from internal evidence the latter must be what was meant; . . 
for instance� . the phrase I want hoewel sijne Compagnie daar heeft gelegen' (no 15 of 
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the opinion) cannot really be rendered, as De Bruyn has it 1 'although the business 
place of his partnership was there', but must refer to his company of soldiers being 
quartered there.· So, too, the phrase 'ten tijde als hem by Dispensutie vry heeft 
gestaan .sich te absenteeren van sijne Compagnie 1 _ {no 3) cannot refer to his having 
1 leaye to absent himself from his partnership'. South African legal science is thus 
ipdebted to De Villiers AJ for putting an end to another long, long trail of a mis­
translation - even though, rightly going to the primary and not the secondary source, 
he was probably unaware that he did .. It will be observed, as the learned acting judge 
indeed pointed out, that thiG opinion is direct authority for the dccir:;ion in Baker I s 
case. 
363) 
The significance of the Grotius opinion in this preBent case lay in the word 
'nochtans I in the· phrase in no 15: 1 wcll'l. t hoewel sijne Compagnie daar [Embden] heef't 
-gelegen soo werd no ch tans geposeert dat hy daa.r geen woonplaats geha.den he eft. 1 
The other pas.sage quoted by De Villiers AJ was from 1 Schrasoert, Con6Ulteticn, 
384} 
Adv;ysen, Vol. 2', C. 90'. Either the typist's devil or the printer's gremlin has 
had a hand in this citation. There is, as far as is kno�m, only one edition of 
Schrassert's Consultatien, advysen en advertissementen (Hardewyck 174o-54), and there 
the passage appears in cons 94 of volume 2. It is cited in the judgment of De Villiers 
385) 
AJ and re ads : 
'Want of wel een 0fficier in de plaets van siJn guarnisoen sig·moet 
voorsien van een logement geduyrende _zyn verblijf aldaer; soo maeckt 
dog een soodanig logement danselven niet tot eon inwoondcr der Stadt 
voor soo verre - andersints een 0fficier geen gedachten hecft om daer 
altoos syn fixum domiciliuin te houden; maer behoud syn voorige woon­
plaets. • •• 1 
De Villiers AJ rightly stresses the significance of the latter part of this 
extract■ 
There is another passage in.the old writings which, being possibly even stronger 
tha.n the Schrru:,sert e xcerpt, might also have been cited. Strangely enough, it hm, not 
been mentioned in any South African decision. It is ari. 1 advys instructoir 1 , dated 
7 April 1758, in Schomaker's Selecta consilia et responsa juris VI cons 25 no 2, 
The passage reads: 
'Zqnder, dat het temporeel verblyft (waar van een Militair, 
gedurende zyn guarnizoen, zig moet voorz:ien, - en hem alleen arui 
den militairen, en niet aan de n poli tyquen Rigter van die plaatze, 
ad exemplum Glericorum, onderwerpt) ecnig nadeel aande regten 1 uit 
zyne geboorte- ofte vaderstad voortvloeyende, kan toebrengen, veel 
minder hem tot een inwoner van die Stad, buiten een gedeclareert 
voornemen van een fix.um et permanens domicilium, maken •••• t 
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The divisions which have hitherto taken the view opposite to that now held 
by the Cape Court should have no qualms in coming to the Ca.pe stnndpoint. Not 
only is there old authority in its favour, but it is supported by decisions in 
386) 387) 388) 389) . 
England, Scotland, Australia and Canada, and by leading text-writers in /111glo-
. 390) . 391) . . 
flJTierican and Scots law. Koreov�r, if the courts hold· that a 'prohibited person' 
present on a temporary residence permit can acquire a domicile of choice in the area -
and the TI·ansvaal courts certainly so hold - why .should they deny this to a serving 
member of the forces who,. if removed by orders of a superior, can have an animus 
revertendi which, unlike that of the prohibi ted person, is capable of being carried 
·into effect without the prospect of flyinz in the face of the law?
This said, it must be  acknowledged that at present not all the divisions are 
392)
of the Cape view. The Natal Cour t, since the full-bench decision in Brace v �,
has set its face against the proposition that a serviceman can acquire a domicile
. 393) in the country in which he is stationed. The High Court of Rhodesia is. in favour· 
394) ·. 
of the proposition • . The attitude of ·the Eastern Cape Division is not clear. In 
. 395}
Frankenberg y FrankenberG it was held that a member of the i.rrmed forces cannot acquire 
a domicile where he is stationed, as he cannot declare a present and binding intention 
396) . 
to settle there. On the o ther hand, in Paterson v Paterson it was held that he could 
acquire such a dcmiciJ.e. But Paterson purports to rest on Baker, which is not authority 
for such a rule. The position in the Eastern Cape Court remains uncertain. 
The Transvaal rule anpears to be that a domicile. cannot be acquired. The 
. -397) 
earlier cases to this effect were upheld by the full-bench decision of McMillan v
39S)
McMillan: 
'[T]he ••• intention [to settle] remains in abeynnce ••• and only 
becomes operative as one of the factors establishing acquisition 
of a domicile of choice, when the plaintiff is discharged and is 
no longer under disability as regards his freedom of action •••• 
A mere intention to reside perma11en tly at the proposed domicile 
effects no change of domicile until such intention is curried into 
effect by actual assumption of residence. 1 399)
-•It is submi ttecl th�t this reasoning is erroneous, and . that, as Ogilvie Thompson 
.. · 400) 
AJ put i t  in Nicol's case, provided there is due proof, there cnn. be a •sufficient 
combination of residence ••• and intention • • • to constitute domicile'. 
401) 
The 'l'ransvaal authority contrary to McMillan v McMillan is either obiter or is 
b d . . th . i t . 4
0
2) . h ase on a misapprehension as to e ratio of BaKer s case. There 1s 1 owever, a
t · · · · d E 
. 
-Gl 
403
)h. h hil t t' t f la er decision of a single JU ge, � pa rte ass, w 1.c , w s purpor ing o ollow 
Mcl-lillan, is really- inconsistent with it, and shows the judicial trend towards holding 
that there is no legal bar to the acquisition of a domicile of choice in these 
circumstances. 
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'l'he issue in Glass was whether the applicant was domiciled in the court's 
area at the time of his m?X"riage. Until he joined the army in 1939 he was 
domiciled in Scotland. In 194-3 he Wo.s sent to South Africa as a convalescent and 
told that he was no longer required for military service and would be discharged 
when restored to heal th. On his expressing a desire to settle in the Tra.nsvaaJ. 
he was promised that he- would be demobilized there. Meantime he was allowed to 
take up employment and wear civilian clothingt which he did. A month after he had 
taken up a job of a permanent character in Johannesburg he married there. Six 
months later he was discharged from the a.nty. Neser J, sitting in the Hi twa.tersrand 
.,.. al D · · · . b t .. d t 
40
d
4) 
t. . h d "'1 " • ll h 1 d . th t . th .L.JOC 1. vision, y a ne:a si es- ep is 1.nguis e ,·.C1'1:t. a.n, o . :i.ng a in. e
exceptional circumstances Glass was a free agent. It was an adroit avoidance of 
the full-bench decision, but t with respect, the distinction is untenable. 
The passage in Schomaker 1 s Consilia cited above,which states that a soldier 
does not acquire a domicile in the area in which he if;; stationed unless he has an 
express intention of making it his fixed and permanent home, draws attention to what 
is generally accepted, namely,that the court should not lightly conclude on the facts 
that such a domicile has been acquired. Assuming the South African rule is that 
. . 405)
such domicile can be acquired, said Schreiner JA in J3aker 1 s cnse, 
'it will no doubt be necessary to exainine the evidence in each case 
with special care to ensure that, before a change of domicile is 
found to have talcen place, there has been clearly proved 11a final 
and deliberate intention11 to abandon the fo rmer domicile and establish 
the new one •• e. In particular, care would have to be taken lest a 
mere inclination to s.ettle in the country where the soldier is stationed, 
after the termination of his service, be treated as a present exercise 
of the choice of a nermanent home in that country.• _ 406 ) · • 
407) 
In the leading Scots decision of Sellars v Sellars the Lord President (Lord 
408) 
Normand) said that mere proof of a 'service re sidence' is not enough: what is 
required is that there 
1 co-exist with a residence, which has begun and is continued unde:z: 
military orders t facts and circumstances which establish a. residence 
voluntary j_n chsi
racter and chosen by the soldier, al though it is a 
residence in the place in which he is stationed by the order of his 
military .superiors 1 • 409) 
· 
Facts and circumstances which have played their part in persuading the courts 
that such a residence has been acquired include the purchase or hiring of land 
410) 411) . in the area ana application for registration as a voter. 'The absence of the phySJ.cal
manifestation of the averred intention to settle permanently which is afforded by 
the purchase of a house, etc , may perhaps in practice often prove fatal to the 
412) 
establishing of the contention that a domicile ••• has been acquired', but this
will not always follow. 
4l3) It is a question of evidence, not of substantive law.
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In one South African case I Jordaan v J·ordaa.A'~
46n the analogy of certain 
of the I soldier cases' it was held that a member of the police force, being subject 
to- compulsory removaJ. from province to province, is unable to exercise any. election 
and so acquire a domicile of choice. It appears to follow from the decision that 
his domicile antecedent to joining the police force would rem?in. As far as his 
acquiring a domicile of choice in .a country other than the one in which he is 
stationed is concerned, the decision has by implication been overruled by Baker1 s 
case. As regards the acquisition of a domicile of choice in the country in which 
he is stationed, it is submitted that the decision is incorrect. Not only do all the 
arguments advanced in favour of the view that a soldier ca.."'1 acquire such a domicile 
apply in this case, but in addition it may well be ;isked whether in any event the· 
service of a policeman is analogous to that of a soldier, whether he can reD.lly be 
said to be subject to compulsory orders in the same sense. His position would appear 
to be closer to that of an ordinary civil servant who ca..'1. resign, possibly subject 
to a monetary penalty. 
Diplomats and other public servants ; employees of foreign firms. It is 
now clear that a public (civil) servant has the capacity to acquire a domicile of 
choice while heis in the public service and that he is a free agent - there is no 
question of a compulsory residence. There were early obiter dicta to this effect 
415) 
scattered through the reports, but when the question fir.st arose crisply for decision 
it was held that he is unable to exercise a choice, that he cannot acquire a new 
. 416) 
domicile and that (semble) he retains hi5 lust domicile prior to joining the service. 
(No attempt was made to meet the problem whether he could not have an animus non 
revertendi, in which event a gap-filling domicile would have had to be.attributed 
· 417) 
to him.) The most recent decision, however, Naville v Naville, follows the trend 
in the I soldier I cases. The proposi tus, in the service of the Government of 
Switzerland as consul in Cape Town for the past six years, contended that he had 
lost his Swiss domicile and acquired a Cape one. When in Switzerland two years 
before he had sold his house there and arranged with the Government that on his 
retirement four years later his pension would be paid to him in Cape Town, which he 
made clear he regarded as his permanent home. The Swiss Government undertook not 
to transfer him before his retirement. Had they broken their undertaking he would 
have resigned. It was held that·he had acquired a Cape domicile of choice. 
Naturally, the court will not lightly conclude that a public servant, especially 
an alien one of and corning from a foreign State, has the necessary animus manend.i. 
But it is submitted that it could exist even though the servant would not be prepared 
to resign if moved by his Government, provided he retained his intention of settling 
aB shown by his having the fixed resolve of coming back: his home must be here Em.d 
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his move in his eyes temporary. 
What \�as said of public servants must apply equally to employees of foreign 
419) 
firms who are sent to the alleged new country of domicile. 'l'he decisions to the 
420 
contrary effect 5eern manifestly wrong. 
;r:mmir;rants, der]ortees and those subject to n deportv.tion order. .A person 
whose entr y into the Republic was and h.::ts remained unlawful is unable to a,cquire 
a domicile in the country or any area. of it. t/hile there are several Sou th African 
cases in which this rule has been pronounced in relation to the acquisition of a 
statutory domicile under the immigration legislation by one who has evaded its 
421) 
proviniona, there does not appear to be a crisp decision on the matter in relation 
422) 
to the acquisition of domicile at common law, though there are 
423) 
obiter dicta that 
the answer is the same. In Rhodesia, however, it h2.s been the subject of judicial 
424) 
pronouncement. 'l'he first caGe, AbeJ.heim v Abelheim, was subsequently considered by 
425) 
the Federal Supreme Court in Smith v Smith not to be a case of initial unlawful 
entry but rather one in which A subsequent to entry and only after the critical period 
for testing d.omicile, viz the date of institution of proc eedings, beca.'1le a prohibited 
iT111J1igr ant. Thus it fell within the class of I precarious resid·ence I cases, and Russell 
J's holding that A was domiciled in the court's area at the institution of proceedings 
had been correct. But Briggs ACJ, delh:ering the judgment in the appen_l in Smith, 
stated plain1y that if, as in Smith i t5elf, the entry and entire subBequent residence 
of the de cujus in Abelheim had been unlawful, the case had been wrongly decided. 
· 426)
The judgment of the Federal Supreme Court is u.ndoubtedly correct and is in 
conformity with the rule now expressed by our courts that a deportee who is actually 
removed from the· country and is a prohibited person whose return is illegal cannot 
427) 
in law have the aninros revertendi. But, with respect, some of reasons given in the 
.judgment of Briggs ACJ are open to question. The learned judge first of all distin­
guished those cases where the illegality of entry or residence has been expressly 
or implicitly condoned by the authorities, for here it is possible for a domicile 
428) 
of choice to be acq_uir ed., no issu e of ill ee;ali ty being involved,; He then .said that 
legal rights and privileges cannot be obtain ed by illegal means and the acquisition 
of a domicile can be considered as the acquisition of a right or privilege, such as 
in the very case, that of suing ·in the court. 'The status of domicile neceGsarily 
confers a nexus of rights, just as it may impose a nexus of obligations. A person 
acquiring a domicile of choice must ••• be deemed to have in mind the rights and 
obligations which spring from it. He must be taken to intend the natural consequences 
of his acts •••• 1 
429) 
To speak of a 'status' of domicile is to give the word 'status' an unusual 
and unnecessary connotation. Further, domicile is only a connecting factor, flowing 
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from residence and the animus manendi 1 which is not the intention to acquire rights 
an.d privileges flowing from domicile but to settle. Thus reference to acquisition . 
430) 
of rights and privileges does not appear to be relevant. 
. 
. 
431) 
Briggs ACJ went on to say� 
1••• [I]t is not possible ••• for a person sui -juris to acquire a 
domicile of choice in this country if his initial entry and his 
residence at al1 times thereafter have both cl.ways been unlawful. 
in terms of the Immigration Act 1954.... Acquisition of a domicile 
of choice requires both residence and animus manendi. Not every kind 
of de facto residence will suffice. It must usually be residence of 
one's own free will or, at least, if it is not,the residence can be of 
no vulue as evidence of an animus. man en di. '.rhe animuB mp. nendi must 
be both genuine and honest. An intention to persist indefinitely in 
a couroe of unlawful conduct may be genuine: but it cannot be honesto 
Feors that the worst may happen do not necessarily preclude a sufficient 
animus. But knowledge that one is residing only in defL,:mcc of the 
law, and will so continue indefinitely, makes it impossible to have an 
animus manendi of the requisite quality. I think also that tbe matter 
may properly be put in another way. The ar.imus mrui.endi, though it does 
not require an absolute intention to reside permanently, muBt at least 
be an unconditional intention to reside for an indefinite period •••• 
In this case the intention of the appellont, putting it at the higheot, 
can only have been, "I will stay in Ehodesia if I can escape the attention 
of the authorities, whose statutory duty i6 to deport me, and who will 
at.once do so if they lero-n the true facts about rne 11 • I think a 
conQitional or provisional intention of this kind cannot amount to an 
animus rnanendi necessary to establish a domicile of choice.'· 
It may respectfully be asked whether this dictum does not raise avoidable 
difficulties. That knowledge of the prospect of a suniJ11ary termination of one 1 s 
residence can subjectively prevent one from having the requisite animus is of course 
a possibility, but there can be the necessary intention despite the anticipation. 
Thio possibility does not appear to have been alluded to. The simple ground of the 
decision, it is believed, is that the law does not permit of an illegal factum or an 
432) 
animus manen di that must result in an illegru. act. In the words of Po1lak, 'the 
residence must be lawful and the animus manendi or the animus revertendi must be. 
. · - · 433f 
capable of being carried into effect without tranGgrcssing the law'. . As it was put 
4341 . 
by Griffith CJ in the Australian High Court in Ah Yin v Christie, ' [ t]he acquisition 
of a domicile of choice by a person coming from abroad to any country depemls ••• 
upon the permission given by that country to enter.it and make it his home'.
The rule applies equally to a person deported from the Republic and who is a 
prohibited person whose re-entry is unlawful. No cognizance could be taken of any 
435) 
. 
animus revertendi that he entertained. But the position waa for long obscure.· . 
436) 
. 
In the Digest it is stated that a banished person acquires in the meantime a 
domicile in the place tci which he is banished. Voet is in similar vein, though he 
speaks of the exile's also retaining his original domicile 1f he has the en i:nus rever-
437) 438)
. 
tendi. Van Leeuwen says that he who is banished with loss of civil rights (a ���ortatus 
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· loses his domicile, but not he who is btmished without such loss ( a �f;atus).
Care must be taken not to equate certain types of ancient banishment or exile to a
particular place with modern deportation, for with· deportation there is either no
definite destination or eloe no compulsion on the deportee to remain in the place
of destination. But in principle the animus revertend.i shoul·d be treated in the same
439)way. 
In modern law banishment o.:r deportation to a country does not confer a domicile 
440) 
there. :Arnone; the later writers on the civil law there is some authority in favour of 
th t t. f th . 
. 
. al d . · 1 
44
U th d th t t' . t . e re en :um o · e or1.g:i..n om191. e - Burge on e groun a . ne pro:posi us 
is preBumed never to have given up all hope of' return, Story on the cround that tbe 
new l;'esidence is under constraint, like tho.t of a prisoner. Neit her view is at a.11 
persua.si ve. 
442) 
Three South African cases up to 1930 support the contention that retention of 
the animus revertendi leud.s to retention of the domicile in the country,. despite 
return being illegal. The contrary and, it is.believed1 correct view, has been taken443) 
in five other deci.si_ons. The first was Ex narte Donelly, already encountered in ::i.ts 
holding in favour of the revival -o.f- the domicile of origin doctrine. 
considered that the authorities favouring retention of domicile by exiles were· con­
templating the domicile of origin and in any event were not laying down a rule aJ)plic­
able to life-long exile.. The learned judge held that the proposi tus could not retain 
his South African domicile of choice as he was liable to instant punishment and depor-
tation on his return� The next decision was F.JC -parte Fra.se;;
4
Jontaining a most 
- even be read to-rend -
unsa�isfactory judgment, which coo ld/ some support for the contention that a deportee
4li5) 
rnay retain his domicile of choice. · Then came Ex uarte Gordon, where C.reenberg J 
followed Ex rarte Donelly but said that.' (d]ifferent ... considerations ••• apply to 
the question whether an exile loses his domicile of origin· and the que_,stion whether
. 446). 
. 
a person _deported from his domicile of choice lo.sea such dom icile'. According to 
Greenberg J, to speak of voluntary residence is inept, and it. could be said thEit the 
deportee had the purpose of leavine the country - an explanation that will not cover 
}he case where he has an intention to· return. 
A. detailed examination of the ques·tion was embarked upon by a three-judge Ca_P.e 
. . 447) . -· li4ff) 
Provincial Division bench in Ex partc Macleod, which sustained PolJ.ak's argument that
'the animus revertendi must be capable of being carried into effect without trans­
gressing the law 1 • De Villiers J, . delivering the judgment of·_ the court, said: 
'The expression of an intention to return in the future cannot in 
the caEe of a person deported from this country� unless it rests 
upon some legal foundat ion, carry the question of the continued 
retention of '1. domicile any further: for such legal foundation 
canr1ot exist while the order of deportation is still operative. 
The effect of the order of removru. is to terminate· his further. 
residence and at the same time to render vain any expression of 
intention to return during the operation of such an order which 
is unlimited in time. 1 449) 
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This passage contemplates the possibility of an operative animus revcrtendi if 
450) 
return is not actually unlawful, which is the position in English law. It was
a. rule that was also accepted in the latest South African deciEion, Drakflnsbe��
451) 
Bpk v Sharpe, which followed the principle of Ex narte Macleod. 0n1y �/hen the 
deportee I s return cea.ses to be illegal, that is, when he is no longer a prohibited 
person (formerly 'prohibited immigrant•)\ will he 'be in a position to re-establish452, 
a domicile of choice in the Rei:ublic r. Of course, this would require his actual 
residence coupJ.ed with the animus ma>1endi. 
What has been·said mu.st be subject to the principle that no one can be without 
a domicile. Despite deportation and a prohibition on return, a dornid.le :i.n South 
Africa (or a province or area therein) may be ret;.i.incd simply because the deportee 
has not as yet acquired a new domicile �d the old domic:l.le J;"emains either qua· 453)
domicile of origin or last domicile of choice t depending on which gap-filling rule
is finally accepted. In the event what haB been written may prove to be much ado
about very little.
When does tlle person subject to a deportation order lose his domicile of choice? 
45Z+) 
According to Dicey and Morri,s 'he does not lose it merely because a deportation order 
. 455). 
has been made against him; he .only loses it when he is actually denorted'. For the 
"'" 456) 
last proposition they cite the South African cases of F.x part� Donell;t: and Ex partc · 
457) 
Gordon. But both caoes wore concerned with acturu. deportation and there are not even 
obiter dicta dealing w:l th the problem. The ar1swer must depend upon when the residence 
became illegal. Should the person involved cscupe the a.uthorj.ties and stay in the 
country after it became illegal for him to do so, he would lose his domicile of choice 
albeit he wn.s physically pr esent. This was stated obiter by De Villiers Jin f�� pa,rte 
/458) 
Mac1eod. 1 If he in some wa;:r successfully evades the order and remains in the Union t 
his continued residence would be illegal. and in defiance of the laws of this. country. 
Cou ld such illegal residence ensure the retention of a Un:i.on domicile? The question 
posed C<.ll'ries with it its own refutation.' In fact,. however, it would appear that 
where a person has a dom1.cile of choice only his actual removal from the Republic 
459) 
makes him a prohibited person whose residence is illegal. That explains the dictum 
. . 460) . 
of Henning J in the Dral{ensberzyers case: ''rhe carrying into effect of the deportation 
order made him a prohibited immigrant and extinguished his domicile of choice.within the . 461) . .
Republic.' The dictum of Murray Jin Van Rensburg v Ballinger goes too far. 
More involved questions ari.se with immigrants. In principle, it i.s clear 
that one who may lawfully reside in South Africa as long as he pleases provided he 
docs not commit one of a list of scheduled offences upon which he becomes l1able to 
deportation can acquire a domicile of choice her-e, because it is within his own power 
to ensure that. his animus monendi can be carried into effect. This appear.s to be 
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462) further
the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Boldrini v Boldrini. It is/argctable
in principle, however, that if the propositui:i is lawfully present in the country
but under only a temporary residence permit or one freely revocable by the executive
or rene1·1able by it in its unfettered discretion. then he cannot acquire a domicile
of choice, for the animus mc.JJ1entli can at any stci.ge be frustrated by the authorities,
463) 
,�hereupon it will fly in the face of the lm1. But except in one Natal case, Neaves 
V. "',·e,�-ve:-:•_
4
,
64
t
)
l.. s re;ewo·---1·nn-l ;;o. ::.;_ n r.= �· I.> has had only a slender app e ol to s OU th Afri Can courts • The 
present position is that the de cujus can formulate the req_uisite animus, provided--
. . · 465) -
the pros11ect of implementing the intention is not too remote. !t may be said to have 
been so \<Jith Nec1ves t bi:l.ndmaster on a ship plying betNeen England and South Africa t
who wished to settle permanently in Natal, but who waG refused the requisite perini t 
by tho im igration authorities and had to content himself with living; with his wife 
466) 
in Durba_n. on temporary visits.. On this practical basis the case can perhaps be distin-
guished from five cases of imrnigrantswith temporary residence certificates, in e&ch 
of which the prot%onist was held 
467) ·. 468) 
Sru.a.am, Gwambe V' Gwambe, Fenner v 
to have acquired a domicile of cho�ce - Joooub v 
469) 470) 
Fenner, Van Tiensbure; v Ballinr-:er and (presumably) 
· 4717·­
l!�x par-te PekoJ.a. Jn the 
472) 
is commendable. Having 
J.ight of realities the liberal attitude taken by the court
reg�d to the stringent South African laws governing deporta-
tion, it would be difficult indeed for an immigrant to acquire a domicile of choice, 
if the test were that it had to rest in his own hands whether his intention to stay 
permanently could be carried into effect. Inter alia, :i.t lies in the unfettered. 
discretion of the executive to deport any alien, armed with a permanent residence 
473) 
certificate or not• 
Unfortunately, the legal basis of these generous decisions is unclem-. In 
Joosub v Salaam and Gwambe v Gw:arobe the court purported to follow Boldrini, which 1 
it has been GUbmitted, is a case of an immigrant with a permanent residence pez·mit 
who could be deported only if he committed one of a number of specified crimes. In 
�•enner v Fenner, Vm Rensburg v Bal.linrer and 1.'x pD.rte Pekala the rule that. a soldier 
. 474) . can acquj_re a domicile of choice was found to be in point, but 1. t was held - rightly 
'clearly not in point' in Gwambe v ��• As has been stated, the servicemen cases 
could be· read as subject to the reservation that the requisite animus rnanendi can 
ultimately be carried fully into effect, and not o.n sufferance, which is the very point 
at issue here, 
In Joosub v Salaam the respondent was a prohibited immigrant holding a temporary 
residence permit, which could be renewed or not or cancelled at the discretion of the 
Minister of the Interior at any time. Greenberg JP held that the rule enunciated in 
Johnson does not refer 1to an alien who wishes to settle �n the country� who intends 
to do all in his power to brinr:; this about, and who in all probability will not be 
Footnotes on pages 110, 111, 112. 
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475) 
disturbed and who believes that he will not' • Fenner was i.'1 a similar position: 
tecrmicully a prohibited immigrant on a temporary permit but who in all probability 
would be permitted by the executive to remain when the special war legislation 
designed to meet an emergency unemployment situation came to an end. To Tredgold J
the intention to reside perman.entJ.y could exist al thour;h it was I clifficul t or uncertain 
of attainment. To contend otherwise is to confuse intent;ion with e:iq:iecte.tion. • It 
could subsist al though i t.s fulfilment 'is liable to be postponed, interrupted, or 
even wholly frustrated by the military or immigration authorities; or by the inter-
476) 
vention of other circumstances'. This statement seems rci.ther strong a,nd must be 
read secundum sub •iectam rnate�iam 1 for surely there must be a firm foundation of 
realism in the intention. One could hardly attribute .m animus manendi to a prohibited 
:persona non gr ata 1vi th the Government who was allowed a fortr.ight Is stay to be with 
his mother in her dying days. 
The judgment in the leading case, that of the full bench of the Transvaal Court 
in Yt:n Rensburg v Eallinger,is, with all respect, of an unhappily wavering nature, 
for Murray J, who delivered the principal judgment, seems to swing from holding that 
it lny in the propositus 1 s own hands to determine his de�tiny and that it loy in the 
477) . 4781 . 
hands of the executive. But,IJ.6 pointed out by Turpin, on the facts it wao really 11 
case of executive discretion. B had arrived in South Africa in 1928 as a prohibited 
j_mrnif7'a.nt with a three-month :residence permit. After two months the Minister of the 
Interior extended his temporary permit 'for an unspecified. time', provided that he 
would have to leave on timely notice, and sa.id that he. could remain permanently 
subject to b.ohav:i.oux· satisfa.ctory in the eyes of the Minister. B resided in the 
country continuously thereafter, acquired land, registered as a Parliamentary voter, 
married a Union national, was appointed a commissioner of oaths by the Minister of 
Justice and participated actively in public life. The court concluded that he had . 
. 479) 
the ·animU6 manendi and had acquired a South African domicile. Murray J said: 
1 •• • [A]s the alien cases show�B�ornicile is lost only when the higher
authority has actuaJ"ly invoked [ the] right of termination [of residence].
The individual is 1 in fact • • • the master of his 01m des tiny. He can
decide to have his borne in the particular place and he can carry that 
decision into effect • 
.•.• The power of a higher authority to terminate a person's residence 
in a particular area cannot per se affect the question ,�hether that person 
intended to make his permanent abode there. If th e power of termination 
is actuc:Jly exercised, then naturally with the disappearance of physical· 
residence the domicile thus acquired is brought to an end •. Until such 
termination the only effect of the possibility of that power of depcrtation 
being exercised by a higher authority is that the person may (I do not say 
he mm::t) be ta.l,;:en to realize the precarious character of his residence 
and consequently mf!.y not be held to have formed the intention of mcldng 
his perman ent home in such area.' 
Footnotes on page 112. 
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Disregarding the unacceptable· widen_ess a f the statement relating to deportees 1 
which slurs over the position where ·tho propositu� evade6 the officials attempting 
to execute the.deportation order and commences livinG illegtlly in the countryt the 
reader may considc:r that the cases conce1'ning the deportee in which it has been held 
that he cannot have an operative animus rcvcrte�, far from strengtheninf; the position 
of the prohibited person physically present under temporary permit, weaken it by 
showing that attention must b_e paid to the question whether the intention to remain 
permanently can be carried into legal effect. But niceties ere out of place in a. 
South Africa whose law pcrmi ts the summary deportation of an alien admitted as an 
immigra,..1t. In practice. n. certificate of permanent residence may yield a precariouG 
· for
presence, while one of temporary residence may turn out to all01-l/remaining continuously.
'l'he rule as �xpounded by our courts today is realistic and fair� and to question the
re.spec tabili ty of its anc er;try is unnecessary.
Refugees, fugitives from -rustice nnd tier.sons U.vinr; abroad because of i11 heal.th� 
It is sometimes claimed that the resid.ence. must be voluntary, that th
.
ere must be a
. 481) 
freedom of choice, before u ·domicile of choice can be acquh•ed. \·Ji th physicel coer-
cion, such as the movement of a convict to another country 1 thi6 statElment may broadly 
speaking be appo�ite. But it is innpplicable to so-celleu mental pressure. 
A political refugee, a debtor fleeing from his creditors or a fugitive from 
the police always had the alternative of remaini]J.g where he was. The mental pre.sEnre 
was not so &!"'eat as to have precluded any act of volition�- unleGs insanity intervened. 
The motive for movi ng, of course, may be a material indicium showing an absence of 
482) 
animus manendi in the new country. But it cannot be decisive.· If a po1itical refugee 
d esires to return to his homeland, normally he will not have lost his domicile th ere. 
483) 
Even· then, 1 [o]bjective factors may sometimes override �-ubjective hopes 1 1 as with a · 484) 
'White Russian' intending to go back to a 'Free Ukraine'. If he wishes never to go 
back, or even if he has the wish to return but admits to himself that it will never 
485) 
be possible, lie may be held to have acquired a domicile of choice in the country in
which he has sought refuge, provided it can be shown that he intends rcmainine- the.re 
486) 
indefinitely. Failure to return to his native land when ·it is safe · to do so Will be 
487) 
impor:tant evidence. 
Similar considerations 
natural conclusion would be 
488). 
apply to a fugitive from justice and a debtor. The 
that the fugi ti vc has no wish to· make the fatal. journey 
back. But again the facts would always have to be carefully examined. If the fugi-
tive debtor intends repaying his creditors and then returning or the criminal h;,,s 
committed a venial offence or one the prescriptive period of which is short, the 
decision could well be the opposite. 
Footnotes on page 112. 
Most trou'olesomt are the cases where movement is for reasons of health. If 
the intentio:i:1 is simply to spend a short time abroad because of, or in_ order to 
nic uperate from, an illness, no new domicile is acquired. So too if the object W.:IB 
to avoid the possibility of infection. dhen in the mid-fourteenth century the 
ten protagonists of Y!occa.ccio I s Dcc8Jneron fled Florence, three-fifths of whose 
inhnbi timtE had been wiped out by the pestilence, the Black Death, ;;:nd spent their 
time regaling one another with th�:ir immortal and racy stories in a villa garden 
· - _ 489) 
on. the slopes under Fiesole I they did not lose their Florentine domicile. ; ror·, in
principle, would a domicile be acquired through residence abroad for ffil · uncertain 
-pcrj_od in the hope of finding a cure &nd then returning home, as with the one time
tuberculotic·s in sanat6ria in alien lands, immortalized in Thomas Mann I s '.l.'he Hae;ic
490)
Mountain. More difficulty is exJ"Jerienced with two other types of case. The first
is where the invalid lives in o foreign country permanently or indefinitely because
his health suffers in what was 1 up .to then at least, his domicile. 'I'he intention to
alleviate suffering or retard the progress of a disease is entirely compatible with
491)
the intention of settling that the law calls for, 'Such a motive for permanent
residence in a place is ••• fully consistent with the exercise of a free choice.' 
492)
'l'he other a1,kwa:rd case is where a person is assurod by his medical advisers 
that he has but a brief spell of life left and he would be advised to spend it in 
Li93) 
another country, ;,iherc he would suffer less. Lord Kings down's well-J,--...nown view was 
that it' would be 'revolting to common sense, and the common feelings of humanity' 
to hold him domiciled on the alien soil, with succession to his movables governed by 
the law prevailing there. Principle� however, drives to the opposite conclusion, 
- - · h"s _ 494) 
because)intention is to remain there permanently - the faint hope he might perhaps
entertain that the diagnosis was wrong_ or a revolutionary medical discovery leading to 
a cure will be found before his death, allowing for his return, could not signify. 
Strictly 6peaking, again it cannot be correct to say that 'he is compelled by sheer 
ncce_ssity to live away• and 'such compulsion would exclude the eJ.cment of free choice 
495) 
which is necessary to found a change of domicile 1• Many t however, will feel that
such a conclusion will give concrete expression to ·cardozo i s_belief that in the con­
f lict of lm.is logic has 1 been more remorseless, ••• more blind to final causes, than 
it has been in other fields' ;
96
it 'rtould -not be surprising if the courts, utilitatis 
��' would hold against a change of domicile in this situation, relaxing the rules 
as to acquisition of a domicile of choice. - The danger, naturally, lies in not firmly 
drawing the line after this extreme case. What, for instance, of a person who is told 
by medical advisers that he· will die shortly if he remains in his domicile, but that 
if he moves to a more temperate clime or to the coast, his life expectancy will 
497)
be lengthened? 
Footnotes on page 112. 
- 55 -
IV THE DOMICILE OF DEPENDENCE 
Th0 domicile of dependence 01· dependency is one �lrising ipso jure 1 :.md is 
founded on the notion of mo.intaining family unity in the law governing personal 
. 498� 
relations. fhese pen;ons ro--e or ma_y be dependent persons in the law of domicill'.:': 
(�) married women; <.2) minors; (£) those insane. 
Som1, of the rules of the domicile o f  dependence may be tho_ught to. breathe 
the r;1ur;ty air of yesteryear •. · Most scathing in his cr1 ticism has been Lord Denning 
499) 
MR: 1 'l'he tests of domicile are far too unsatisfactory. In or·der to find out a
person's domicile,· you have to apply a lot of archaic rules. They ought to have be en 
done away w:i th long ago. But they still survive� Particularly the rule that e. wife
ta1<:es the domicile of her husband. J111d the rule that a child takes the domicile of 
its father. 1 
Ye t the formative jurisdiction that will be assumed by our courts will undoubt­
edly and understandc:ibly be limited. If what appears to follO\,,r may to 1;,ome seem to 
lean on the side of conservatism and ultra orthodoxy, it is because it is believed 
, that radical reform must emanate from the legislature. 
(a)• Married women. '!'he general rule is that immediateJ.y on conclusion of a 
- 3"00) 501) ,
marriage recogniz,ed by our law- - which would not include a ·polygD.!llous union - the 
wife tekes the husb&nd' s domicile, and, o'Ubject to the possible exception where a 
. 502) 
decree of judicial. separation is granted, follows it as it. changes stante matrimonio. 
This rule 1 which was once said by a South African juc;ge, too lvidely for. the circum-
503) 
stances of today, to be a iuniversal ·rule of law 1 1 obtcina irrespective of the nature 
of the mHrriager whether it be a.t common la1-1 or with antenuptial contract, and if 
the latter, whether the mari t.tl p_ower is etxcluded or not. 
On dissolution of the marriage by death of the husband or divorce the broad rule 
is that the widow or divorcee does not revert to her pre-nuptial domicile or domicile 
· 504}
of origin but retains he.r last domicile until she changes it. She may continue to
live in the seme area with·the �i:11us m�endi; in which event it becomes her d omicile
of choice. Otherwise it continues pro tem. There is a danger in conceiving of. this
rule of continuance of a domicile of dependency as a fictional domicile of cho.i.c:e,
resulting in a sub-rule that the ;,,oman must at the critical time hav'e a new residence
and acquire a new animus manendi to obtain a different domicile of choice. · The
proper approach, it is belie�ed, is that both the factum and the clllimus in relation
to another area may be proleptic or, if it be preferred to put it another way, in a
state of suspended animation that becomes operative from the date of the death of the
husband or the divorce, even if the woman be unaware of it or be then insane or in a
state of unconsciousness from which she never recovers. . The facts· of certain English
cases may be adapted to illustr?,te this proposition. If W, a domiciled French _.,oman,
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comes from· France to marry e. South Africoo domiciliary in Johwmesburg, but never 
had the independent wish to settle :i.n this country ond on the death of her husband, 
being penniless and deapairing of ever getting back to France, committed suicide, 
SOS) 
she dies domiciled i n  the cll'ea in which her hu.Gbend was domiciled at her death. 
T-v1ist the facts radically, so that many years before H's death W left him and 
returned to }ranee with the intention of settling there. 
of which she has not become a·ware, she dies in Fr,mce. 
Two wGeks after lri.fi death, 
506) 
There she dies domiciled,· 
But say she had become inmmc a week before H's death, or was run down by a li1otor ClU', 
rendered unconscious and dieJ. without regaining co nsciou,:-,ness, so that ·at his death 
she had not the capacity to formulate the requisite intent to settle in France. It 
507) 
has been argued with much cogency that she should still be held to have died domiciled 
there, for this will produce an answer that accordG·with common sense imd the re2iities 
of the situation. 1 •• • [S]he should not retain her dead husband's domicil by opera-
508) 
tion of law, if. she has already de facto a dornicil of choice elsewhere. 1 
If n marriage is declared null cJJ1d void ab ini tio, ��-1:_lyoothesi the woman at no 
. - 509) 
time tocik the man's domicile � wife. Nevertheless, if she was a major spinster at 
th e  time of the ceremony., looked at as one sui ;juri.s for the acquisition of a dord.dle 
510) 
of choice, she mie;ht have acquired it an:imo et facto in the same area a.s the man. 
Here the motive, that of living with the man she believed to be her. husbtmd� must not 
be allowed to detract from a possible finding of intention to remain IJermanently. If 
she was - u dependent person at the time of the ceremon y, say because she was a minor 
or already married, her domicile of dependence will continue. It may in fact coincide 
with that of the man.
If the marriage is annulled as voidable, since the unio n subsisted until it was 
set aside, the wife followed the husband's domicile un til the decree was granted. 
Once it is gr-anted, will its general retroactivi ty be taken to apply also to the 
511) 
quondam wife's domicile? There is some persuasive authority that it will not 1 in 
which event the woman could acquire a new domicile only after the annulment of the 
marrj.age, either through dependence or as one std :iuris. 
The rule· that a wife follows her husband's domicile llas been said to be I a 
512) 
consequence of the union between husband and wife brought about by the marriage tie'. 
This - is mere verbi age, however,_ and expresses· no rationale. 
513) -
Pothier seys husband 
and wife are regarded as one person. 
514) -
- This old fiction again o.f for<ls no explanation 
of the rule. In some systems the reasog15f on_ce said to lie in the incapacity of
a married woman to manage her own affairs, but this could never have been applicable 
to Boman-Dutch· law, where the husband 1 s marital power could al,,ays be excluded by 
ant enu:ptial contract. A Louisiana arJpeal court has ventured the justification that 
'the social and economic doctrine of marital unity and public policy demand that the-
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civfliz,ed concept of the family unit be protected <°1nd made qecure by permitting 
· 516)
one family (husband and wife) to h�ve only one domicile 1• Herein must lie the true
rea.son. As the Royal Commi.s.sion on Marriage and Divorce 1951-5 ::;aid, •to have two
laws regulating the 1mitual' rights end oblir;ations of husr�and and wife will introduce
· 517 J 
unc�rtain ty in a matter where certainty is es.sential 1• The practical difficulties
flowing from allo\1ini:::; a 1�ifc to have a do·micile different from that of her husband
lie primarilJ' with choice of law, not with jurisdiction.
It would up:peru.� - there is no authority on the matter - that unity of domicile 
will exist even though the wife is a prohibited im:migrent (per·son) or h&s been deported, 
for the rule is one .that flows �so· .iure, irrespective of the leeality of the residence 
of the wife. The weight of old e:uthori ty opposes a clause in an antenuptif1l contract 
tl1at the husband shall not change h:L.s dom:icile without his wife's consent. 
SLB)
It is 
519) 
very unl0ely that our courts which, like the English courts, have been applying the 
unity of domicile of spouses concept with incrcdi.sing strictness, v10uld do anything 
than uncompromisingly condernn such a stipulation, were it ever to arise for judicial 
consideration,- an �nlikely happening in these days of sb.ndard-form antenupti<Jl 
contracts. 
··Nor. cc'.l.n a wife ac'luire
. . 520)
her husb,�.nd or 
a separate domicile merely ber-ause she· lives. 
521) 
he has commi ttt,d ll. matrimoniaJ. offence or the spouses have 
522) 
sepfil'ation. 
apart from 
entered 
into a deed of 
523) 
Voet states that if the husbcmd is � exile, a go1llcy slave, a prisoner o.f wm-, 
inaane or a declared prod lga1, so that he is con side red to have sufj ered civil death, 
the wife is regarded as a widow. · The inference is that she can acquire a domicile 
of her own. . There L, no Sou th African CD.Se in which Voet I s views were follo\1ed, 
and it must be considered that they do not form par� of South African law, so fa:r as 
the situations they deal with are conceivable today. Th_e ensuing problems of juris•-
diction in matrimonia.l suits end the domicile of dependence of minor is.sue of the 
union will be so difficult if �t all possible of solution that this exceptional case 
of Voet 11;; mu.st be disregarded. 
There have been occasions in the past, however, when South African judges 
have felt cbufed by the tight bond on the principle of common domicile of spouses 
and tr�ed to loosen it. 
524) 
'rhe view was expressed obiter by Buchanan J in Mn.son v 
M:ason that the wife should not be held to follow her husband's domicile where he 
'has illegally abandoned his -wife and left her in the former home, while he has 
chosen for himself a ne,� residence where his wife cannot follow him'. The reason 
advcmced was .that. the r\l.le of the unity of domicile of spouses rests en 1_the legal 
duty of the wife to dwell with her husband wherever he goes 1• When he make.s this 
"' impossible, then she should be able to estHblish, 'if not a separate domicile in the 
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full sense of the term, at lea,5t af5 as;ainat him a seJlarate forensic domicile'. '!'he 
fallacy in this dic tum li<:::s in the supposed reason for the unity of domicile principle, 
. which, if it were true 1 would allow every deserted wife to bring divorce proceedings 
. 525)
in th£: court of tho area of her own Bepe.rate domicile• which is manifestly incorrect. 
· 526)
Further, while, as has been shown, the notion that domicile can exist for certain
purposes and not for others will have to be ·conceded in certain excepti onal cascs t
it should not be pressed further than absolute necessity drives. The legislature,
albeit somewhat tardily, has come to the relief of the deserted wife who wishes to
bring an action for divorce or- judicial 
527)
common domicile. 
sep.;3.rution else,,ihere · than in the m-ea o.f the
528) 
Rode.nbu:rg, aB i,:as seen, held that a wife does not follow the domicile of a 
. 529) 
vagabundus husband. According to the Ver vol r: op de Holl endsche Consult atien, a 
vagabundus keeps the last domicile he had before, like the prota5onist of Robert 
Louis Stevenson's '.I.'he Vagabond, he said 1 ::/etlth I ,.,_sk not, hope nor love, /Nor a 
friend to know me; / All I ask, the heaven above, / .1\nd the road beJ.ow me,.. If 
mo.dern law is possibJ.y prepared t o  concede the possibility of the existence of. such 
"530) 531). 
a person, it is ·not prepared to endorse cer·tru.n judicial suggestions that the la1·1
. 532) 
endm.;r hiG wifo with the ca.paci ty to acquire a domicile of her own. 
On two occasio��
3
f<otze JP expressed the view otit�r that the wife might be uble 
to acquire a separate domicile (at least for t he purpose of divorce proceedings) where 
the husband came on a visit from abroad, married her j_n South Africa, her domicile of 
origin, ,md then deserted her, leaving the country. A South African court on one 
534) 
occasion went so far as to hold that a deserted wife can cJ.Cquire a dol!'icile of her mm 
in a country in which the spouses were not domic iled at the time of desertion and in 
which the husband was not at prese nt domiciled, for the purpose of suing there for 
divorce. 
'.l.'he decision of the Privy Council on appeal from Ceylon in Le Mesurier v
535) · 
Le Mesurier is incompatible with all these zugeested exceptions to the principle of 
the unity of spouses' doc:Jicile, which are contrary to Romcm-Dutch principle w..d 
amount to no more thtin a succumbing to an appeal ad misericordiam and have been re jectEri 
536) 
in later cases. Hardship to the deserted wife desirous of inotitutine action for 
matrimonial relief has been relie·ved to a considex·abl.e measure by recent legislative 
measures. 
'!'he 'presumption' against a change of domicile may afford some help to the 
deserted wife too. Again, if a husband changes his residence with the object of 
adversely affecting his wife's interests, as t for instance, in brinr;i.ng a divorce suit, 
the court might be chary of concluding that there was a genuine change of animus on 
537) 
his part t hat would result in a change of his domicile. Of course. the law does not
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prevent a husb<.Yjd from chani;:Ln5 his domicile even though his wife's interests may 
538) 539) 
be prejudiced, and the ccurt must not be r.ead ;i.n g_eytler v Steytler as requiring a
bona fide change of domicile by the man. '!'he pfn;i ticm is correc tly stated by Scho-
540) 
maker tr1at a change of domicile i.n fraudem le['is iB not presumed.
Finally, the frequently r<� erred to ma..;;.im ubi uxo1· ibi domui
4�Js give relief 
where the husband has deserted his wife, quit the area of domicile and disappeared. 
1 The aupposi tion is that if a, man leaves his wife behind he does not intend - to change 
542) 
his domicile 1, and the court mcy· be prepD.l'ed to hold that he continues domiciled in 
543) 
the area in which he last had a home. But the maxim, which does not furnish 1a·
se of the husband• c; domicile but furnishos an element in deciding th,:>-t 
545) 
criterion u er
- 544) 
domicile' , must not be pressed far 1 for it 1 loses much of its force when the gulf
546) 
between husband and wife has so widened as to be impast,able' • 
'I'his leaves· the vexed que1:Jtion whether the judicially separated wife is 
couipetent to acquire her o�m. domicile of choice. 
547) 548) -
First, as to the w.ithorities. U 
Huber c:nd l'othier- hold that she is. But it is significant that numy writers, including
549) 
J Voet, do not c:1llow fer any qualifications to the rule · that a married women follows
550) 
her lmsband' s domicile. 1"'he court in_ two 
obitcr,as to the existence of the alleged 
Natal decisionG · expressed grave dot1btt>, 
_ 
. 
551) . 
exception. In .Steytler v Steytler it was 
held that though the judicially tc;epcirated. wife might be Nble for certain purrosr.s 
to acquire a separat0 'jurisdictional domicile' and be Sued there, :5hc always follows 
her husband.' s domicile in matters pertaining to the marriage tie and status. But 
in the Roman-Dutc:t1 law, which the court did not explore, there is no warrant for such 
• divisible domicile 1• Somewhat similar was the recommendation of the Royal Commission
552) 
on Merriaee and Divorce 1951-5 of L'ngland that a wife, whether judicially separated 
or not, should be capable of claiming her cwn domicile, but only for the purpose of 
bringing JJrocee dings for di vorcc or rumulmen t of a voidable marriage. Tl-.is restrictive
553)
view has been cri ticized • 
. In Scots law the judicially separated wife continues to follow her husband's 
- 554) 555) 
domicile. !I.'he position would ?ppear to be the same in English, law, though while the
h 
. 556) - · - _ 
Privy Council as pronounced to this effect a House of Lords ru1cl even a Court of
Law 
Appeal ruling is still wanting. The Private International/Committee in its First
Report in 195!1- wished to give the judicially sf)parated woman the capacity to aciuire
557) -
her own domicile fo:r· all purposes. The abortive Di_vorce Bill 1959 was bolder,
allowiiig a married v,onmn generally to acquire a separate domi,cile, which goes somewhat
further than does the apparent United States rule, which would require her to live
apart from her husband unless there are special circumstt�nces making such a result
558) 
unreasonable. l:n its Seventh Report, however, the Committee included that 'legc::tl
559) 
complications' would ou t11eigh any advantages yielded by such a step.· But it did not 
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retrD.ct its orig,j_nal recommendation regarding a judicially sep,:n:J.t(;'d wifo. )Jn;ost
__ ,l tl . JJ ' J 1 1· t·  J ' . ' ' th· ·· t t· . t 
560) 
� 1e H .. cgea .ega co:::p 1.cu ·ions ,11ou .a c-lT'l.6e in · :1.s si ua ion oo. 
\·ihat advn.nto.ges nnd disudva.ntages woulcl emerge in South Africa if our courts 
were to alJ.m-.r a judicially. ser1arated wife to a.cguire her own domicile? 
tagu:, would l:i.e rnr,\inly in the sphere of choice of law. 1:Jhere the domicil:i.arj' 1.S<,,J 
is applico.ble to  a wife it will be th8.t lnw which is most closely connected v:i th 
her through her O\·m will ·and volition. 'rl',ere would not be any problemG with th8 
deterr:1ination of the domicile of minor childron, fo:r it would continue to be govorned 
561) 
by the riresent ruleG. As rcg,:irds the matrimonial proprietary regime, this is fixed 
.bY the hu::,band 1 s domiciliary law at- marriage, ap:plics to all property and is immutable, 
. . . 562) Th . , so that. no difficulties appear to emerge there. c personal consequences of mcU"riage, 
however, are governed by the present: domicilicJ.ry lat-1:
6 
�iia here we encounter a rule 
that, o.t ler-1St m:; regard,':> legal relations bet1..-een the spouses thcmse1ves, presuppoecs 
unity of matrimonial domicile. What law, for instance, would govern donation.s .' betw0en 
opouses or determine whether they could sue each other in delict if they had different 
doinicilcn'? 'l'here may be other situations as well in which, as the Private Internatio:rrJ 
Law Committee put it�
61hi:; existing rules ,,,.ould not work if the husbe..nd and wife had 
separate domiciles. L egi_slation would then have to 1>rovide that the personal law 
of one· or
.
other of the spouses should prevail.
Jurisdictional problems would emerge. If the appropriate court to set El.side a 
subsisting decree of judicial. separation is the court with jurisdiction in the divorce 
actior7�
5
Jhich court is that for this :purpose? More im1Jortont I which court is it for 
the purpose of assuming competency at common law to grant the actual divorce dGcree? 
It is not easy to see our ceurts developing the common law, as have the courts of the 
United States�
6
to) vest jurisd�ction in a divorce suit in the court of either 1,arty's 
domicile. 
In fine, it seems probe.ble that the acceptance of a rule that a judiciru.ly 
separated wife is capable of 1J.cquiring her own domicile will bo attended with a number of 
consequential legal difficulties, and coping ,-iith some of these will tax the courts' 
law-formative powers beyond the breaking-point. Legislation will be necessary I and 
in that event there is a strong argument for going al  the wey and grrnting the capa-
. 567) 
city to acquire her own domicile to every married women. 
. 
There may then be one or
two addj_tional legislative IJrov-lsions called for. One could well be that a married 
woman i5 presumed to acquire .her husband 1 s domicile on mar�tar'! and as it changes
thereafter unless a contrary intention on her pru:·t is shown. This would enable 
husbands and wives to carry out their normaJ. intentions of sharing the same personal 
569) · · · l · · h _.. hi h ld t t . law. 'There. 1.s notl:ung revo utionary ll1 t e pro:poscU., w c wou amoun ,O no more
than the wife I s having to prove that she has no animus manendi. 
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(_£) Minors. The domicile of origin of a minor has already been 
discussed. \'!hat is of concern here is the domicile assigned by the law 
thereafter during thechild•s minority. It must be borne in mind that, 
for the purposes of the law of-domicile, minority terminates by the cornine; 
of age, by marriage in the case of a man, by widowhood and divorce in the 
case of a married woman �nd by venia aetatis in the cases of both a man and 
a woman. �acit emancipation has to_ be considered as an _additional possibility. 
Mariiage may also remove a woman, in the law of domicil�, from the category 
of a depen�ent person through minbrity to the category of a dependent person 
through marriage. Where a marriage is void ah initio,ex hy:pothesi it had 
no effect on· the capacity of the man to acquire a domicile of choice there­
after. Thus� for-instance; if a marriage is entered into without the·consent 
of the Minister of_ the Interior where both parties sre below the rharriageabJ.e 
570) 
age, or the female is· and the_ male .1 s under 21,, the male continues to be 
a minor and his capacity to acquire a domicile df choice remained from the 
_ - 571) 
start unaffected by the •marriage.'. -13ut if the marriage is voidable only 1 
unl;il it is avoided though under 21 he is sui ju!:_is for the purpose of 
acquiring a domicile. If it is annulled, it is not clear, as has been seen, 
whether the decree is retroactive in operation as regards the domiciles that 
have been acquired durine the ,subsistence of the union. If it is not, all 
domiciles acquired by the man as an independent person though under 21 stand. 
If it is retroactive, it must follow that until he came of age or in some other 
way ceased to be a minor for the purpose of acquiring a domicile the man 
followed the domicile of de1lendence assigned to him as a minor by the law. 
If .the decree is granted when he is· st'ill not sui iuris for the ac·quisi tion 
of a .domicile,evcn if it is not retroactive he nevertheless must re•ert to his 
domicile of dependence as from then. 
The broad principle gener�lly accepted today is that a legi tiff,;/•/ minor
whose father is alive follows his father's domicile during minority. The 
old authorities are by no means unanimous 1 however, that this is an inflexible 
ruli �nd the legal position requires careful examination. There is a 
temptation ever before conflicts lawyers and the Dourts when dealing with 
confllcts problems, of succumbing to the lures of a simply formulated 
principle that yields a predictable answer. The attitude is: Better the rule 
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be broadl y couched even if it occasionally produce a result that offends 
573) 
one's sense of justice than that the luw be slippery. But concessions to 
this attitude must be kept within r�asonable limits. With husband and wife,as 
has been said, there are solid reasons of convenience why the unity of domicile 
notion should prevail. Is there any compelling need for a child to follow 
574) 
One searches for it in vain. In the words of his father's domicile? 
57 5)
Restatement Second, a 'person's do�icile should usually he in the place to 
which he is most closely related'. There is no need,.-with a minor's domicile, 
- 576)
to use Roscoe Pound's phrase, to be kept 'in the thrall of a fiction•. A
strong case can be made out for giving expression to a realistic attitude
ST?) 
by regarding the domicile of a minor, in the words of Lord MacDermott LCJ, 
as 'a manifestation of parental authorit1 and responsibility'. Recognition 
must be given to the claims of both· the vinculurn san;:uinj.s and parental 
authority on the one hand and equity and the practicabilities of life on 
the other. 
The Roman law did not say that a filiusfa6ilias automatically t�ok his 
father's domicile duri�g minority.and appears to have allowed him to acquire
578) 
a separate domi ciJ.e if he ceased to belong to his father's household. The
Roman-Dutch legal treatises are not clear on the position. There are several 
issues. 
First, does the minor's domicile change with his father's domicile if 
· 579) 
he does not accompany him to the new residence? According to J Voet·it does 
not, and apparently remains unaltered, thou�h in case of doubt the child 
should be tuken to have .his father 1 s present domicile. So broadly couched, 
the rule does not appear· acceptable today. A domici.le of origi n is· attributed 
to a child from his father 1 s area of domicile at his birth, even though the 
child has never been there the old authorities cast no doubt on this rule. 
It would be strange if this domicile should be held to continue, though the 
father has changed do�icile, until the child moves physically to his fathei's 
new residence. As a primary rule, it may be accepted that a father's domicile 
is attributed to his• minor child who is living elsewhere: that much tribute 
can be paid, to the .. claims of the blood tie and natural guardianship. There 
are some_ca�es i�:�u�port of this proposition, albeit they are weak and
f .. .  t ' 
. 
t· ·t· SSOi, . • ·t St 
SSl). 
h . l . de 1c1en iti- mo iva ion. �ven in the Uni ed ates, wit its very f exible 
and down-to-earth �ules of domicil�, this starting point is accepted.· But it 
is arguable tha·t if i:he father. _has actually abandoned h is child, even. though he has 
not been deprived of guardianship or custody his child should no longer follow his 
582) 
domicile,. 
Secondly, has. a minor of sufficient understanding ipso jure the
-capacit y to -acq�ire his own domicile? Some affirmative support is found in
th e R�man law, as has·been seen, and also _is impli�it in two opinions in the
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. 
.
. 583) . 584) 
Hollandsche Consultatien. Pothier says that a minor can transfe r hi.s domicile
to any place where he can acquire a benefice or a charge (puhlic office) or 
other employment of a permanent nuture which demands a permanent residence •
. · 585) 
On the other hand Eynkershoek states thnt minors sub cura vel oarentum vcl 
tutorum are inca:pa.blc of changing their domiciles by their ot-m will. 'Ik • • • 
weet dat een W�eskind of Minderjarige op zyn eigen houtje zyn Domicilie niet 
586) 
veranderen kan. , • •  1 It seems that this is the better answer, as a change 
of domicile may affect the minor's rights or future interests and it should 
not be left to his own free and unfettered will. It must be linked up w:i.th 
guardianship or custody, though not necessary entirely controlled throueh it. 
Even in American law this iB so. If a minor has been abandoned, that is, 
deserted, by his father, he takes his mother's domicile, and if he has been 
abandoned by both parents .retains the then domicile of the parent who last 
587) 
abandoned him or of his father if both his parents abandoned him simultaneousl� 
This is an extreme case., Ex hypothesi, in the normal situation. of parents 
not having abandoned their child, the child has no capacity to change hiG 
domicile. 
Thirdly, it may be.asked whether the father may give his child such 
. 588) 
capacity. J Voet can be read to favour this possibility. If full tacit 
. 589) 
emancipation can endow a minor with practically the whole gamut of capacities, 
including that- of acquiring a domicile. there seems no reason w�y the father 
cannot simply confer on his child the capacity to acquire a domicile. This 
is the parallel of his beine able to permithis son or daughter mereiy to 
carry on his or her own trade, ·bu6iness or employment, without this entailing 
general emancipation. Thus, it is believed, subject to the possible 
limitations still to be explored, the answer to the question posed is Yes. 
Fourthly, as already presaged, tacit emancipation may yield a capacity 
to acquire .. a domicile.. In Rom an-Dutch law a tacitly emancipated minor wns 590)
fully freed from the parental power save as to the contracting of marriage. 
Thus he could acquire his own domicile. 
591) 
J Voet se-.m1.s clear authority for 
- 592) -
this rule, to which the weighty support of Pothier has to be added, Modern
593) 
South African law has come out in favour of· emancipation of varying degrees,
which may reach the old 'absolute' state. It seems clear, then, that it may
594) 
be sufficiently extensive to confer capacity to acquire a domicile. 
Admittedly this point was left o�en in  the only South African decision in 
595) 
point, Ochber� v Estate Ochberg. There it was held that �the facts do not 
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point to his emancipation being of such a degree as to carry with it the 
power t o  choose a domicile of his own act, or, conversely, to deprive his 
father of the capacity to change his cion 1 o domicile'. But this dictum
was on the assumption that emancipation should be of this range. It is· 
submitted that in principle it can be.
Fifthly, the qu,�c,tion ari;;;e,; whether a father may give his child a 
domicile different from his own, there beinc no suggestion, however, of vest­
ing any capacity in the child to acquire his own domicile� Say the father
entrusted his son or daughter to the cure of relatives a.b.road. rrhere · is an 
opinion in the Hollctndsci:ie C��;:mJ.tat:i. ii\�hich sug6ests that the quc8tion is
to be answered in the ci_:ffirmntive� A father sent his son from the enemy 
country of domicile to the court's area, to be educated in and to follow the
religion of �hat State. There he was publicly acknowledged to be entitled 
to reside and no longer obliged to go back to his father 1 s power or domicile.
It wa� held that he was domiciled in the new State. Subject to possible 
limitations on the father ! s power to change his child's d omicile that will 
be discuised, it is believed that the question posed must also, in the 
597)
interests of a realistic solution, receive an affirmative nnswer. 
Sixthly, it must be consicfored whether the primary rule that children
follow their fathers' domiciles is .subject to a limitation suggested by
. 598) 
Cloete J in the early Cape case of l!_�l v Mcl-iaster, that it 'only applies 
wherever the interests of these minors are not affected or prejudiced by 
such a change of domicile'. 1,/hile no old authority was adduced by the 
599) 
learned judge nor has any been found, the proposal is not so strange as to 
warrant instant dismissal. It throws up for consideration - the 1·ationale 
behind the general rule of the father t s domicile being attributed to his . 
600) 
minor issue. It cannot be, as shown 1 that, as with husband and wife t
b�cauEe of mutual rights and obligaticns an intolerable situation will 
emerge ,-,ith split domicile.;-_,. 11h0 legal incapacity of the child is no 
explanation. And if this argument were driven to its logical end, it 
would produce unde,:.irable consequences� ';Co repeat an imaginary situation 
already posed with a married woman: S:J..y a son, A, aged 20, against the will 
of his father who is domiciled in the Transvaal, is living in Rhodesia with 
the animus manendi that can be carried into effect lawfully. A fortnight
before A turns 21 he is rendered unconscious in a motor-vehicle c6llision, 
a week later his father diea and three weeks thereafter A dies in Rhodesia. 
Where is A's last domicile? While at the time he hec�me of age A did not 
have the mental capacity to formulate the �equisite intention to settle in
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Rhodesia, it can be strongly argued that he should be found to have died 
domic iled there, for that was his home in fact at the critic�l time. As 
with a married woman, factum and animus should be regarded as proleptic t
operative from the ending of minority even though the former minor be 
unaware of ·his comine of age. 
601) 
It has been argued that provided the father has guardianship and 
custody the primary rule is inexorable, flowing from the fact that in the 
vast majority of instances E+ child actually has the home of· his father and 
the father's legal duty to give the child a home. While this reasoning is 
basicaliy reconcilable with Lord MacDermott LCJ's notion of 'manifestation 
602) 
of parental authority and recponsibi1ity 1 , _it should'also be borne in mind
that Lord MacDermott conceived of the law 1 s vesting authority in the father to 
603) 
act in matters of domicile for the benefit of his child. 
Acc:ordin�ly, there is much to he said in favour of the reservation 
alluded to by Cloete J. 
Seventhly 1 attention must be directed to the res controveroa 
among the old autl1orities, whether a father's change of domicile is reflected 
on to hi{:, minor child if the change.was iri pursuance of a fraudulent intent. 
604) 
. 
605) · 
J Voet, basing himself on R odenburg, says that a change of domicile of a father, 
widow-mother or non-natural legal guardian ( on �1hichever one a minor is 
dependent for purposes of domicile) from South Holland, where Schependomsrecht 
prevails, to North Holland, adhering to Aasdomsrecht, which oh the death of 
� child intestate is more favourable to the surviving parent, operates so 
far as the child is_ concerned only if it was made bona fide and the parent 
had a _j£sta et.probabilis causa.migrandi, otherwise it would be deemed a 
fraud on the intestate �eirs who would succeed acc ording to the law of the 
previous domicile. (Succe.ssion .9-b intestato to movables is governed by the 
lex ultimi domicilii. Presumably Voet's result would not follow-if the 
606) 
child had attained the age of competency t o  �ake a will.) Pothier refers 
only to dependenc y on the widow-mother, stating that her minor child follows 
her domicile as it changes p�ovided she has altered it· without fraud, and 
that fraud would be held to exist if there did not appear to be any reason 
for the change other than that of procuring an advantage to herself in the 
607) 
succession to the movable estate of her child on his death� 
608) . 609) 
On the other hand Bynkershoek, who is supported by Van der Keessel, 
rejecting the alleged rule propounded by Rodenburg and Voet, contends that 
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the parent or non-rtatural legnl guardian has unfettered capacity to change 
the domicile of a minor. No inquiry, says Bynkershoek, can be made as to 
fraud, because it is very difficult, if at all possible,- to prove it, and 
endless dieputes will result. This conclusion born of despair is manifestly 
unsound 1 for it \•rould. put paid to the fraus lcgis doctrine which permeated 
610) 
the Roman-Dutch law. 
The views of Rodenburg and Voet were approved by Cloete Jin Hull v 
611) 
Hdlaster, who stated that the children would not take the ,·father I s new 
domicile if it had been fraudnlently acquired to deprive them of their· 
rights. Attention here is directed not to the position of third persons, 
as in Voct 1 s exe.mple, but that of the minors themselves. But the princj,ple 
must embrace both :.,ituations. Unfortunately, in � v Ecl-:aster Cloete J 
misconceived the nature of the issue before the court, -..:hich was in no wise 612) 
concerned with the controv�rted point._ 
. 613) 
There is also an English ca.se in which the Passages in Voet and Pothier 
led to dicta that if the widow-mother changes• her home fraudulently, for 
instance to affect the distribution.of the child's estate on_his death 
intestate, the child does not take the new domicile. As the existence of 
fraud was expressly ne�atived by tbe court, the decision can be· hardly be 
considered a{> strong authority. The attitude of English jurists to it_ has 
. 614) 
been mixcdo 
Should the question ever arise in concrete form, it may well be that 
a South African court will find that there was no genuine intention to 
615) 
settle in the new country and that therefore no domicile was acquired there. 
616) 
As Schomaker says, a change of domicile in fraud em le,i;i:is is not presumed. 
Nevertheless, there is no assurance that the very.reverse inference will not 
be drawn that the motive goes·to show the existence, not the absence, 
of the animus ma11cndi. In that ·event a choice will have to be made between 617) 618) ·
thC! two 11oman--Dutch schools of thought. Pollak and Spiro 6yr.tpathize with
Bynkershoek'� views. It is submitted1 however. that the equities point in61';1) 
the direction of the answer of Voet. -
There is a finnl problem. Allowing·for the foregoing exceptional 
d.rcumstanc es, could a child take or re·ta;in (as the coewe may be) his father's
domicile through dependence if he (the.child) is unlawfully resident in
South Africa or has been depor-ted? · ·It is believe_d that, as with a wife, the
attribution of ·domicile would probably be held to continue to.apply. The
alternative solution is for the minor to retain his_ last domicile.
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How far may there be a deviation from the pri.mary rule that a legi.timat<t> 
minor child takes his father's domicile qua domicile 6£ dependence? The answer 
to this question may also be of sign:i.ficance in relation to a clomicile of dependency 
on a widow-mother or non-natural guardian. The answer- rests, first, on whether. the 
dependency £.lows from guarctianship (or its statutory counterpart) or from custody 
of the child; end secondly, on how far by common law and legislation guardianship or 
custody can he_ taken awa)' from the. father. 
In its full ambit guardianship embraces the entirety of the rights and duties 
of parents of control, care and administration over the person, property and business 
620) 
affairs of their minor issue, In the normal course it is vested in the father, but 
be shares control over the child's oC:!rson with the mot.her and her con.sent too is 
. .-.621) 
required for .the minor's marriage. If custody is severed from guardianship the 
custodian parent (normally the mother, on the granting of a decree of divorce) is 
entitled to have the child live with him_or her, controls his day-to-day activitiP.s,
such at the persons with �rom he may associate and his education, religious upbringing 
and plac,e of residence·. To that extent guardianship (if it is vested in the. other 
parent,almost ah .. ays the father) is diminished. In this n.-:urower.,residuary, sense,
guardianship include? administering the child's property and running his financial 
affairs generally, su�h as making business contracts for him, investing his money, 
discharging his obligations; it would also cover such matters as agreeing to his 
antenuptial contract. 
At common law, save whP.re ther<?. are proceedings before it for, or it is 
granting, a decr.ee 9f. divorce or 'jud.:i.cial separation, the court can deprive the 
father of custody only oO. some special ground, such as danger to the child's life, 
622) 
health or morals. The possibility _exists, not explored hitherto,.that the court 
as upper guaidian of all minors has an even more. extended power in 
6}.
1r,t extraordinary
circumstance�, namely� that of depriving the father of guardianship. The legal 
position has now be.come more complex because of the provisions of the Matrimonial 
624) . 625) 
Affairs Act 1953 and the Children's Act 1960. 
Under. ss (I.) of the cdticaJ. s '.i of the MotrimoniAl Affairs Act the court, 
on the application of either of the parents of a minor, in granting a divorce, or 
where they are divorced or li.ving apart., may grant to efther· sole guardianship 
. · · 626) 627)
(including the exclusive power to consent to a marriage) or sole custody; or it may 
order that on the predece,:1.se·of the named parent, a person other than the survivor 
shall be guardian. In terms of ss ( 2) -t where the parents are living apart the order 
lapses �hen they become reconciled. Subsection (3) read with ss (6) provides that, 
subject to any court order, a parent vested with the guardianship or sole custody 
under ss (1) or on whom has been vested by a chil.qr.en's court in. terms of .s 60(1) 
of the Children's Act •'_ the. exclusive right to exercise any parental powers in regard 
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to a minor 1 riayr as long as he remains so vested, by will appoint a sole guarcH.an 
or. sole custocHan, as the case may be. It also states that unless the father hes 
had conferred on him such sole guar�ianship or exclusive parental power he can at 
most appo:i.nt by will a r:;uardian to act jointly with the mother. Finally, under 
ss (5),where a parent haf; by will appointed a guardian or custodian under ss (3) 
or a father has appointed a joint guardian with the mother, the court after the 
testator's death may make such order as to guardianship or custody as it deem5 in the 
minor's interest. 
Clearly s 5 refers to the child of both the parents, but would also govern 
628) 
a child lcgi tima ted 2er, m,8 tdr'ioniurri subseguens, adopted or born posthumously. 
It is not confined to divorce or judicial separation. Separation de facto is also 
cate.red for. 
Section 31 of the Children's Act enables a children's court to oider a child 
in nC'.ed of care to. be placed in the·custody of a suitable foster parent. Under s 3l12 
629) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act a court may order that a person under 18 convicted of 
an offence be placed in the custody of a named person. Ty:i.ng up with these provi.sions, 
s 59 of the Chi�ldren' s Act provides that a parent or guardian of a pttl,)il of an 
institution U e reform school, school of i.ndustries or children's home) or who has 
under that statute or s 342 of the Criminal Procedure Act been placed in the custody 
of a person who is not one of his parents -is 1 di.vested of his right of control -over 
and of his right to the custody' of the pupil, the�e being vested in .the management 
of the institution or the named custodian. But these rights do not include, inter 
ali�, 1 the power to deal with any property of a pupil or chil<l or the powel." to consent 
to [his] marriage 1 • 
Section 60 of the Children's Act enables the court to deprive a father or 
mother of the right to exercise any.parental powers over a child living with the 
other parent and confer on the latter the exclusive right to exercise these powers, 
including the power· of. consenting to the child's marriage or adopti.on. Th.e court 
is empowered to resci.nd Hs order. 
630) 
Finally, s 72 of .the Administration of E�tates Act 1965 may come into play. 
It deals with the appointment of tutors and curators. A tutor is authoriz�d to 
take care of the person and� possibly, the or certain of the property of a minor; 
a curator the, or certein of the, property of a minor. As joint tutor nominate 
with the minor's mother or as curator nominate must be appointed a person nominated 
by a legitimate minor's father who has not been deprived of guardianship under the 
Matrimonial Affairs Act or parental powers under the Children's Act; as tutor or 
curator nominate must be appointed a person nominated by the mother. of an illegitimate 
minor or of a legitimate minor whose father is dead, where she has not been so de-
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prived of guardianship or parental powers, or a person nominated by the parent 
so vested with sole guardiEi.nship or exclusive parental powers. There is al.so 
provision for appointment through a court order of a tutor. or curator to take care 
of a minor's person or property. Then a person bequeathing property to a minor 
may nominate a curator j_n respect of it. Thus a minor may have a tutor and a 
curator or curators. For the law of domicile what is crucial :i.s tutorship, for 
it concerns the care and custody of the ward's person. Si.milarl.y with the 
appointment by the Master under s 73 of a tutor or curator dative. But it has been 
held that under. thls section the Master is not empowered to decide who is to have 
631) 
custody of the person of the orphan as distinguished from guardianship of him. 
It follows from the foregoing that the father of a legitimate minor may be 
deprived of the guardianship or sole guardianship of the child, as the case may be t 
in the following circumstances: (i) almost surely at c.ommon law, stante matdmol}.iz 
and without proceedings for divorce or judicial separation having been instituted. 
632) 
guardianship being owarded to the mother or a third person. Similarly where the . 
633) 
marriage has been dissolved through the death of the mother; (ii) on the granting 
of an order for divorce or judiciol separation, both at common law and under s 5 
of the Matrimonial Affairs Act. Under s 5 sole guardianship may be awarded to the 
motlier. At common law guardianship may be awarded to the mother or, po:Ssi.bly, to 
a third person; (iii) after divorce or, it. seems, at common law after judicial separ.aticn. 
Here th€ same rules apply as under (ii); (iv) where the spouses are living apart, 
under s 5 sole guardianship may be awarded to the mother, the order lapsing on 
reconciliation of the spouses; (v) under s 60 of the Children's Act exclusive parental 
powers may be awarded to the mother, apparently both during the subsistence of the 
marriage and thereafter. Under (ii) (iii) and (iv) the court may order that on the 
death of the mother guardianship shall be vested in a third person; and a mother 
vested with sole guardianship under s 5 or exclusive parental powers under s 60 
may by will appoint a third person as sole guardian. 
The father of a legitimate minor may be deprived of the custody or sole custody 
of the child, as the case may be, in the following circumstances: (i) stante rnalri­
monio and without any proceedings for divorce ot judicial separation having been 
634) 
instituted, custody being .awarded to the mother or a third person. This is also 
635) 
possible where the marriage has been dissolved through the death of the mother; (H) 
on the granting of an order for divorce or judicial separation, both at common law 
and under s s. Under s 5 sole custody may be awarded to the mother. At common law 
custody may be awarded to the mother or a third person; (iii) after divorce or, it 
seems, at common law after judicial separation. Here the same rules apply as in (ii); 
(iv) where the spouses are living apart, under s 5 sole custody may be awarded to
the mother, the order lapsing on reconciliation of the spouses; (v) under s 59 of
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the Children's Act custody may be vested in the management of an institution or 1n 
a named third-party cust0dian. A mother vested with sole custody under s 5 (or 
possibly - the wording of s 5(3) is unclellr - vested with exclusive parental powe17s 
under s 60) may by will appoint a third person as sole custodian. 
Where the father is deprived of the totality of guardianship, by whatever 
name it be_ called, manifestly his minor child will no longer follow his domicile. 
Whether the child will bave some other domicile of dependence remains to be discussed. 
Where the father is deprived only of custody or sole custody, the matter. becomes 
more contentious. The old authorities do not appear to have dealt with lt. Th� 
attitude of our courts, so far as it has been expressed, is bred of a mixture of leg�l 
636) 
dogmatics and a mistaken notion of the concept of domicile. In Landmann v Mienie 
Van den Heever AJP said obiter: '••• an order. in regard to custody does not and 
cannot encroach upon the father 1 s paternal power save in so far as the exercise of 
that power would be inconsistent 1,rith the. mother's custody. The father cannot ch1mge 
the child's residence, consequently! but may change its domicile.' The one other . . 6J /) 
decision in point, Favari! v Favc1rd, is not decisive either. Apparently only the 
custody of the minor had been awarded to his mother by the Engiish court that gr.anted 
her a divorce. Subsequently she came to South Africa. The question that Tredgold CJ 
put his mind to, though he stated it was not strictly necessary for the decision of 
the case, was the domicile of that child� when, as a major, he marriecl in England, 
for on that decision turned the resolution of any possible future dispt1te as to the 
matrimonial proprietary rigime. En passant the learned Chief Justice had to consider 
whether the propositus followed his mother's changing domicile. He considered that 
.Van den Heever AJP was correct - 'the change of domicile depends more upon the 
intention of the· guardian than of the custodian parent in cases where guardian.">hip 
and custody are separated •••• [A]ny question of a change of status is essentially 
of a nature in which the decision rests with the guardian rather than the custodlan. 
The effect of a change of domicile in amino� as a result of action by the parent 
is to attribute to the minor a decision on the part of the parent to change his or 
her permanent. residence, and a decision on such a point seems to ••• be a matter 
638) 
ordinarily within the purview of the guardian.' With respect, this reasoning is 
not convincing. A change of domicile is not a change of status, though it could in 
certain circumstances have that effect. But more likely its effect is a change in 
the governing law or jurisdiction in relation to the de cujus. The reference to 
change of residence seems strange, for surely this lies in the hands of the custodian 
and not the residuary guardian. In any event, the court was concerned with uncertain 
facts, as the minor was a ward in.chancery and Treclgold CJ considered that 'final 
th it t d . h tl [E 1· h] t d·' "th · d' 'd 1 1639) B · au or y res e wit 1e ng is cour s an not wi any in 1v1 ua ·• earing
in mind that it was an English order that was involved and the issue of domicile did 
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not arise crisply for decision, one cannot attach rwch value to the views of 
the Southern Rhodesian court as to t.:he effect of depriving a father of custody, so 
far as South African law is concerned. 
640) 
Spiro for the past twenty years has contended that domicile goes with residuary 
641) 
guc1rdianship,not with custody. Pollak, relying on American authority, submitted th<1t 
the 'reasonable' view WHS that if the mother was given custody on the granting of a 
divorce decree the chHd should follow her domidle� Although the law of the United 
S d . . t · th" d" 
' 642) f l ' d d h d . . tates oes po1n 1n 10 1rect1an, un ortunate .y it oes not raw t e ist1nct1on 
of our law between custody and guardi2nship. Custody would appear to be what we 
call full guardianship. On the otheT hand§ 22 of Restatement Second shows that the 
place of residence of a minor is a significant factor, for that section states that 
if a minor lives with one of his parents, he has the domicile of that parent. This, 
j_t is believed, is the realislic view. Natural guardianship, as has already been 
stated, plays 2 role in determining the domicile of dependence of a minor. But 
should this nol be full gunrdianship - the e.nlirc d.rcle. of powers of control and 
adm:i.nistr;,t.i0u, not the drcle minus the criticP.11 segment of day-to-day care, includ­
ing choice of place of rasidence, that is, custody? 
English lHW appears to be veering f,i this c1:i.rection. Up to 1968 there was no . 
643) 
�ecision and little co�ment by the writers, though .the Draft Code of the Law of 
644)
Domicile ir•_ thtc, First Report of the Private International Law Cortirofttee of 1954 
provided that �s from the termiriation of the �arriage of the parents of·n legitimate 
or legitimated infant his domicile is that 'of the perso� (if any) in �horn [his] 
custody ••• is from time to· time lawfully vested or, if it is ve�ted in more than . . 6451 
one person, that of such of them as they may agree'. However, the court could in 
all cases 'make such provision for the purpose of varying an infant's domicile as 
it may deem appropriate to the welfare of the infant'. In Scotland the Court of· 
646) 
Session helcl in 1965 in .Shanks v Shanks that even if the mother is a·warded custody 
the child fol.lows the domkile of his father. Three years later Lord MacDennott LCJ 
refused to fol.low Shanks in delivering his celebrated J"udgment in the Northern ---- 647) 
Ireland case of Hone v H'2_i?�.• While the general rule was that the father has the 
parental authority and responsibility to act for his _minor child, said the learned 
Lord Chief Jusl:ice, and this pa!>.sed over to the mother on the father's death, when the 
father has abjured his r.espoasibility, this resulting in custody being awarded to the 
mother, the latter is nou the parent in charge of and respons1.ble for the welfare 
In .!!£2.�. the father had deserted his family - 1 walked out of his child's of thG child. 
648) 
life 1 - ancl the mother hi.id been awarded custody in the divorce suit�
It is believed that this decision points the direction for our law, but does
not go far enough if :it is to be re:ad as confined to a case where a father has 
shrugged off his clo:nestic re.<-ponsil)il ities - a situation, incidentally, ·where the 
mother might well ask for and be granted guardianship. In a divorce action custody 
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(0r sole custody) is awarcled basically on wh/-\t is in the interest of the m:i.nor. The 
father may well not have quit his duties and indeed may he desirous of taking 
personal care of the children, but if they are girls or young boys their custody . 
649) 
will normally be awarded to their mother. Thus if the marriage no lone;er. subs:tst:� 
but the father is alive, the granting of custbdy to the mother, it is submitted, 
should utilitatis ca.usa carry with it the determination of the domicile of dependence.
Otben-1:i.se untenable situations will arise. Say n divorce is grantt?.d whGn a child 
is a year old, and the mother, who had been awarded custody, shortly thereafter 
migrates to New Zealand,while the father remains domiciled in the Repuhlic. If the 
child dies unmarried and intestate at the age of 20 his estate will he distributed 
according to the law of South Africa if he does not take the domicile of his mother. 
As his whole life is cent.red in New· Zealand this Ahould not be. In whe.t follows
it will be taken as a general rule that with a natural guardian custody carries 
domicile. 
If the marriage has not been dissolved� the uife will continue to follow her 
husband I s domicile. She may have hi::d vested in her guardianship at common tc,.,., 1 sole 
guardianship under s 5 of the Matrimonial Affair� Act or excl�sive parental powers 
under s 60 of the Children's Act. Or she may have been awarded custody at co�non law. 
or sole custody under s 5. What now is to be thE! rule as the minor 1 s rlomicile? In 
both instances ther.e seems no avoicH.ng the answer that, subject to the possibl{'.
limitations .:tlready outlined in the analysis of a child's dependency for domicile. 
vesting in his fat.her, he will follow his father's domicile at second remove, thf't i.s, 
through his mother's domicile of dependence� It is too artificial to reason
that an analor:ue can be found with the remarria.ge of a. widow-mother where, as i:-,il l 
be .-,hmm, it has been argued (though fallaciously, it is suhin1.tted) that, despite 
the preservation of the vinculum san°uinis and the parental power in the mother, a 
minor child would n6t follow the domicile obtained by her through her dependence 
on her new husband. 
The topic hereafter bristles with a bewildering variety of possible situations i 
difficult to· arrange in any systematic. orcler. Hhat follows does not profess to 
coT\lprehend all of the situations but only the main ones - many of which fortun.\'\te.ly 
are none the less unlikely to cristallize in real life. 
Let us start with the widow-mother. On the applicable law there is some 
learning. Or the father may be alive, but the marriage be dissolved and the moth'"r 
may remarry, thus obtaining a new domicile of dependence for herself. On the score 
of this being reflected on to the child if she has been granted custody or guardian­
ship there seems to be no authority. 
If the father of a legitimate. minor dies,.in general the minor follows the domicile 
of his mothe�
5pj deference to the call.s of the vi.nculum san.guinis and of the parental 
· 650' . 
authority �ich automatically devolves on her in the ordinary course of events. 
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This broAd principle of dependency is, of course, subject to th� possible li�ita w 
tions o1ready mentioned. In particulnr i.n rel;:;1ti,m to the f:i.Hh pr6l1lem posed, 
whE?.ther the parent fr.om whom the d01d.cile of dep0ndence flm·,s c?.n giv£' the child 652) 
a different domicile,. the. English case of In re Bcnurn.ont is of persu�si.v<i force. 
Here the minor da.ur,;hter of a widow was held not to f<>llow her mother's domicHe where 
her mother left her in the care of an ,nmt in Scotli.:nid J where her. hus'harnl, the fotlwr 
of the child, had died do□iciled. 
At comrnon law a fathr.?r with· g1111rdir.mship could by will or _deed app()in t a third 
person es guardian of his minor chil<l 1 to the exclusion of the mother, although she 
could not in this way be deprived of custody. According to the old writers,in this 
event the child followed his mother 1 I". clo,ni.cile onlv if be took uo the tv�t: re.sidencc 
653) 
' 
I. with her with the guardian's consent. In modern law the father. s r;ener.ol power i.s 
restrict0d to the appointment of a joint guardian by will in one of the circumstnnces 
already adumbrated. This should not -9.ffect the general rule that the mi1 0r :follow�; 
his mother's domicile, :i.t is believed. Natural.ly 9 if a stranzer is vef.t.NI wj_th sole 
guardianship. or sole custody, in accorr1ance with the legal rules h£l.re propounded, the 
�inor will not be attributed the domicile of his mother. The principle would alsn 
hold in the.·reverse situation, where the father. is thG survivor. 
When the widow-mother on whom a minor is de�endent for domicile re�arries, the 
654) 
resultant legal position, according to Pothier, is that since she thereafter ccvs0s 
to be hec1.d of the familr, becoming part of the family of her new husband, he.r chi!.-­
dren no longer follow her domicile and retain, until they become sui iu�is, the 
6J3T-·--·-d omi ci le they had on remarriage. It is posslble to read into Voet the same rule. 
Otherwj se the Roman-Dutch writers do not appear to have considered the matter. TM s 
is surprising,because they do go into the question af the effect on a minor orphan's 
domicile of the appointment of a guardian. Here, as will be seen, the weightier 
view is that a relationship of aependency is created. South African case lav is 
silent on the effect of the remarriage of the widow-mother. English law is 5.n an 
uncertain stat1: .• It has lJeen suggested that the. child fallows his mother's deriv<1t:i.ve 
656) 
domicile only if he lives with her lit her actual place of domicile and (9ossibly) 
only if the change of domicile is not to his disadvantage and not with fraudulent 
657) 658) 
design. According to the latest version of the knerican �:,1ter1ent, the child 
does not follow the domicile of his step.father by_ operation of law. He will take
his mother's domicile if this is in a place 'where the mother would be domiciled by 
application of the rules relating to the acquisition o.f a domicil of choice•. 
The ideal solution would appear to lie in Rn ;:idmix!:.ure of L:he Rest�tement 
rule� and the gloss on the general principle that a legitiwate minor follows his 
father's domj_cile during the' latter's lifetime.; The f:i.rst question, then, wo_ul.d be 
where, were she able during her new marriage to i:icqu:ire her mm <1amicilB, as is 
659) 
possible in AmericB.n law, the minor's mother would l1e domidlecl. In thB vast 
majod. ty of cases it would be in the same place as her new husband, but not if she has 
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her home elsewhere (more likely if she and her new husband hfl.ve parted ways t but 
not necessad.ly confined to this e,•2ntmd.ity). If the minor's mother would on 
this test be dom5.cilec1 elsewhere, he would not take his mother's deri.vative dorn:i.ci.le. 
The r..ost realistic nn<l satisfactory ans,\•er wouln then .be that his domicile is this 
hypothetical one of his mother's. That apparently would be what w-,uld be decicied in 
the United States - assuming the Re�tatmne2.!_ correctly expresses the chimerical 
common l .. w of that lend - for that would bC'. the actual domic.ile of his mother in 
that 1-aw. Would it be beyond the permisd,.re are.a of creativity of our courts to 
fashion this suggtcsted rule? (It shoui'd of course be gtosscd wlth the reservations 
tacked on to the general pr:i.nciple that a teeit.ima te minor follows his fathe.r' s 
· clomid.10. during his father's lifetime.) Other solutions would inevitably be less 
satisf�ctory becaus� they would depart from reality. They would range from the one 
pole of Pcthier's ah:.i.ding h r the last domicile principle; the one intermedi2.te <1nswer 
that the minor w011ld continue to follow his mother's domicile even though it come 
through his stepfather., unless his mother's hypothetical domi.cile w.,-.s elsewhere, in 
which event he would keep his last domicile; the other intermediate answer that 
he would follow hi.s r:tothcr's derivative. domicile only if he actually lives w:i.th her 
in her nep country of ilomlcile and otherwise would retain his last domicile; 
to the other pole of saying that he continues to follow his Mother's domicile in all 
circumst�!1ces and thus in reality obtP.ins a domicile o.-1: dependence through his step­
father. All would yield unfo·rtunate results. Consider their appl:i.cation to the 
following situations : Jill t a South African-domiciled widow with a son Harry aged 2, 
m.arries Jack, a domiciliary of the State of Queensland 1 and goes to Uvc with him
in tbat State. A year_ later the man·iage hteaks clown, Etnd she returns to South Africa.
For some rev.son (possibly a rel:i.gious one) a dh�orce does not take place. It is bad
enough that Jill continues to be domiciled i.n Queensland. It would be still worse if
Harry did. Of course, on the Pothier rule his domicile would never have changed
to Queensland. But how unsatisfactorily that rule would have worked had Jack and
Jill lived happily ever after, as is still the usual course of affairs. Had Harry
died intestate at the. ege of 19 the distribution of his movables w·ould have been in
accorcfance with the law of South Africa t of which distant land dur:i.ng his lifetime
he had not the dimmest memory and of the legal rules of which he was profoundly
ignorant. Apply any solution' other than the one here advanced in either of the
above situations and the answer will be found equally unsatisfactory.
There seems to be no reason why the submission made to govern the remarriage 
of the widow-mother should not be applicable also to the remarriage of the divorced 
mother having guardianship, sole guardianship or exclusive parental powers or 
custody or sole custody of her minor child. 
Finally, there is the possibility of a third party's having guardianship or 
custorly. In practice this must arise in the preponderance of cases where the 
legitimate minor's mother and father have died. If no guardian or .sole g,uardi:rn 
(ie tutor) is appointed to him, the minor must in principle retain thP. last clom:Lcil_e 
he had unt:i.l he becomes .::"-...t:U�.!J�� and then en.uses H to change. (If the orphan 
is a girl, she could, of course, acquire a domicile of dependence through marriage,) 
If a guardian, sole �uardian or tutor is appointed to the raincr, in terms of one 
of the legal provisions already mentioned, will the minor now acquire in general a 
new domicile of dependence through this stranger? (Clear 1 y, the Uml ta ti ons on the 
general rule applicable to dependence on the father durinr- his lifetime must apply 
660) 661) 
here too.) According to Bynkershoek and Van der Keessel the answer is in the 
662) 663)
afHrm,".tive. According to Christin.?eus and Pothier the minor continues to keep .the 
last do1,iicile he had. The view of J3ynkershoek and Van der Keessel yielris a more 
664) 
satisfactory answer and should be adopted, In addition it must be considered to
be the prevailing attitude of the Roman-Dutch jurists, for it is significant that 
:it is repeated in § 11.5 of the Ontwerp 1820. The absence of the. vinculum sanguinJs 
or its surrogate (adoptfon) should not he allow(".d undue wei�ht. Nonnally the child 
wil 1 1:i.ve with his non-natural guardian, just as he would have continued to live 
with his surviving parent. 
Under s 5 of the :Matrimonfal Affairs Act sole guardbmship may be granted to 
a stranger by will of a parent vested with sole guardi.arn;hip or exclusive parental 
powers to the exclusion of the surviving parent; or the court may order that on the
dece2se of a named parent a person other than the survivor sh.,1.ll be sole guardi;rn 
(guardie.n). No reason is apparent why the rule should he any different in one of 
these situations. So too, if it can a�d does happen that a stranger is vested with 
gunrdianship by the court acting under cotmion-1.aw jur:i.sdiction, durlng the lifetimA 
of the parents or the survj_vor. of thc.rn. ·. Nor, though perhaps the argument. is not 
so strong,· should there be a different solution where a parent vested with sole 
custody appoints a stranBer sole custodian in terms of s 5(3)(�); or where custody 
is awarded by the court, acting under common-law jurisdiction, to a stranger dur:i.,1g 
the lifetime of the parents or the survivor of them. There remains the granting of· 
custody under s 59 of the Children's Act to a foster parent or other third person or 
the management of an instituti.on. Such custody is of an �xceptional character and 
is innocent of some of the powers that custody at common-law confers. Nevertheless 
there is a powerful case for saying that it·yields a comicile of dependency. Again, 
the close relationship of a person to his place of residence should be determinative 
of his domicile. In the case of the management of an institution, regard �ould be 
had to the area of situation of the institution. 
A child l�giti�ated oer subseouens metrimonium is recarded as a legitimate 
child for the purposes of a domicile of dependence. Thi_s may result in n retrospec-
665) 
tive change of domicile as from birth. 
An illegitimate child, as has been seen, takes as h:l.s dorriicile o-f origin the 
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domicile of his mother at the time of his hirth, and in general he continues 
to follow it �
6
�Jose reser.vRtio:1s a.nd subsidinr.v rul(:s an1.plying,rn1t�tis mutancHs. J • 
' ')___ 
_, 
as would c1.pply to a legi tirnate rdnor depenclent on his faf:her. A difficulty arLws, 
hm, ever, where the �,mmg!l. is under ag-;e 1 for, unlike a ,-,.i.dow or divorcee, an unrn;,,rded 
mother, until she beco'.Ti� 21 yea:r.s of age, c&nnot be the na.tural 3uai:-dic1.n of her minor 
667) 
chil d  a1�d is not 2..1:1.L • .J.�5.s for the purpose of acquiring a do::nid le of he,:- own. Until
she attains majority she wil 1 norrnal!.y follow her· .father's domicile a.c; it changes.
H:i.11 her chHd change. domicile simultaneously - tht"Ol f?,h dependency on dependency? 
The vinculum sanguinis is present but not the parent;:d. power. Nevertheless the
answer should be Yes, for it would lnad to a most undesirable position to hold that 
an illegi.t.imate chil.d of a. minor woman retpjns his don:dc:i.le of origin until his 
668) 
mother becomes of a.go. · (Then the ch:i.ld uiU undou11tc.dly become dependent on her 
669) 
in the l.<n·.' of domic5.le.) 
If, as is contended, the n�tural guardianship of a child of R putative marriage 
670) 
vests in his mother� the child �•:>i.1.1. follm.1 his mother's dor:1icile. during r!linoritv,
671) 
It has aJ.rea.dy been submitted tbat 2.n .'.1.nopte.d r.hHd takes as his domicile or 
dependence the domicile of his a<loptive parent or parents RS from the time of
adoption. this is because under the Children's Act 1960 the adoption order, of a 
constitutive character, pleces th� nlnor thereafter in all respects in the shoe� 
of a legitimate chilrl of the adoptive parent or paI'ents. 
(s) Insane nf!r.:c-:ons. On the. d:i_fficul.t question of the domicile o\tffsc who
because of unsound mind are not nble to 0c�uir.e a domicile for themselves 1 ther�. is 
no old aLJthori ty directly in point and South African c�sec law 5.s slender. A uis­
tincd.on is drawn in so,�e 11:•.g;il. systems between thos<:> who become insane while 
de.pendent persons and those who bccorn12 insr-ne when ,....ui jmis. 
As regards insane minors (the insanity may date from hirth or from a t{me 
thereafter.) the consensus of 1-n:i.ters on Anglo-Arner:i.can law is that the child durinr.
67 3) 
·-
minoTi ty follows the domicile of the natur..o.l. guardian on whom l,e is dependent. Most 
of them also agree that the ins.;1ne child afte.r reaching the 2ge of majority continue . ., 
674)
to do so, 3.nd does not simply ni.t,dn th0 last domicil0. he had befoi:-e turning 2L 
This solution see�e most in accord with the r�alities of life, even though it could 
lead to a child of the insane person being attributed a domicile through a remote 
cause. There could not often be such a dependant •. What if a child's natural 
guardian die during his minority or thereafter? Should the child follow the 
domicile of a non-natural CLJTtttor, if any t a�poi.nted to his person and not, as. is 
th� rule, only to his property? There isno authoritv.
) 
Following what was submitted
675 
on the issue of a sane minor similarly cixcumstance.<'1, it is beli.e.ved that he. should, 
The foregoing submissions are nll subject to the approp�iate reservations applicable
to the domicile· of dependency of a legitimate minor on his father, :i.n particular that 
the guardian docs not a,.t with fnmclulent intent and (possibly) thRt no prejudice 
is caused to the werd, 
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When a person sui .12:�!:i.5. becomes insane, there is some authority tht•t he 
676) 
retains the l.(lst domicile he had before becoming insane ;incl does not follow 
the domicile of the curator, if any, to his person., whether the latter be his 
677) 
father or. someone else. The ;;ir�uf'.lent used fn one English case w·13s that the interests 
678i of others could be prejurliced. _his 1 .. s not convincing, for rer,.sons ,1.lrec:rly given. 
Four otho2r solutions have been arrived at. The fir.st is that thQ lunatic. follows 
, I , • .. 6 79) 
. 680) . 
hJ.s curator s don1 c1le: thus the. lm-? of France 1,.nd Louisianc1. The second goes even 
further: that the curator has the capacitv to give the lunotic a domicile differe�t 
681) 
- , -
from his own. The third is that the domiciliary court may give the curator the 
capacity to chanF;e the hmatic 1 s i'lomicile�
82
fhe fonrt.h is th:it the Cttrcitor may shift 
thG lunatic's domicile if that vas in the lunatic's interest and not to serve a 
683) 
selfish purpo[:0. of the curator. None of these variants from the rulef: :,::nhmitted 
as applicable to insane minors appears to be necessary.Those rules should obtain 
in this situation. It has to he borne in mind that the lunatic may have dependants 
himself, who could then automatically at a. double remove foPow the curAtor. 1 s do::d.d. 1 e 
·if the lunatic does.
What has been said would apply to a person whose instmi ty extended through
minority into majority_and who then had a sane interval, only to relapse into madness.
If a married woman b�comes insane, she will. contimrn to follow her husbarid 1 s
684) 
dornicile. The rule is a sound: one, by analogy with that npplicable to <1.n insane
minor and in view of the awkward questions of choice of la,-1 and jurisdiction that,
as has been shm,m, coul.cl arise if the doctrine of unity of domicile were breached
without a statute's taking care of the resultant si tuatiou. If the marriage is
dissolved by death or decree of the court this domicile of dependence will end� nnd
the woman will. retain her last domicile unless a curator is appointed to her person.
In that event, she should follow his c'lomicile in accordance with the rule proposed
abo\•e.
V ESTABLISHMENT OF DOMICILE
Questions of the onus and the.requisite degree of proof of abandonment of o
domicile of origin or choice or acquisition of a domicile of choicie have already
685) . 686) . 
been considered. Reference has also been made to the maxim 
1 ubi uxor ibi domus'
and the presumptio hominis in favour of the last domicile, but nei.ther maxim nor
'presumption' will assist when the last domicile is unknown. As was mentioned in the
687). 
discussion of the domicile of origin, tne necessity of settling the issue may driv�
a court· to say that a domicile of origin is the first known domicile.
The importance of residence as a factor from which animus manendi can be . 688) 
inferred has been pointed to; but it has also been stressed that the strength of 
the inference depends on the particular circumstances. The Roman-Dutcg891xts 
frequently refer to persons such as business men, diplomats and consuls who live 
abtoad under such circumstances that a conclusion of the existence of the required 
FootQotes on pages 124, 125. 
- JC, -
intention is unwarrnnted 1 however long the residence. ffare the mode of residence 
is the .sir;nif_icant factor. In many other situations, naturally, length of residence 
would he iu1portant evidence of domid.le, for the establishment of which 'no circum­
stance is too small to be taken into consideration'. 
69•P�e evaluation of each fact
would depend on the context, as each case is unique, &nd what may be decisive in. 
691) 
one may be unimportant in onother, having regard, in Durge's words, to 'the quality
and station of. the person 1. 
A person may acquire a domicile in an area whatever his motive be. But his 
motive may be an important element in determin�ng whether his residence is coupled 
692) 
with the necessary �.:!:.s mcmendi. As was said in a leading American case, 1 [m]otives
are imml.terial, except as they indicate j_ntent.i.on. A change of domicile may be made 
through caprice, whim or fancy, for business, health or pleasure, to secure a change 
of cUmate, or a change of lmvs, or for any reason whatever, provided the-re is an 
absolute and fixed intention to abandon one and acquire onother and the acts of the 
person affected confirm the intention •• n No pretence or deception can be prc.ctised, 
for the intention must be honest, the action genuine. •u' A special motive must 
be scrutinized carefully lest it be tacked on to a residence that is to cease when 
the purpose is acC'.omplished. But it could well be concluded in appropriate circum­
stance� that a special motive aids in drawing the inference that the animus manendi 
693) 
exists: as, for instance, to have·the freedom to will one's property as one pleases, . 
694) 
even perbap s to · sue for divorce,. to allow one ts troupe of performing chimpanzees 
695) 
to enjoy a salubrious climate. 
'All the facts, incidents and events of a man's life are both -relevant and 
696) 
admissible indications of his state of mind,' the following circumstantial 
factors, inter alia, are mentioned in the old authorities or have influenced a 
court in concluding that a new domicile has been acquired: sale of property in the 
697) 698) 699) 
fonner country of residence; acquisition of land or a dwelling house in the new one; 
700) 
removal of the propositus and his family with their goods and effects to the new; 
701) 702) 
application· for a certificate allowing permanent residence; hiring of accommodation; 
703) 704) 
payment of income tax; movement of the bulk of one's business interests and. fortune; 
705) . 706) marria�e in the area; presence of wife and children; education of children in the 
707) 708) · 709) 
area; investment of savings in a business; service on a jury; life insurance with . 710} 711)
a local company; executing the local form of will; learning the new country's 
712) 
. 
713) 
language. Generally close association with the community will be a positive indiciurn. 
· 
. The taking out of citizenship normally will point strongly i11 favour of local 
714) 
domicile, but failure to apply for citizenship does not preclude the acquisition 
of domicile t nor does the application fo-r and obtaining of it necessarily lead to · 715) 
the inference that local domicile hai been obtained.
The need for a court at times to make a positive finding as to the domicile 
of the �2-2 - which would probably arise more oft1:.m in questions of choice of
Footnotes on pages 125, _126. 
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law than in questions of jurisdiction - may result in its allowing 2 factor 
. . i d 
• • 716) 
i intrinsically of little we ght to be .ec1-s1.ve. If illl that s known of a man
is that he Uved i,n a certain place at about the critical time, it m:i.ght be decided
that he was then domiciled there?
17
ff nothing is 'known of a deceased person other 
. . , · 718) 719) than that: he died at a particular spot, or that he set .sail from port X, he could 
be held to have had his last domicile at that spot or port, 
The existence of the animus mancndi may be dedved from statements at the 
720) 
trial by the propositus of his present state of mind .and from past express decla.ra-
721 J 
--
tion.s by hi.m. Such declarations made a time ago 'must be examined by considering 
the person to whom, the pui:-poses for which $ and the circumstnnces tn which they 
[were1 made, and they must further be fortified and carried into effect by conduct ;1 
. . 722) , . 
and action consistent with the declared expression.' Desp:ite issuing wa-rning.s of 
this sort, the courts, if necessity presses, will accept a statement brought to the 
sur.face from the depths of the pool of memory. For instance J in Von Falkstein v · 723) 
Von Falkstein the �laintiff wife in a divo�ce suit gave evidence that the marriage
had taken place'! sixteen years before in Mafeking in the Cape Colony. After·the
couple had lived there for a month the husband, who was employed by the Transv.1c1l
Republic, had left for Johannesburg. He had stated that he was living there and
on arrival had sent the plaintiff a telegram asking her to join him. On arr.ivd i::he
had failed to find him and had not succeeded in tracing him since. It was held that
the husband was domiciled in Johannesburg at the commencement of the divorce pro­
ceedings,
�n particular a statement made some time by the propositus that he intended 
to acquire a domicile must be treated with considerable reserve
� 
for '[o)ne may well
doubt whetpe-r [he] was acquainted with the meaning of the word'. 
24
;urthermore, a 
formal past declaration as to the then domicile may be suspect because of its self�
. 725) 
serving· nature. And statements at the trial by the propositus as to his present 
state of mind must fali into the same low scale of values where he is an interested 
p,uty. 
726) 
In a few cases hoary with age it was said that where the domicile of the defen-
dant is in issue some weight can be attached to his failure to deny an aUe.,,_7)ion 
that he is domiciled in the area stated. More recently, however, Horwitz AJP 'craved 
leave to doubt whether any real cogency can be attached to the nonnappearance by a 
defendant, especially where, as here, a divorce appears to be desired by both parties'. 
Possibly the courts migh� be prepared to be influenced by non-denial by the defendant 
in a matter of choice of law (at least where the interests of minors ore not involved) 
or jurisdiction not involving an issue of status. 
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1. Many years have passed since the late Mr Walter Pollak QC published his admirable
articles on the subject ('Domicile t (1933) 50 SALJ 449, (1934) 51 ibid 11). In
the intervening period· many -important judgments have been handed do,m, a number of
statutes touching on dor.1-id.le have been passed, new problems have been r.evealcd
and a large literature of the subject has accum.ulated� Thus a re-examination appears
warranted.
2. The Roman-Dutch writers considered that the conflict of laws embraced only choice
of the appropriate legal system and the recognition and enforcement of a forcj_gn
judgment. See eg the treatment of J Voet .1.4 Pt II and Huber PraelE'.ctiones ju�
entitled De conflictu legum and cited henceforward as . . 
1De Con'. In modern Anglo-American law as a rule domestic superior court juris-
diction is also dealt with, so es to determine which intc:-nal court is competent: 
to hear a. case with a foreign element._ Normally Continental treatises do not cover 
thii; topic. I Szaszy International Civil Procedure (1967) 9, 15-19, 26 would include 
it in international civil proce.dure, which he considers the twin of private inter­
national law (ie conflict of laws). It seems to be a Siomese twin. In South Afric11, 
with each provincial and local division of the Supreme Court, a few exceptional 
instances apart t · being treated as separate fr.om its f<�llows, and each province and 
the area of each provincial division to some degree having a separate system of law, 
it would he useful to consider the jurisdictional rules of the Supreme Court as part 
of the conflict of laws, It would also be extremely artificial to exclude domestic 
juri�diction from the purview of that branch of law, as with certllin topics, notably 
matrimonial law, que.stions of choice of law and jurisdict1on are clo5ely connected. 
3. It was of importance at one tirae for the acquisition of Union nationality. See Vm1
Rensburg v pallinger 1950 (4) SA 427 (T). �his study is not concerned with the
statutory definition of domicile under the Admission of Persons to the Union Regula­
tion Act 22 of 1913, s 30, which differs from the common-law meaning. See eg It,; . ..!'$.
Feeda Hoose� (1915) 36 NLR 381, !:!,�ssen Mia v l�rrnigrants Appeal 8� (1915) 36 NLR
620, Kajee v Imrnirzrants Appeal Board (1916) 36 NLR 42, Parker v Princinal I�i£.ratj2,!l
9££1ce:. 1.926 CPD 255, Pillay v PrinciDal Immigration Officer (1926) l,7 NLR 520,
Limbada v Princie!IJ __ ImmiRration Officer 1933 NPD 146.
l,. D 50.1.27.2. And see below, n 75. 
5. See generally F C von Savigny _§ystem des heutis::_en rtlmischen Rechts VIII (1849), 
translated by W Guthrie sub tit Private International L,iw : A Treatise on the 
Conflict of Laws--=;:) (Edinburgh 1869; 2 ed 1880)§§ 351ff ; L von Bar The Theorv und 
Practice of Private International Law2ed, translated by GR Gillespie (Edinburgh 
1892) 119-20; L Wenger Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure, translated 
by OH Fisk (New York 19Li0) § 4n59; H F Jolowicz Roman Foundations of Modern� 
(1957) 38-43; Cheshire's Private International Law 8 ed (1970) by G C Cheshfre and PM 
North 16-18. 
01 
6. § 357. He says that where a defendant belonged to more than one municipality by
orig£ or domicilium� he was subject to the jurisdiction of each; but clearly only
one law could be applicable to him a11d 1indubitably' this was determined by the origo 
rather than by the domicilium and the or:igo by birth rather than by adoption,
manumission or election. lf he had no principal citizenship, which Savigny, unlike
many jurists, holds was possible (§ 351), the lex dotnicilii applied. What happened
if the defendant had then no or more than one domicili� is not clear.
7. See Coleman Phillipson J'he I.!2.W'nationaJ. Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome I
(1911) 273ff.
8. Nason v Ha son (188 5) 4 EDC 330 at 3'•2.
9. Jooste v Jooste 1938 NPD 212 at 213.
LO. 1:!_e� v Webber 1915 AD 239 at 242. See also Innes CJ at 243; Solomon J at 249. 
Cf De Villiers AJA at 258: 'our law .does not differ from the English l&w, largely 
derived as it is from lhe civil law', which is couched too dogmatically. See too 
Ex parte Donelly 1915 WI,D 29 at 32-3.
L  See cg ,Eilon v filJ:2.!l 1965 (1) SA 703 (AD). See tex:tfollowingnnl87,306. OM can but 
sympathize with the sentiments of Rumpff .TA in his dissenting judgment (at 704) that 
in relation to the test for animus manendi 1Westlake [_!lrivate International Law] ancl 
the English cases l'eferred to ore best left alone'. See too the warning by 
Willir.mson JA in his dissendng judgment that English law may not always be a reliable 
guide (at 706). But, alas, the Roman-Dutch writings often afford scant help • 
. 2. eg § 82 of the Portuguese Civil Code of 1966: 'A person takes the domicile of the 
place of his habitual residence ••• �• 
3. Act 7 of 1953, as inserted by the Wills Amendment Act 41 of 1965. Section 3bis
came into operation on 4 December 1970: Proc 306 of 1970.
4. See E Kahn in 1965 Annual SuTvey_ 477.
5. See Szasiy op cit 119-21. In France ordinary residence: D von Landauerin (1964) 13
ICLQ 6 + The German BGB § 7 speaks of 'Wohnsitz 1 , which cannot be translated os
'dornic::i.le' but only as 'habitual residence': E J Cohn Manual of Gerrnrm Law I 2 ed
(1968) § 106. In Sweden the 'severe criteria' of English (and, semble, South
African) law are not applied: Hilding Eek The Swedish Conflict of Laws (1965) 75;
see too 129ff. Generally on the domiciliary, nationality and 'mixed' systems of law,
see Ernst Rabel The Conflict of Laws: A Coni.oara.tive Study I 2 ed (1958) 117-29.
For a discussion of the meaning of 'habitual residence' see Bhadra G Ranchod 'The
Concept of Domicile in South African Law' 1970 Acta Juridica 53 at 73-5.
6. Ian F G Baxter Essays on Private Law, Foreign Law and Foreign Judi.=-,ments (1966) 124.
7. Innes CJ in� v �� 1910 'fPD 423 at 427.
8. Per Dar.ry JP in Mason v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 �t 337.
v Webber 1915 AD 239 at 249.
9. Below, text to n 279.
See too Solomon Jin Webber --
82 
20. Whkke't v � (1858} 7 HLC 124 at 159-60, 11 ER 50 at 64,
2l o �1£1 v §_�hegan (1878) LR 9 ChD 441 ( CA) at l156, 
22, Robert A Leflar �_!i'�ri5an Conflicts Law (1968) 17.23. �rier. ci. _fulgel Brewi.ng Co v Dreyfus (1898) 172 Mass 154 at 157, 51 NE 531 at532, 70 Am St Rep 251 at 254.
2.4 • .!!i,s_ev & Morris on the Conflict of Laws Bed (1967) Rule 3 p 78� 
2.5. § 11(1).
26, § 12.
27. At 9, See also at 12, See too H E Read 'Recognition and Enforcement of Ford.gn
Juc<:r;mr-mts ln the Comm£.I!...!aw Units of the British Commonwealth (1938) 6,
28. J D Falconbddge ,Essr,,ys on_ the Conflict of Laws 2 ed (195L�) 3 approves it.
29. The Paradoxes of Leval Science (1928) 67. ·
30. See R H Graveson }'he Conflict of Laws 6 ed (l.969) 187-8, This is clear from
Johnso-e_ v �ohnson 1931 AD 391, where the issue. wn.s the domicile of the husband
ot the time of mai·riage in order to establish the matrimon1al. · proprietary regime,
The court ·made it clear that domicile in a particular State in the USA had to be
estahlishe.d, not in the USA as a whole (at 406).
31. Such as an ordinance on town-planning forbidding certai.n types of sale of land.
32. Such as the peculiar rules governing the matrimonial proprietary regime in Natal.
See H R Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife 3 ed ( 1969) ch 22,
33. Notably the Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act 18 of 1932.
34. �J:.s.E. v Ellison 1911 AD 73 at 82 1 92-3, 98-9.
35. eg the Orange Free State Provincial Division holds a mi.nor' s marriage l-Jithout
consent of guardinn:s void (Van der Westhuizen v Engelbrecht 1942 OPD 191),the other
divisions voidable only.36. See the authorities cited by E Kahn in (1956) 73 .§!Jd. 312.
37. 55 of 1949. See my analysis in the Appendix to Hahlo Husband and Wife 580-1.
38. 22 of 1939_. The natl.on of South African domicile was also employed in the Matrimonial
Causes Jurisdiction Act 35 of 1945, but that remedial measure for war-time marriages
is to all intents D.nd purposes defunct. See Kahn op cit 532078,
39. Insertecl bys 21 of the General Law Amendment Act 70 of 1968.
LiO. See Kahn op cit 625. 
41. The suggestion is mine: op cit 626.
42. Admittedly this contingency is remote, There are cases where the court has bent
the bough - beyond breaking point, it is believed, if domicile means the same thing
for every purpose - to find the husband domiciled in its area., ·where otherwise no
South African court would be competent. See Ricketts v Ricketts 1929 EDL 211;
Croft v Croft 1930 WLD 201.
43. . .. [T]he four provinces [ara regarded] as so separate and distinct as to give
rise, not.to a Union domicile, but a purely provincial one. Each province must be deemed in this respect to be 11another country 11 , one might almost say, a "foreign 
country111 ; per Horwitz AJP in Smith v Smith 1952 (l+) SA 750 (0) at 756. 
44. (1933) 50 -� 458-9.45. Dicey & Horris Rule 39 D 307.
46. Zelman Cowen 6.. Derek Nendcs cla Costa Matr:i.monia.l Causes Jurisd:i.ction (1961)30�1 and 'The Unity of Domicile 1 (1962) 78 LQR 62; P E Nygh Conflict�.2,L.J��
fustrali� (1968) 67.
47. [1962] VR 70 at 71.
1+8. At 72. t,9. [1968] SASR 243, discussed by 'D St L K' in (1969) i,3 Australian LJ 26 •
.50. Nygh 68. 51. 1 D St L K 1 op cit 26. Me.ricka v Mericka_ [1954] SASR 74 at 82-3 lends some support 
for simple residence. 52. Will.is L M Reese 'Does Domicil Bear a Single Meaning?' (1955)55 Columbia LR 589, reprinted in (1955) 2 ---:? f n-,,, en, :J
�eder.land�_1ij_.9schri.ft voor Inteinational Recht 15.
The first person to raise the possibility of an affirmative answesr ·was the icono­
clastic American jusrist Walter Wheeler Cook. See his ���cal and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of L� (1942) ch VII. He said (at 196): ••. as new combin11tions
of £.acts have presented 1:.hemselves, more and more unlike the simpler cases from which
the development started (ie clearly a "borne" and only one 11homen ) the meaning given
to the symbol "domicil" has varied with the nature of the pro11lem presented: taxation,
divorce, intestate succession, etc, etc.' He contended st�enuously that his 'rela­
tive' as opposed to the 'single conception' theory of domicile allowed for the
j u r i sd i c t io,
meeting of social and economic requirQments. Reese argues that foT in pers�12_� /
domicile of choice should be more easily found to have been acquired than for
personal property or inheritance tax. He adduces various American decisions to
show there the cousrt manipulated the stated requirements in order to produce an
equitable result, thro.ugh variations in the quantum of proof required to establish
a domicile and the drawing of different inferQnces of fact in the 1:i.ght of the issue
involved. Leflar op cit 17 is not unsympathetic. The Private International Law
Committee of England in its Se venth Report, Cmnd 1955 (1963) § 12, rejected a
variable test for domicile.
On the ill-fated.suggestion by Buchanan Jin Mason v � (1885) 4 EDC 330 at354-5 (see too Kotze JP in Hooper v Hooper 1908 EDC 474) that an abandoned wife
should be able to establish, if not� full, a\ least a separate forensic domicile,
see below § IV.
84 
On the suggestion in }2.9ste v .Joo�te 1938 NllD 212 at 216 that the revival of tbe 
domicile of origin principle apply only in certain circumstances, see helot,1, n 161. 
On this principle generally see text following n 141. 
R H Gr.!\veson 'The Law of Domicile in the Twentieth Century' in The Jubilee Lectures 
of _!_��-Faculty of I.mcr_�f:.r�· of Sheffield ed O R Marshall (1%0) 85 at 90-1 
finds the answer to the query, Why 'should there not be different domiciles for 
different purposes?• to lie in the need for general concepts and the ability of 
the courts by admitting and giving �eight to different facts in a person 1 s life, 
to make domicil.e a-fixed legal concept with a variable factual content. 
Taking a realist attitur1e 7 the Australian writer Nygh (at 65�6) submits: 
never 
'Though in formal reasoning our courts have/suggested that different criteria 
should be applied depending on. the purpose for which domicil is required, it is 
probobly true to say that in actual fact the purpose does often influence the 
ftnding. Our. courts have, in general, shown reluctance to make a finding of 
domlcil which would result in the inval.idi ty of a will [citing R�_msav v �!:.!.E2,<>l. 
�-�al Inf::i.rmar.z [ 1930] AC 588], or the Habili ty of a taxpayer 1 citing inter alia 
Witrnns v AmG [1904] AC 287], but they have been much more ready to fi!ld dornicil
'�-;;-acr �assume jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. I 
{Pr-:i.vatc If}�ern5;tional Law 2 ed (1950)
·· 
Mart'in--w,rrffr·.l' r) rnucb earlier suggested that in Ramsar 'the decision was i.nfluenc-
ed by·the unexpressed wish of the court to uphold the deceased man's will'. 
The 1 inarticulate major premiss 1 suggested for the much-criticized Winans (to be 
discussed in § II below -�: ) can hardly be ll.Ccepted. It re.sul ted in a loss to the 
British Treasury of legacy duty on the foreign-situated estate of an American whq 
had been long resident in England. (Admittedly, estate duty had been paid on his 
English property of over two million pounds.) The decision was probably the result 
of an aberration on the part of Lord Macnaghten. Professor BA Wortley (.l!:!!,ispr�­
dence (1967) 80)5ays that the majority were influenced by the eloquence ofcounse4HH 
Asquith. On matrimonial jurisdiction, however, the realist approach could find 
support in the South African cases of Croft and Ricketts (above n 42). It would not 
be unfair to say that in undefended divorce actions judges are (or we.re) often 
content with slight evidence of domicile: eg Hawkes v Hawkes (1882) 2 SC 109,
Mason v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 at 344, McCurroch v McCurrach (1892) 6 HCG 256, 
Ex parte Hamman (1894) 1 Off ·Rep 306, Ggttiba v Gguiba (1901) 10 EDC 4, Knox v
Knox (1907) 24 SC 441 at 443 (but cf -��l:PA� v Q._�aE! 1922 OPD 41 at 44), Davies v 
Davies 1922 CPD 323, Bishop v Bishop 1923 CPD 414. [run onl 
And could not subliminal forces have been at work ad mfseric.ordiam in the decision 
of the majority in Johnson v Johnson 1931 AD 391 (see§ II below) that Johnson at 
the time of hi� �arriage had not lost his �,erlish domicile of originJ It be.at 
out the pathway that was to lead to a finding in favour of the ill-used Mrs Johnson 
that she had been married in com11un.ity of property. 
53. 1970 (1) SA 146 (R).
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54. Cf Dicey� Morris 83-4. See also J H C Morris The Conflict of Laws ( 1 <J71) 14. 
55. No final decision was reached by Goldin J as he held that ih any event domicile
in Australia had not been proved by the defendant husband.
56. 
57. 
Dicey & Morris 80; Nygh 68, 70.
Wolff§ 98; Herbert F Goodrich Handbook of the Conflict of Laws 3ed (St Paul•
Minn, 1949) § 31; Pollakin (1933)50 SAL� 454-5; American Restatement of the
Conflict: of Laws Secozti Proposed Official Draft Part I May 1967 (hereafter called
Restatement Second) §. 11 Comroent i•
-58. Hutchison's. Executor v The Master (Natal) 1919 AD 71 at 76-7,where a bachelor 
of advanced years was livini:; in the Royal Hotel 1 Dur.ban; Ley v Ley' .s Exe.cu tors 
1951 (3) SA .186 (AD) at 195, where a bachelor artisan had to find work in different 
places and could not be expected to have a dwelling house or permanent lodeings. 
59. See Restatement Second §§ 12 Co1mnents E_ and i, 16; Joseph H neale A Treatise on the
Conflict of Laws (New York t 1935) § 17.l; Wolff§ 98.
60. He may have his home in Johannesburg but work in. Pre tor.la. In that event he is.
domiciled i.n the area of the WLD as well as that of the TPD. In the reverse
situation he is domiciled only in the area of the TPD.
61. 
62. 
Rcstateraent Second � 12 Comments e and f.tJ . -
LeL_s Executors 1951 (3) SA 186 (AD) at 195. · 
63. __ --�!. Dicey 6. Morris Rule 3 p 78s Rule 15 p 117; Restatement Second§ 13; Falconb_;icl�eJ.30-�
This was possibly decided implicitly (sub silentio?) in Carvalho v Carvalho 
1936 SR 219, the argument being advanced that a Portuguese civil servant was 
domiciled in Southern Rhodesia, where he was.resident and stationed, because. 
P.ortu�u�s.e law so held�- Lewis J simply applied the law of. Southern Tlhodesia1
according to whichhe was not domiciled in ��e colony.
64. In re Annesle:c[1926] 1 Ch 692; Dicey 6. "Morris 30-2; Cheshire 46�7; Graveson 63;
Falconbridge 130;..l, 728; Nygh 80; Beale § 10. l; Goodrich § 21; G tv Stumbeig··· -•-·;.
Pr:1.ndples of Conflict of La'!>ts 2 ed (Brooklyn 1951) 53; A E Anton Private Inter­
national Law:A TrE:atise from the Standpoint of Scots� (Edinburgh 1967) 54.
65. Falconbridge 728-9; Kahn in H.i.hlo on Hu�b.:md 6. Wife 632. See Simons v Simons
(1939] 1 KB 490. In the well-known case of Torlonia v Torlonia (1928) 108 co·m1 292,
1942 A 8.43 (E E Cheatham, E N Griswold, W L M Reese and M Rosenberg Cases and.
Materials on Conflict of Law,S. 5 ed (1964) 70) the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut held that the plaintiff wifr couid bring a divorce suit as she had
acquired a separate domicile in the forum according to its law, although accoTding
to the lex domic:i.lii of her husband, that of Italy, she followed the domicile of
her husband (the rule of South African law too).
66. RH Graveson 'Capacity to Acquire a Domicile' (1950) 3 J.!& 149.· in 
See also his Conflict of L�ws 195; EM Clive/1966 Jur Rev 1 at 9-12. 
67. See Dicey 107-8; Cheshire 180; Nygh 80-:- 1; Restatement Seco.E_!! § 13,especially
Comment £•
68. Hague v Hague (1962) 108 CLR 230 at 240.
69. Conflict of Lows 195.
,..... -------- -
700 Or a man. Sec Banubh,,.i_ v �f Im igrati.on Officer, Nd_ta! (1913) 34 NLR 251. 
The son of B, a Natal domiciliary, at the age of 9 entered into a marriage in 
India, yrl1ere he then resided, but it was held thnt immediately thereafter he still 
took his father's domicile. Though no express reason was.given for this decision,
from the remarks of Gardiner AJ at 266-7 it appears that the marriage, though it 
may have been valid by the lex loci celebration:l.s, was not rocognized,as child 
marriages are against our public policy. 
71. Cf �tatement Second§ 13 Comment£•
72. Above,te.xt to n 53.
73. See� v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 at 337; Dicey o.. Morris Rule 4 pp 81·2;
Ch�shire. 159; Graveson 193; Leflar 16; Restate.m�nt __ Second § 11(2); Nygh 65.
Article 1(1) of .the abortive Draft ·code of the Law of Domicile in the First Report
of the Private International Law Cormnittee of England, Cmd 9068 (1954} read:
'Eve-ry person shall haw� a domicile but no pe-rson shall have more thari one domicile
at the same time.' It is, however, a rule that requires qualification., as has been
seen.
74. But cf Goldin Jin Smith v Smith 1970 (1) SA 146 (R) at 147: 1 It has frequently been 
laid down that no person can ba without a domid.le because the law will attribute 
a domicile to him. 1 But he cited only Dicey and Wille's �r.inciples. · 
75. D 50.1.27.2. See Pothier EEEi 50.1.18; Savigny System VI.II§ 351,q Bar§ 46.
76. See Savign)r op cit § 354nd.
77. eg B,1rtolus ad Cod 3.15.1, 11.48(1�7).2; Calvinus Lexicon Iurid icum sv _yagabimdu�: -
'_ve:eabundum "intelli.git, .cui nee certum domicil.ium, nee cons tans hab:Ltatio est.t ,. , 
See also Helen Waddell's fascinating The Wand�rinr Scholar! 6 ed (1932), dealing 
with the vagantes, the roaming Latin poets of the later Mlddle.Ages. 
78. Voorden-tol� sv vagabonde�.
79. De 1u-re c.oE.,j_, Prae l 2 (pars alt) 1.2 p 105. See furthe_r below, text to n 528. 
80. II No 302 p 13�.
81. (1885) 4 EDC 330 at 354.
82. 1902 TH 165 at 175.
83. 1912 TPD 805 at 807-8.
84. 1937 TPD 35 at 37.
85. lII(2) (ie Rotterdamsc.he Derde Deel) cons 317 (sc 217) n9. See also ibid 138
and 196� (Gr Opinions (De Bruyn) no 9).
86. Manier van Procederen 4.24.15.6.
87. 5.1.92, 50.1.3.
88. En-Jin Spiro 'Domicile in South African Law: A Critical Study' 1962 Acta Juridica
62 at 65�
89. ·6.4.40.2,3. See William Bui-ge Commentaries on Colonial and ForeiR,n La� led
(London 1833} I 34. According to A A Roberts A South Afdc�n Legal !3ibliographv
(1942) 73, 'although he was a German jurist he is freely quoted hy practically
all the well-known Roman-Dutch writers'. See further. H von "\.leber 'Einige Bemerkunger,
/J / 
Uber B{meciict Car_pzov 1 (1963) ?..6 THR�m:� 40. Spiro (1962 Acta Juridica 72) 
contends that thf, 'clorrd.dU1� gini� 1 mentioned by Carpzovius is the .£!..i�. 
of· Roman la:w. 
90. Hol! .. �� III(2) cons 138, 196 (Cr Opinions (De Bruyn) no 9}, 317(217);
J Voet 5.1.98,99.
91. § ll..l.
92. See Pollak in(l9J3)5C1 SAL.J lf7t;-S. Tlrnt th:i.s does not apply to Continental
countr:l.es tliat invoke the lex pa.f:..E.l�!?. as the personal law (Wolff § 99) is
perfectly understandable.
93. 
94. 
It is significant: that our courts, if need driYes, wi.11 find a domicile on the.
slightest evidence. See below,§ V.
L Raapc Internatiorrnl,�s Prlv,1.trecht 5 ed (1961) 73.
System VIII§ 359.
The V':st four words cater for. the situation raised in 2� v Smith <lhovc,
text t:o n 55.
The word 'operative' is used if our law .adheres to the rule of the revival of
the domicile of origin on the loss of a domicile of choice or dependenc:.e without
its replacement hy such a do.11:i.cile. In that event everyone has a latent domicile
of origin.
For. persuasive material see Dicey 6. Horr:i.s Rule 5 pp 82-4; Cheshire 160; Graveson
193-4•, Draft Code of the Private International Com�nittee of England art 1(1) (above.in
in·
� 
n·73);Leflar 16; Restatement Second§ 11(2); Nygh 65;Pollak/(1933} 50 SALJ 474.
ln French law (� ':l,vil. § 7(2)) and all Continental legal. systems derived from it
only one domicile is permitted. Genna.n lnw, liowever (BGil § 7(2)), allows a
plurality of domiciles. So too Portuguese law; C_ivil Code § 82. Out it must
be borne in mind that domicile plays a very minor r.ole in the Gecrnan conflict of
laws and has the meaning of heaclqu,;1rters or principal home.
What follows 1s based on my note 'Multiple Domiciles' (1965) 82 SALJ 147.
96. See text ton 55 above.
97. § 46.
98. See D 50.1.5, 50.1.62, 50.1.27.2; C 10�39.5,6; Savigny System VIII
§ 35l,.
99. By Coleman Phillipson !h.£2.!�atfon<1l La!':..�--�ustom of Ancient Greece and
� (London 191.1) I Zl;8, relying ori D so.1.s, and compD.ring 50.l.6.2.
He . al s·o con tends that. in 1 n ter. Roman law it was less common to find two cot1curren t
domiciles.
100. See Radelant Dec Cur lli,126 n 4; Fab�r Ej_� 2. 2. 2nl; Peckius Verhandelinr:h
van besetten 39.4; · Van Zutphen Practycl� r;v -.�rnii;:._il.ie no 4; Merula Nanier
van pro� 4,24.15.5, 4.40.3.1.4; -�'> Van Leeuwen Cens For 2.1.125, ➔ RHR 5.6.1;
Rodenburg De jure con;, Tract nrael 2.2.l ➔ p 33, 2.5.16 ➔ p 93; P Voet De statutis
Cliristinae.us Comm in leg-12� 5.4.3; Wesel De con bon soc I 103 p 37; 
J Voet ad Pand .38.17 .➔ App 3t,, 5.1.92; Vromans DI.'! fora comoet I 4 p 1.3.!1; Holl Cons 
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III( 2) (Rott ed) cons 138 n 23; Bynkc.rshoek Ohs '£urn II no 1371; Schomaker Cons IV 
cons36nn44-5; Van der Keessel Dictata ad Gr. 1.2.27 ➔ (Pret ed I pp 138-9, Meijer.s 
e,d p 32). 
101. l.oc cit.
102. A0..-�  38.17·-, App .34 f citing Rodenburg De jure conj, ,!'.E.££!..2.2.1 � in fine and
2.5.16 _, i�_,:Eed and P Voet D-e stat!!,tis 9.1.9.
103. Even soi w:i.th concurrent residences, which is not a remote contingency� probably
the only operat.:lve one. is the home where the ,P!"OPOSitus is present at the ti.me �
see �i v TBmba (1905) 22 SC 574. But again there i.s the possibility that
he is present in none of th8m.
104. loc cit.
105. op cit 4.40.3.14.
106, loc cit. 
107. loc. cit.
See also J Voet 5.1.92. 
1.08. Gf,. Van Zutphen loc cit; Peckius loc cit; Vromans De for.o comoet I 4 p 135; -
Van Leeuwen Cens Fol'.' 2.1.12.s, -? R.H,R. 5,6.1; · Radel.ant loc c::i.t; Pcckius 
loc cit. See too J Voet 5.1.92. 
J.09. Ex rrnrte Doi:_i.£.!..lx, 19t5 WLD 29 at 32; �Jebber v Webb_£E_ 1915 AD 239 at 242.
110. 1965 (l) SA 703 (AD). Speaking for the majority of the court, Potg:f.etcr AJA
ssid (at 721): 'In the case of Webber v Webber 1915 AD 239 at 242, Innas CJ, in
an ohi ter di.t�!,�, referring to the law of England, pointed out th.;i t no man can
.?.t any p.':lrt:i.cular time have mor,e thau one domicile ., On the facts of this U!se,
it is, however, not necessary to ded.de whether or not in our law the possihili ty
of; dual domicile exists.' Speaking for the dissenting two judges of appeal,
Williamson JA also ex.pres sly left the matter open (at 706).
11 l. Er-win Spiro in 1962 �.:!.��E..:h:�t_c,! 66-·9. 
112. Ad Pnn1 3f.l.17 App JL�.
113. Those of the Argcnt_ine, nni:d.1, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Nicar,9.gua,
Peru and Uruguay.
114. Sl�e eg Ph<1nor J :,:dcr l-r:1er.icanwColun!bian PrlvHLe Iritct7ltltion_a1 Law (1956) ch IV.
115. loc cit: 1 Narn cum stgtut."J. utrius1ue c1ornid.lii contr?.ria si�tt non potest coru,n 
ratio hahe:d .• '
116. � v Eilon 1%5 ( l) SA 703 (AD) al:. 721, per Potgieter AJA.
1.17. I-�as� v Ha.� (1885) 4 fmC 330 at 349.
J.13. Savigny �:yst�_ VHI § 359,
119. The crucial time is birth, not Uteljority: Henderson v Hendnson [1967] P 77.
120. D 50.l.lpr.;
J Voet 5. 1.91;
C 10.38.3; . Christinaeus Dec V dee 33 and Co� in l':'g r,mnk 5.9.5; 
Holl Cons Ut(2) cons 317(217) n 8. 
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Cf C 10.31.36; Niem-r Nec1 
!�::J:::� (Kop) 110 32. p 170; J Voet ':..l.91; Ho� III(2) -7 cons 317(217) n 
8; Savlgny .�Y,.:.s_.!em VI.II § 353. There appears to be a suggestion in !�o�ll.rt1 v 
Roh� f (1903) 17 EDC 132 at 135 (ti-nd John Weftlnke A T1·e.'lHsc on Private 
Int(:roation.e.1 Law 7 ed (1925) § 26t is uneq_uivocahly of this view) that if the 
fa the'!' chang(,s h1.s domic:i.lc durinf!, the minority of his child the child's domicile 
of origin ch<'tTlges _accorc1:l.n::i;ly. nut t11is cannot be supported. See Dicey & Nord.s 
85; Holff � 117; Chesh:i.rc 177; Graveson 198; J Fo_ster in (1935) 16 BYJHL 87. 
122. Sec Q�Y.£ v StlllHt (1903) 2l; NLR L)40 at M+l. SeP- too D 50.l.9; Voe t 5.1. 91;
,c;a.vigny f.;y_�t_.?:;:� VIII § 353; Erwin Spiro J,aw of ]:{:,,!_Qnt and Ch:U.d 3 ed (1971) l.25:
Dicey & Mon:is Rule 6 p 84; Cheshire 176; Graveson 197; ReBt.atement Second§ llf (2).
L23. There is no South African authority. This is the view of Dicey & Morris Rule
6 p 64; Cheshire 176; Gravason 197; Holff § 100; Nygh 69; _RE".s�_§_�ement Ser,onrl 
� 1J�(2),1md serc0.rns reason�•tblc. See Pollak in· (1934) 51 � J.2nl03. 
121,. Spiro 124. 
12 .5. See below § lV (�). 
126. At 125: 1 • • •  cine cannot ignore the order of court for. which there must have been 
very st-rong; rea.50;,s.' Or.i.gimilly Spiro plurnr-,ed for the mother's domicile at 
birth: �0..:.:]....::.. 'Domicile of Minors WHhout Parents• (1956) 5 ICL.Q. 1% at 197 • ... 
127. By Wolff § 111.i; Goodrich § 37. Grave.son 199 is syopath,1t1.c_ but doubts if the
English courts would so hold. The or:i.ginal Amer.ican Rest!ltcmen!_ of 1931+, § 3li 
Comment .!:;,. uas to the s.iarn.e effect, but Restatern<;_,1}._� SP,cond is silent. Many
E:1glish wdte.r.s state flatly that although the! father's domicile will be followed
by the child after legitirnatlon, the child 1 s domicile of origip remains that of
the mother: eg Dic_e.y 85; Westlake §§ 24-6- 7; Clive M Schmi tthoff The Engl�
Conflict of L,�� 3 ed (1954) 93.
1.28. Sec s 11 of the Births� Marringes and Deaths Rcgistr.�tion Act 81 of 1963, which 
allows for registrati6n bf the birth 1as if such person's parents had been
legally married to each other at the time of his birth'. See ge�erally Spiro 42, 
116. 
129. It is the view of Spiro. Sec at 125. See also at 42.
130. Dy Spiro 19, 41� 125.
131. See HR HahJ.o rmd Elli�on Kahn The Union of South Africa: The nevelooment of :i.t�
Law and Constitution (1960) 369.
132. 1-Tew South Wales Adoption of Children Act 1965 s 39-( 2) i Victoria Adoption of
Children Act !%Lis 3.'.i and Queensland Adoption of .Children Act 1964 s 31(2).
133. 33 of 1960. s�e especially s 74(2). 
134. SCc-e Erwin Spiro The Children's Ar.t 1960 (196'.i) 68 and-Lm,1 of Parent anct Ch:i.ld
3 ed (l 971) 125, See too Wolff § 117 � Dicey & Norris 85; Restatement Second
§ 14 Cornrnent !!_, esp Illustration.
135. See Restatement s�cond ibid.
136. 
137. 
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Westlr:ke § 2Lf8; Dicey [, Hord.s Rul� 6 pp 
tl)'gh 69� 
Also supported by Spi�o 
Chc:;!1:l.Tc> 476; Gr,'lv�:son J.98; 
138. Re 1'·1sf'�lS2-..£, Dr-lce,-:-r,:w_l (19:iJ.) :il !lR (HSU) 293. See too Westlah § 2l,8.
J.39. ie by Joss of both reddew:c� and th(� .0.!!i!il�1..1...��i or, more strictly,
Mere loss of residenc� does not suffice. 
·'£hus 5n .!_3�r:i . .scw·. v l!!J:coe 19,p':- GWL 4 tw.>. lve years' absancc from the domicik
of origin w,:\$ hcdd not to con:;ti.tuteo chandonment of it, owing to the pi::esence
of the animus r.cvcrtcnci .
I. li(). § I.
1-41. See !!0.LCons III(2) c.ons J.38, 196 (Gr� (DE, Bruyn) no 9), 317(217); 
J Voet 5.1.98 t 99. Cf Carpzovius' s view � text to n89 above. 
142. �1! v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 <"tt 337, 3117; _Lau.g;hl!._1]; v _!.aughli:}_ (1903) 24 NLR 230
at 239; Honcde.iz_ v Moncd!'.11, 19Jl1 CPD 208; Dreyer v _r,-reyer 1936 EDL 38/h
This rule is supported, as was seen by Carpzovius -���ILJ1:ir elec1; 6.4.40.2,3.
143. Mnson v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 at 337, 347; Laughlin v L&ughlin (1903) 24 NLR
230 at 239; �� v Forster and WhE.'a_!,ln__g_ (1905) 26 NLR 124 at J,25; � v
Gunn 1910 TPD 423 at 427; .�}.F__r.i.rte §_andherg 1912 TPD 805 at 809 (all the forgoing
dicta being obit';':.E_); Ex port�: Donelly 1915 WLD 29. See too Hutchison's Executor
v The Master (Ne!;,!;.!:]) 1919 AD 71 at. 7t1. See furthern 158 below.
144. In Monroe v Dougl� (1820) 5 Hadd 379 ot 405, 56 ER 940 at 949.
145� Op cit I 34. 
146. Joseph Story Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws§ 47.
147. See eg Cheshire 34_.,;5; Nygh 60.
lq8. (1869) LR 1 Sc App 441. 
149. Followed eg in King v Foxwell (1876) 3 ChD 518; �rr:l.son v Harrison [1953] 1 WLR
865; In the Es� of Fuid (�) (1%8] P 675. See Dicey Rule 10(2) pp 10.5-6;
Cheshire 174-5; Graveson 199; Anton 167, 169-70 (who points out that it is the
rule applied by the Scottish courts).
150. At 450.
151. At 458.
L52. At 454-5. 
at 337. 
These words were usecl by Barry JP in Mason v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 
153. Beale I§ 23.l; Goodrich § 25; Stumberg 33; Leflar § 10; the fir.st Restatement 
§ 23; Restatement Sec.end § 19. See In re Estate of Jones 192 Iowa 78, 18 NW 227
(1921)- (Cheatham et al 25).
154. System VIII§ 359.
155. 1915 WLD 29.
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156. By Spiro in 1962 Acta Juridica 69�75. He invokes as persuasive matter the.
identical or o similar rule in the legal systems of Switzerland� Turkey,
Venezuela, �Tapan� Chile, Colombia, Ecuador:, Nicnragua 1 Peru, Uruguay, Portugal
and the Netherlands (see lfil § 74). But again it must be said that the persuasive
force of these Code provisions in countries wb:ich have a different notion of
domicile and some of which espouse the. lox p<!tr.5.ae as the personal law cannot
be great.
157. This is the explanation of \7a.n Leeuwen Cen.s For l.3.12.S-/ and RHR 3.12.10
of the domicile of a traveller whose domicile was not lmo�,1n and who died on the
East Indies route being deemed to·be at the place of departure. 
as support for his theory (at 74-5).
Spiro uses it
158. J.fa�cm v Mason (1885) I+ EDC 330 at 337, 347; ��ughli� v _Laughl._i.E. (1903) 21+ NLR-..- --
and 
230 at 239; I£.E.il££ v Forster / Whf!eling (1905) · 26 NI.R 124 at 125; Gunn v Gunn
1910 TPD 423 at 427; Ex parte Sandberg 1912 TPD 805 at 809; but cf McCurrach v
McCurr:ach (1892) 6 HCG 256 1 �1ich can be cited in support of the American doctrine
(see Pollak}fl9:3/J) 51 � 23-4nl58!!_), This case, however, was criticized by
Kotze JP in Ex parte Standring 1906 EDC 169 at 179 on the ground that the dor:1icile
of origin should have been held to be assumed as a rule of law.
159� At 33.
160 ., At 30-1.
161. Several reported decisions ar:e indecisive, as they in effect hold that the last
domicile, which happened to be the domicil iu_L�.Jl.!_;zi._ni.s., has continued·, despit,l 1 
its abandonment: eg Smit.� v Smith 1970 (1) SA 146 (R) (here it wns common cause
between counsel th.e.t Rhodesia was the domicile of origin (see at 147C-D) though the
court alluded to the possibility that it was his domicile of choice (at 147E-F).
But Goldin J seems to veer in the direction of Donelly: 'It is not sufficient
to prove that he has abandoned his domicile of origin but he must prove on a
balance of probabilities -that he has acquired a domicile of choice' (at 147).
In �ste v Jooste 1938 NPD 212 Selke said - (at 216) tlu1t he was not sntisfied
that in deciding what was a person f s p.ovincial domidle within South Africa
one was bound 'to have regard to. their entirety to the principles of Inter.national....... 
Law which i.-egulate the: revival of a domici•le of origin,'. If, as appears, th�
learned judge was thinking of a different rule to fill the gap in different
situations (eg whether the domicile of origin is South African or foreign, reviving
in the latter but not the former case) it is an interesting via media, but one
not really acceptable, because of the superior overall merits of the continuance
of the last domicile rule. En pas.ll!!,l, one mny ask what principle of international
law compels our courts to acknowledge the revival of the domicile of origin. In
Massey v Mass� 1968 (2) SA 199 (T) at 204 Jansen J simply assumed for the purpose
of his decision that the doctrine of the revival of the domicile is part of South
African law. He specifically made no pronouncement.
9.2 
162. Di.cc.y &. Horris 106; Cheshire 174-5 and (1945) 61 J;S:)Jl 363-4; Wolff § 105;
Graveson 200�1.
[63. Fhst Report, Cmd 9068 (1954) § 1.4 and Dtaft Code art (5). Unfo-rtunately, 
no reasons were given foi:- the conclusion. The Seventh Report (Crond 1955 (1963)) 
does not dis,'!pprove, .but the matter .was not squarely before the Cammi ttee then. 
1G4. (1869) LR 1 Sc App 441 at 450. 
165. See In rustate of Jones 192 Iowa 78 1 178 NW 227 (1921) (Cheatham et al _25):
'••• a person who in these days �bandons his domicile of origin and acquires a
legal domi.cila in anothe.r. jurisdiction is, presumably, at least, fumil:i ar with the 
lnws of the jurisdiction of the lll.tter jurisdiction •••• ' 
166. Ronald H Gravcson 'The Comparative Evolution of the Principles of the Conflict
of Laws in England and the U.S.A.' (1960} I Recu<'.il des Cours, Academie <le Droit
Jntern!ltional (vol 99) 21 at 43.
167. [1904] AC 287 at 294.
168. See Cheshire 175; Graveson J'uhHec Lectures 86, 95.
169. See In re Estate of J_o_!;�� (supra.}.
170. 1965 (1) SA 703 (AD) at 705.
171. Wolff§ 100.
172. Cf Stumberg 34-5. J Wil lis (1936) 14 Canadia�r R 5-6 argues that the Americnn
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195. See Centlivres CJ in~ v I.ey 's Executors 1951 (3) SA 186 (AD) at 193 -
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of origin was probably involved. 
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199. 1931 AD 391. 
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204. At 404. 
205. At 406. 
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(1954) § 12. 
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); 
50.1.27.1; _..., c 10.39.2,3,4; 7 Weatherley v WeatherJ.c_y (1879) Kotze 66 at
76-7; Mason v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 at 345; Forster v Forster and Wheeling
(1905) 26 NLR lllt; Webbet_ v Webber 1915 AD 239 at 242; Johnson v John.son 1931 AD
391 at 398; 0chberg v Ochberh 1 s Estate 1941 CPD 15 at 37-8; Eilon v Eilon 1965
(1) SA 703 (AD) �t 719-20.
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212 at 217. 
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&wa.y f ) of the i7lt0.nU.011 to return. Ther.e need r.ot be the formation of a
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find the distinction tenable. A com..'TI.ent in (196L1) /+l. �;!!�lian LT 466 SEJ,YS 
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237. Ley v Ley' s Ex.ectttO't'S 1951 (3) SA 186 (AD); Etj.on v Eilon 1965 (1) SA 703 (AD)
nt 719·. See too Burge I 55 •· 'preponderating intcmtion to acquire a domicile'. 
238. See above, n 187.
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240. See Lt'!wis v Lewis 1939 WLD 11}0 nt 143; al.so !:�1..fil2.1 v Moreland (1901) 22 NLil
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when raore important· 'jndtic�� 1 [sc indic!!] create fl doubt.
241. See Henderson v Henderson [1967] P 77 at 82-3.
242. Per Millin J in Lewis v Lewis 1939 WLD lhO at 143. Cited with approval in
o t Mant v 0 1 Mant 19l17 (1) SA 26 (W) at 28.
2lt3. Ibid. 
244. 1945 TPD 62 at 64-5�
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246. At 68. See too Ex parte Rowland (1937) 54 SALJ 254 (T); Ex parte Gibson 1936
SR 71.
247. 1951 (3) SA 186 (AD) at 194-5.
248. (1861) 30 LJE 284 at 292. (The passage does not appear in 6 H & N 733.)
249. At 193.
250. 1965 ( 1.) SA 703 (AD).
251. My italics.
252. Per Potgieter AJA at 720.
253. At 721.
254. My italics.
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cons 1-t,5, IV cons 271; Utr Cons I cons 7.3 n 12; v d Berg Ned Advysboek III 
no 113 p 268; Savigay System VIII§ 353. See eg Ex parte Standring 1906 EDC 
169 at 175; Oanubhai v _g_hief_�_mmir;rat:i.on 0fficer1 Natal (1913) 34 NLR 251 at 
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263. C 10.39. 2.
261+. Nieuw Ned Advvsboek (Kop) no 32 p 165; U Huber Prael II 5.1.44 -.:, p 216; V"romans
De foro com1)et I 4 p 1.33; Ontwc:?rp 1820 § 107. See too Dernburg Pandekte� I § 46. 
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tion is presumpti.ve evidence, but can be rebutted if the animus r.evertendi is 
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265. Van .Straaten v Van Straaten 1911 TPD 686 at 689; � v � 1939 CPD 314 at. 316;
Smith v Smith 1952 (4) SA 750 (0) at 754.
266. Per De Villiers AJA in Webber v Webber 1915 AD 239 at 264.
267. Per Bristowe Jin Van Straaten v V3n Straaten 1911 TPD 686 at 688-9.
268. Per Lord Macmillan in Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary (1930] AC 588 at 598.
For the. facts see above , text following n 219.
269. Shapiro v Shapiro 1914 WLD 38; Clayton v Clayton 1922 CPD 125. See too Beale I
There arc some USA decisions contra:· see Cheatham et al 30-1. 
270. 1938 NPD 212�
271. At 216.
272. Pothier Intro gen�ral aux contumes X; Beale I§ 15.2: 'If the fact and the
intention concur, even for a moment, the change of domicil takes place,'
273. (1888) 31 W Va 790, 8 SE 596, 13 Am St Rep 896 (Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia). See Cheatham et al.10� Ernest G Lorenzen Cases and Materials in the
Conflict of Laws 4 ed (St Paul, Minn, 1937) 13.
27�. See Lord Westbury in Udny v Uclny (1869) LR l Sc App 441 at 458; Wolff § 109; 
Goodrich§ 26. As Wolff points out (p 114n5),it is analogous in this respect 
to the acquisition of possession corpore et anirno, in which th� one element may 
follow the other. 
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276. 1g05 (l) SA 703 (AD) al 714.
277. Sc-a po_r:_�_!i_:-;.211 v Donaldson [191,9] P 363; Wolff§ 109; Graveson 206.
278� See Dicey & Horris 90; Gr.aveson 206. Cf Voet 5.1.98, belows n 286.
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dom.i d le where they h:w�. placed thEd.r household goods and the greater. part
of their property an.cl for�uncs, and no one shall depart from thence unless
something requires him to do so, and whenever he does leave the place, he is
considered to be on a journey, and when he returns, to have completed it.'
280. Ad Cod 10.40(39).2.
251. Gane' s translation reads: 1 • " . do;;:ticile ••• the pl&ce ••• in which he has set 
up his homB and the main body of his property and fortunes, from which he is 
not likely to depart H nothing calls him away and which when he has left he 
appears to be travelling abr.cad. t 
282. Br.:issonius Lexicon sv _do'!l_icilitimj Vicat Vocubularium juris sv domicilium.
283. Gane's translation reads: 1 ••• domicile ••• properly so called ••• is that
which one establishes for oneself with the intention of not leaving it if
nothing calls one away •••• '
2s4. 2.1.12.s: 'J' ' ·1· . I ' b' l f or,11.c1. 1u.���. u .J. a1:9n1;. rcrumque ac ortunar.um suarum 
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nihil avocet 1 • 
1 cum :mimQ :i.nde -rur eius n_o!}_ �:i.scedendi 1 si 
286. Gane 1 s translation of the full relevant passage reads: 'It is certain thit
domicile is not establi shed by the met"e intention and design of the. head
of the household; nor by me.re form,d. declaration wf.thout fact or. deed; nor
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287. Ad D so.1.20.
288. Ad D 50.1.17.1.
289. �Icons 7.
290. Defin For 1.3.18, 3.38.18.
291. Consultaticn cons 9l, n 11. See too Vattel 1.19�22.
292. Holl Cons II cons 173 p 345. Likewise Nieuw Ned Advvsboek (Kop) no 32 p 167. 
See too Holl Cons III( 2) cons 317 n 5: Utr. Cons I cons 73. , -
293. Loenius (Boel) Dccisien en observatien cas 50 p 328, citing a Hooge Raad
decision of 1676.
294. 3.12.10. Kotz, 1s transletion reads: 'I say u fi*ed abode, because not the
bare residence of a person, which oft.en last only for·a time, ••• but the fixed 
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his domicile. 1 
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297. lUJ.on v fil� 1%5 (1) SA 703 (AD) at 70/h 
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J Voet 5.1.98; !foll Cons IV cons 174; Vro:nans De foro compet I 4 132.
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303. eg V.:rn Leeuwen Cens For 1.3.12. 5;
304. 9hS..\� II no 1178.
305. Vr6mans De foro comnet I 4 p 131.
306. 1931 AD 391.
307. At 398-9,
J V�et 5.1.98; Ho 11 Cons IV cons 2 71. 
308. This statement is a direct quotation from Lord Macnaghten's speech in Win�ns.
309. Above, text following n 201,
310, At !106-7. 
311. At 410. Pollak ((1933) 50 SALJ 468) puts the position too weakly in saying that
'he contempl,:,ited the pobs:i.bflity of leaving New Jersey if he were offered a
better position anywhere else'.
312. J\.t l+lO.
313, (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441 at 458. Cf Story f s definition(§ 43): 'That place is 
properly the domicile of a person in which his habitation is fixed without an}' 
present j,ntention of removing therefrom.' 
314. See Restatement S_<:?cond_ § 18 Comment _ _£ Illustration 3.
31.5. Ley v b_,ey 1 s Executors 1.951 (3) SA 186 (AD). See at 190-1. What follows is 
partly based on rhe writer's note 'Domicile: An Important Decision' (1951) 
68 SALJ 360. 
316. At 191+.
317. At 19�. My italics.
318. Above, text to� 248.
319. At 195.
320. At 195. My italics.
321. Senior v CIR 1960 (1) SA 709 (AD) at 714; Eilon v Eilon 1965 (1) SA 703 (AD)
at 720.
322. The curious reader will find a passage remarkable for its anticipation of these
views in the judgment of Mason J i.n llorelaud v Mor.eland (1901) 22 NLR 385 at
... r1,1 -
387-8.
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326. At 720.
327. At 720.
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31 .. 0. In the Estate Fu!_!h Deed (No 3) [1966] P 675 at 682-3. 
341. '[P Jermanent oi· indefinite residence 1: t-1.:lson v H.-1�.on ( 1885) 4 EDC 330 at 337, 354.
See too � v Qunn 1910 TPD 4-23 at 427; Udny v _Udny (1869) LR l Sc &.. Div 441. at
t,58, per Lord Hei::tbury; In the Estate of Fuld,Dec<l (No 3) (1968) P 675 at 66l•,
per Scarman J; Di.cey 6. Morris Rule 7 p-86 and pp 89--90; Cheshire 154-9; Anton 178;'
Graveson Jubilee Lectures 97: 'We must realize the temporary nature of many of
our best intentions in this life of uncertainty and movement, and we must not deny
local domicile to a man who has settled jn a place without, as a realist, intending
to remain there for ever, but simply to make his life there as long as circumstan­
ces allow him to do so. 1 Cf the position of immigra-ats under temporary visas and
al:i.ens, all of whom are subject to deportation, below n �73. In Smj_th v SrnHh
1962 (3) SA 930 (FC) at 936 Driggs ACJ, delivering the judgment of the Fede.ral
Supreme Court, soi cl: 'The _g._Eimus manen<li must be both genuine and honest ••••
(T]hough it does not require an absolute: intention to r.eside permanently, [it]
must at least be an unconditional intention to reside for an indefinite period.'
By 'unconditional' the learned judge con.noted settling: he gave the.example of
a chronic invalid's saying, 'I will settle· if the climate suits my heal.th•. A
domicile of cho:i.ce would not have been e,cquired if he were to die a :m-: days later.
'Tl1ere would at least have to be a. trial period, after which the un< -·�.ditional
102 
Sec too 
intention might come into existcnc.e.' /Howard v Howard l.966 (2) SA 71B (R) E!1: 
721; Smith v Smith.1970 (1) SA 1Lt6 (R) at 151. 
342. In 0svath-Latkocz.y v .9.5..vath-Latl.coc.z..x 1959 SCR. 751 the Canadian Supreme Court
heJ.d. that a Hungari,m refugee had acquired (] domicile of choice in the Canadian
p-rovince of Ontario where he had resided for eighteen months, was employed in .
his line of work, int�nded setting up his own business and had made m1 application
under the Canadian Citi.zcnship Act, although ha said he �ioulc r�turn to. Huneo.ry
if it ceased to be Russian-controlled, as ttiis was a contingency so remote and
uncertain that it should be disregarded.
343. The old authorities cite the case of a merchnnt who goes abroad t:o make his
fortune and then retu-rn to his domicile of or:i.giri in the Nether lands. They
say he does not acquire a dom,icile of.choice in the oversea country, eg Donetlus
� D 17.12; Holl Cons.VI cons 1.53, See too Vinnius Ad Cod 10.39.5. One can e;ei:
this situation, eg �Jtmschwik v Btunschwik 1902 TH 223, where the husband wished
to return to his domicile of origin in Prance. when he had made sufficient ll.loTiey
in the Transvaal. He did not take up ci tizenshi.p in that cotmtry, nnd though the
marriage was solemnized there 7 it was registered with the local French consulAte 1 
nnd the marriage settleu1ent was <lr<'twn up in Frsnce and stated that the spou:1es t 
property rights were to be governed by French law. The husband said that he h�d
'no inte.nti.on of 1:1.ving and dying in South Africa'. It was held that in the
circumstances he had not acquired a domicile of choice in the Transva.aL But
then one has the Doucet v Geoghegan (1878) 9 ChD l�41 (CA) type of d.tuation,
discussed earlier, wher.l'.! the facts of a man's life outweigh his fond ambition to
return to his-homeland.
344. Cf g_uayle v Quayle 1949 SR 203.
345. Cf the wording of the minority members of the English Private International Law
Cqm ittee, First·Report, Cmd 9068 (1954) § 16: 'a definite intent.i.on of ceasing
to live ·there upon the occurrence of some specified event in the future that will
happen in the normal course of things.' Cf too Smith v Smi.th 1952 (4) SA 750 (0)
at 752, 754 (no regard had to the husband's statement some seven months earl:l.er
that if his wife's divorce went through and this was _'talked about' in the neigh·· 
·bourhood he would leave the alleged domicile in Welkorn and seek employment in
Durban).
346. Levinx, v J.eviny (1908) 25 SC 173 illustrates this. L, whose doroidle of origin
was in Australia, had come to South Africa on a military expeclitfon five year.s
earlier, had taken n short lease of a country store, was eking out a precarious
living and was quite prepared to go back to Australia or to any otbet country if
anything better offered.
347. Noyes v Schuiz (19Ll) 32 NLR 318,
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348. I 150. The US test, according to Restatern��-so.129. § 18 ( .see too Lefl.ur 19)
is much looser -· to make one's home.for·the present. A self-support.inf; arJultf
fo-r instance, who goes to another country to take a law degree at a university
there wi 11 be domiciled there if he. int.ends mak:i.ng his home there wb:i le at
university. It does not matter that the propositus intends changing his home
on the happening of a futurg event.
349,. At this sta!?,e reference to the views of the First Report of the Private 
International Law Comm:l.ttee, Cmd 9068 (February 1954) would bt> apposite. The 
Committee defines the domicile of a person as 'th� countt"y in wh:i.ch he has his 
home and intends to live pcnnanently 1 · (§ 6 and Drci.ft Code art 2(1)). The Committee 
refused to redefine domicile as 'habitual residence', on the ground that Britons 
living abroad would then have. 1 no method lihereby they could continue?. to regulate 
thair lives according to the familiar British conceptions. It should also be 
remembered that a country wh5.ch does not apply nationality as a yard.stick in· 
matters of private internattonal law is bound to substitute for :i.t a strict test 
invc;;l ving a measure of peIT!lllnence 1 (§ 7). The majority of the Com ittee also 
rejected a definition of animus manendi in terms of an intention to reside in the 
new country not permanently 1 but only for an indefinite pe1::i.od. Some mc-,mbers 
wished 'to make it clear that a person acquires a new domicile iu the country in 
which he voluntarily establishes bis home, if he does so, not for fi men� srecial 
and tempo-rary purpose, but wlt:h a present intention of living there for an 
unlimi te<l tirue 1 ( § 7). 
In the end the Committee, to overcome 'the <liff.i.cult:y and inconvenience., .ns the
law now stands, of provinc an intention to change a domicile' (§ 15),· advised the 
statutory creation of 'three presumptions t'C'hich would in nwny cases moke resort. to 
litigation tmnecessa't"y and, whe't"e this is imposd.ble, would at any rate facilitate 
proof of intention to live in a given country' (§ 15). The recommendations appear 
in a·rt 2 of the Draft Code as follows: 
1 (2) Unless a different intention appears, the following are rul"!s for
ascertaining a person's intention to live permanently in a country; -
Rule 1: Where a person has his home in a country, he shall be presumed 
to intend to live. there permanently. 
Rule 2: Where a person has more than cine home, he shall be presumed to 
intend to live permanently in the country in which he has his 
principnl home. 
Rul��: Where a person is stationed in a country for the princi.pnl 
puipose of carrying on a business, profission or occupation and 
hi°s wife and· children (if any)" have their home in another country, 
he shall he presumed to intend to live pennanently in the 1<1.ttGr 
country. 
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'(3) Paragraph (2) shall not apply to persons entitled to diplomatic 
immunity or in the military, naval, air force or civil service of any 
country, or in the service of an iuternatiortal organization·.' 
Rule 1, if it were to meet the view of the majority who would define the �::..us. 
manendi in tenns of an intention·to live for an unlimited time, would have to be
recast: 'Where .a person has his home inn country and no home in any other 
country, his intention to live. there for an unlimited time shall be presumed, 
unless it is proved that hi has a definite intention of ceasing to live there 
upon the occurrence of some specifie� e�ent in the future that will.happen in 
the nonnal course of thing�• (§ 16).. 
For a comment on the above presumptions, see R H Graveson in (195tt) 70 L.Q.R. · 500. 
The Private International Law Cammi ttee I s recomrne11da lions when introduced in ·the 
House of Lords in May 1958 in the form of a Dill led to criticism on the ground 
that they would prejudice Commonweal th or. foreign business men in Brita in, especially 
as regards the incidence of income tax and ustate duty. Th� Dill was not · 
pr�ceeded with. In January 1959 a fresh Bill wa� introduced in the House of 
Lords in which the doctrine of the revival of the domicile of origin was repealed 
.and a domicile of choice was to be acqui.red in a country 1 by [one] residing in that 
country with the settled intention of making it his permanent home', disappointing 
to those who favoured the presumptions of the first Bill, but. still not satisfac­
tory to the foreign business· comm.unity. . The Dill passed the Lords but was n.ot 
pursued in the Commons. The Lord Chancellot· referred its recommendations to the Private 
International. Law Committee in November 1959 for reconsideration in the light of
these. objections, and also to consider the legal difficulties that ni.ight follow· 
the. implementation of its· recom.rnendation that married women for domicile be 
considered sui juris. The Corrunitte.c in its Seventh Report, Cmn<l 1955 (1963) 
found the House of. Lords' difficulties exaggerated. But to meet them it simplifie-e 
the rules in what it called the'businessman 1 s fonnula' (Appendix A): 'A person's 
domicile is in the country where he ordinarily resides and where he intends to 
live permanently' (clause 2) and (clause 3): 1 [A} person who ordinarily 
rE;sides in a country is presumed to j_ntend to live there permanently;· but the pre­
sumption may be displaced by evidence of a different intention.' It then went on 
to state certain cases where the presumption would not apply �·to a person eneaged 
in employment or services in a country in which he did not ordinarily reside 
before· doing so, or is employed by any such person. ) [run onlin . 
{For a review of the report, see N Mann/( l 963) · 12 ICLQ 1326. See fur.ther W Rae burn in 
in . · iv (1963) 
i/tl95S) 
12 ICLQ 133, M Mannl(l959) 8 ICLQ 457, A J Bland /�1958) 7 J£1Q 753, E I Cohn 
71 LgR 562.) There the matter rests for the none!!. The. South African Law 
Revision Committee at its eighth meeting on 27 June 1056 rejected out of hand the 
Code of the Law of Domicile annexed to tpe First Report of the English Private 
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International Law Committee. It found the draft incomplete; that its adoption 
would make substantial changes in the law; nnd that the proposed changes in the 
rules governing the domic:i.le o.f persons under orders of custody, lunatics and
infants (the�e are considered later in this article) were questionable • . (See 1956 
Annual Survey 414-15.) The matter has not come before the Law nevision Committee 
since then. 
In 1970 the English Law Commission provisionally recommended that the domicile 
of a wife·should be determined independently from that of her husband, for the
purpose of divorce jurisdiction_ (Wor�dng Paper No 28).
350. See generally C C Turpin ·'Freedom of Choice in the Acquisition of a Domicile
.of Choke. 1 (1957) 74� 201.
351. Ex _ r.arte Quintrell 1922 TPD it� at 15. At 18 11ason J said: ' ••. the expression
11 domicilc of choice" implies a capacity to make a choice and carry it into
effect •••• '
352. Story § L�7; Fawkes J cH.nsent1.ente in Nefler v Nefler 1.906 ORC 7 at 10; Beale I
§ 21.3; Restatement Second§ 17.
353. At 99�
35li. At 168� 
355. At 207-8.
356. 1.906 ORC 7. �� v Cravcrn (1923) 2 PH 1313 (W) does not appear to be of any
assistance.
357. zeiinan Cowen in Dicey 6 ed {1949) 118n25. In Dicey 6. Morris 99n89, however, :i.t
j_s said (by G H Tr�itel) that 1it is not· clear whether the hu�band wo.s domiciled
in the place of imr>risonment or whether the court took jurisdiction on some other
ground'. Turpin in (1957) 74 SALjZQ4 concludes that the majority decision was
that life imprisonment constitutes domicile so as to confer divorce Jurisdiction,
although there was no ·animus mancmdi. He. thinks this is not an unreasonable type
of domicile by. operation·of law, but would prefer legislation to create it.
358. 
359. 
,360. 
361. 
362. 
363 • 
. 364. 
365. 
366. 
367 � 
(1949) 118.
Aldred v Aldred 1929 AD 356 at 363.
Turpin iu (1957) 74 � 204.
Restatement Second§ 17.'
See below, text following n 373.
See the analysis of J D McClean in (1962) 11 ICLQ l157-60.
D 50.1.23.1. See too Voet 5.1.13.
Per Sch-reiner JA in Bak�r v Baker J.945 AD 708 at 712.
The same reasoning would hold-for a member of the navy or air force.
Per Schreiner JA :i.n Bnker v Uaker 1945 AD 708 at 711-12. See too J.lcMillan Y....., ....... �... ---
HcMHlan 1943 TPD 345 at 349. See also L D Thames 'Dcimkile of Se1:vicemen 1 (1963)
34 MissJssipoi LJ 160 at 161.
106 
368� Dicey 2 ed (1908) 154-5; Burge 2 ed II 76; Pollak in (193Lr) 51 �- l7. The 
English dicta·cited in favour of this proposition were all obiter, however: 
In re Steer (1858) 28 W 22 at 25� per Watson 13 ( there is no relev.mt passage 
in the report in 3 H & N 594); Ex par:te Curmin,2.ham: In re Hi tchcll (1884) 13 
QBD 418 (CA) at;. 425; In re Hacr.eir,ht (1835) 30 ChD 165 at 168. Nor is there 
any Roman-Dutch authority or South African case which is in support of so wide 
a statement. 
369. 1945 AD 708. The court found hig-hly persuasive the decision of the Scottish
Court of Session in Sellars v Sellars 1942 SC 206, described in Cruickshanks v
Cruickshanks [1957] 1 All ER 889 ai 891, [1957] 1 WLR 564 at 567-as 'the most
illuminating modern authority'. The same conclusion was reached by Millin: J
in the earlier case of Comrnin v Commin 1942 WLD 191. Baker was followed in gngl.and
in Stone v Stone [1959] 1 All ER 194, (1958] 1 WLR 1287.
370. Per Schrdner .JA at 715.
371. Thus in Pater.son v Paterson 1946 EDL 67; Moore v Moor1:, 1945 TPD 407.
372. See the judgment of Schreiner JA at 712-15.
373. Sulliva� v _Sullivan 1912 JWR 312; King v King 1914 JWR 225, 282; Davies v Dcwies
1922 CPD 323; lHshop v Bishop 1923 CPD '•14.
374. 1924 CPD 62.
375. See PbilU.ps v Phillii)S 1937 CPD 54; Powell v Powell J.943 (1) PH B2 (C);
Murnhy v Murphy 1943 (1) PH BB (C); Flack v Flack 1944 (2) PH B66 (C); .lii£9l v
Nicol 1948 (2) SA 613 (C); Hibhs v Wynne 1949 (2) SA 10 (C),esp at 13; Ex oarte
Readings 1956 (l,) SA 432 (C). It should be observed, however, tha.t there is no
ful 1 -bench deci sjon.
376. 1948 (2) SA 613 (C).
377. Reasons advanced, too, in numerous other cases, eg Ex parte Quintrell 1922 TPD
14; McHillan v McMi.llan 1943 TPD 345.
378. At 617.
379. By Turpin in (1957) 74 SALJ 206.
380. loc cit.
381� 1958 (4) SA 432 (C). What follows is based on th« writer's noti 'Acquisition by 
Soldier. of Domicile in Country .Where He is Stationed' (1959) 76 � 13. It 
may be noted that to the. same effect is the law of England (Donaldson v Donaldson 
[1949) P 363; Cruicksha.nks v Cruickshanks [1957] L All ER 889, (1957] l WLR 564; 
Dicey 101-2),many of the. Australian States and Canada (see the cases cited in 
Dicey 102nl2), Scotland (Sellars v.. Sellars 1942 SC 206). 
382., At 436. 
383. It was.not �ited_ to the court therein or by learned c6unsel in the cas�, Mr (later
Mr Justice) IL Horwftz KC, whose penchant for wandering in the old works was well
known. Was this a result of the De Bruyn rendering?
I 
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384. At 436.
385. At 436.
386. Donaldson v .Q_onaldson [191_.9) P 363; -��ic-�<;h/11.Jk� v Cru��hanks [1957] l All ER
887, [1957) l WLR .561�. See note. in (1950) 3.!!.:9.74.
387. Clarke v Newmarch (1836) 13 S 488; Sellars v Sell.ars 1942 SC 206.
388. eg Cox v Cox [1945] VLR 105; Pumpa v Pumpa (1946] VLR 56; Wal.ton v Walton [191+8]
VLR 487; Auld v. Auld [1952] VLR 455; Armstea_� v �:-rnstearl [1954] VLR 733;
Wilkinson v Wilkinson [1949] l WWR 2l16. See J G Fleming in (1950) 3 .!,!& 87-8.
389. Young v. Young_ (1959) 21 DLR (2d) 616.
390. Dicey & Morris 101-2; Cheshire 171; Westlake.§ 273; lfaJ.sbury's .b� of Enr.land
3 ed VII (1954) § 42; Beale I§ 21.2. But cf Restatement Second§ 17, which
has great reservations; L D Davis 'Dornic-.ile of Servicemen' ( 1963) 34 Missis.si1Wi
LJ 160.
391. Anton 177.
392. (1904) 25 NLR 52,
393. Lea v � (1902) 23 NLR 91; Baxter v �_axt�r 19l�3 NPD 85.
394. Evans v �� 1942 SR 12; Pickford v Pickford 1943 SR 6.
395. 1943 EDL 147,esp at 149.
396. 1946 EDL 67.
397. Van Niekerk v Van Ni.ekerk 1941 TPD 59; E�_l1arte De_Lanp,e 1941 (2) PH B82 (W). In
!�X parte q��i_l!trell 1922 TPD 14 Gregorowski J said in the. court E....Jl� (at J.5): 
In order to create a new domicile you must not only have residence, but you 
must have. intention to remain permanently and indefinitely, and you rnust also have 
the power to carry out that intention •• _ • ., [H]e had not the free choice of 
residence .♦ .. ..  J he was bound to go wherever he was ordered; he was not a freE! agant,' 
On appeal the question was left o[_)en, · but Mason J expressed the following 
difficulty (at 18): '••• the. expression tldornicile of choice" implies a capacity 
to make a choice and to carry it into effect, which is not possible in the case 
of a soldier still on service and subject to compulsory remov3l to any part at 
the discretion of the military authorities.' 
398. 1943 TPD 345.
399. Per Murray J at 353.
400. 1948 (2) SA 613 (C) at 618.
401. Co;;rmin v Commin 1942 WLD 191, which in any event was not followed by the same
Judge in Davel v Dave_l 1944 ( 2) PH B49 (W}. But there is a strong obiter die tum 
in Van Rensburg v Ballin�er 1950 (4) SA427 (T) at 437-8. 
402, Moore v Moore 1945 TPD 407. 
403. 1948 (4) SA 379 (W).
404. Veiy fitting for a famous rugby player in his youth.
L:.05. 1945 AD 708 at 7lft;.,J.5. See too Sell ars v Sell:lS:. 19lf2 �;c 206 at 212. 
1106. This statement shorn, that in many of the cas0s in which, it is suggested, 
the wrong rule of law wns applicd 1 the. correct result i,,::\S arrived et on the 
facts. 
407. 1942 SC 206.
408. At 211.
409. See too Lor.d Honcricff at 213.
410. Clarke v J-kwrna�h (1836) S l.;83; !!ill� v Wynne 191{-9 (2) SA 10 (C) at 13.
411, Hibbs v Wrnne uhi. cit. 
'•12. Per Ogil-vie Thompson AJ in Nicol v Nicol 19L,.;J (2) SIi 613 (C) at 620. 
413. See eg Nicol v B.i£2.1. (£112!.E,); Don<1.ldso1:_ v .Po!!.ald�<.?..'."_l; [191+9) P 36J.
41!,. 1939 OPD 197. 
415, Ex part<: Quintrcll 197.. 2  TPD lL, ;,t 16; Fo� v Fozari:� 1921, .CPD 62 at 63. 
Later in rkl-1illm1 v HdUlLan. · 19t,3 TPD 3t,5 at 349-50 ■ 
L1l6. ]!;th� v ]_� 19L;{) (J.) PH B9 (0) (South African r.ailway employee� the 
questi.on being wheth0r he ret.a:i.ned tbc dof:'Jid.le he had ml join:i.ng the 
Administration: so held); Carvalho v Carv�lho 1936 SR 219 (Portugues� civil 
servznt stationed in Southern Ithoilcsi�, from uhich countr.y it was tml.ikely 
he would be moved pt:ior to retirrnu:ant and whore he des:t n,,d to make his pen1:;,.n�nt. 
home: held that he had no power to carry out his intention). 
417. 1957 (1) SA 280 (C). No n;ferrmce was r;;�,cb :i.n the .iudgmcnt to ca1:lier dcci.sions 
on the domJcilc of public serva,1ts. 
418. Cf Havillc v Naville 1957 (1) SA 280 (C) at 283.
419. Cf Cohill v Cohill 1938 (2) PH B41 (c).
420. eg Neade v Heade (1928) 12 PH J325 ('W) (see Pollak in (1934) 51 gb!_ 18).
See also Moncrieff v Honcri.cff 1934 CPD 208, analy.<:ed by Turpin in (J.957)
74 SALJ 207-8.
/421. In. re I�eeda Hoosen (1915) 36 NLR 381; lfoss12n Mia v Imrai<7.rrmts A:ooea.1. Board 
(1915) 36 NLR 620 at 625; Pillay v Princ)J?El_Irmnigration Officer (1926) 47 
NLR 520; Parker. v Principal Immin:ration Officer 1926 · CPD 255; :,fonchoo v 
Princinal Immigrati_�_ Officer 1931 NPD 22.9·; Essop v Commissioner for Irnrnip,ra_tJ� 
1932 AD 223; Ismail Mia v Com:nissioner fo,. Immir._ration 1933 TPD 338; Chow 
See v Minister of the Interior·l951 (3) SA 848 (T)� 
422. Neaves v Neaves 1936 NPD 682 was not clearly decided on this score. Hathorn J
appears to have been influenced bi the fact·that N did not intend to reside
permanently.in Natal, as he recognized the prohibition by the immi.gration
authority on his doing so (see at 638). He distinguished Abelheim v Abelheim
1918 SR 8.5 on the ground that A had this intention (see at 686).
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423. By Greenberg JP in Joosub v §alaam 1940 TPD 177 at 180, in relation to whether
the respondent was an tnc.ola; by De Villiers Jin Ex pa.rte Macle.od 1946 CPD
312 at 315. See too Ilar § 44. D 50.1.31 clearly suggests that a person
canuot acquire a domicile in a place prohibited to him.
42lf. 1913 SR 85. See the present ,;;1riter' s analysis in (1948) 65 SALJ 224. 
425. 1962 (3) SA 930 (FC) at 931-2.
426. It is supported by the New South Wales decision o E �mo� v .Sol_omoij_ (1912)
29 WN (NSW) 68, noted by Briggs ACJ at 935, but not relied o� heavily by him
as the report was inaccessible to him.
427. See below, t�xt following n 435.
l128. Driggs ACJ at 933,citing as illustrations Pd.nci[Hil Immi�r.ci.tion. Officer v Ms>.dh 
1928 A.D 451 and Kara Y KtiE..£.iDDl immigration Officer. 1931 CPD 149, 429. At 935-6.
430, See i:;;rwin Spiro 1 Domicile of Illegal Immigrant' (1963) 12 ICLQ 680 at 683. 
431, At. 936. 
432. (19 34) 51 � 20, d ted in Smith at 934. See e 1 so Turpin fn ( 1957) 7l1- SALJ 210;
Dicey & Morris 88.lf33. Whether a South African court would be concerned with such ill.egali.ty in relation 
to an alleged acquisition of a domicile in a foreign country hes been questioned. 
Pollak op cit 20 says No, on the analogy of non-application of the penal J..nws 
of another country, which is not a very convincing explanation. Dicey & Morris 
88 say it is an open question in English law. Spiro in (l.963) 1.2 ICLQ 68Lr po:ints 
out correctly that the lex fori determines whether a foreign domicile has been 
acquired and considers that possibly the illegality of the animus there will be 
disregarded either because it is 'repugnant to the public policy of the lex 
fori' or not being capable of the recognition because of its nature •••'• One 
wonders whether this chauvinistic ·attitude is warranted. Is not the understanding 
of domicile in South African law that the animus manendi should not fly in the face of the law? Uhat reason is there for not applying this notion to a foreign 
domicile? 
43L1. (1907) 4 CLrl 1428 at 1431-2. 
435. The position would be identical with a South African domiciliary who while
outside South Africa was declared a prohibited person under s l} of the Admission
of Persons to the Union Regulation Act 22 of 1913. Say A, an. immigrant from
Ireland who had acquired a South African domicile, while on a temporary visit to
Rhodesia committed a crime there that led to Ms deportation from Rhodesia to
Ireland. The crime causes the South African Minister of the Interior· to deem
him a prohibi tcd. person in South Africo. The result· is that he immediately
loses his South African domicile, even•if he has an animus revertendi to this
country.
436, 50.1.22.3, 50.1.27.3. 110 
l�J7. Ad Pand 5.1.93. Erwin Spire 'Deportation and Domicile' (1964) 81 .§!:bl.173 points out that th:l.s is an inst;mce of a person with two domiciles. 
438, 439. Cens for 2.1.12,7, 2.5.1.46, Spiro in (1964) 81 SALJ 173. 
440, Ebert & Co v Goldman (J.900) 17 SC 530 at 532, See too Dar§ 44, who says 
that an exile's shadowy hope of return does not signify and hanishmeut to a penaI. 
settlement where, the prisoner may establish a household and dwelling results in 
domic.ile there, 
441. Ilurge 1 ed I (1838) 46 t 2 ed I (1907) 73; Story§ 47.
442. 0lwage v Buntman 1910 WLD l�4t holding that deport.3.tion did not ch,mge domicile,no e"---press reason being given (Greenberg J in Ex parte Gordon 1937 WLD 35 at 36
thought that the ground apparently was th,1.t voluntary intention of abandonment
of domicile is necessary� and with deportation it <loes not exist); applied.in
Hi t�hcox v Hi. tchcox (1930) 2 PH B33 ( C), where there was ev:i dence of ani,�
revertendi; similarly Taylor v Taylor 1931 CPD 98.
443. 1915 WLD 29. The com: t was, it seems, unaware of the decision in Olwage v
Duntman (supra).
444. 193/i SR 35. Apparently the c.ourt felt there m:lght be an a.n:l.mus revertendi,
applying the. maxitn ubi uxor ibi dor.ms.
445. 1937 WLD JS .. 
446. At 37�
447. 
448. 
1946 CPD 312. 
(1934) 51 SALJ 20. 
449. At 317.
See the judgment at 317. 
450. Thiele v Thiele (1920) 150 LTJ 387.
451. 1963 (4) SA 615 (N).
452. Per Henning J at 617.
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.of life, either with his parent_s' consent or because they are dead or have aban­
doned him' (loc cit). See further Beale§ 31.1; Goodrich§ 38.
593. See particularly Ochberg v Estate Ochberg 1941 CPD 15 at 37; Ahmed v Coovadia
1944 TPD 364 at 366; Dickens v Daley 1956 (2) SA 11 (N).
594. See Hahlo in ( 1943) 60 ™ 290; · Spiro. in (1951) 4 ILQ 194-5. But Spiro 
seems to have changed his mind: LaH of Parent and Child 3 ed 126.
595. 1941 CPD 15 at 37, per Sutton J (Howes J concurring).
596. III (i) cons 32 nn 1, 2.
597. See WR Duncan 'The Domicile of Infants' (1969) 4 The Irish Jurist 36,esp at
40-1, 45, 49. Most English and American texts however, are against this
submission: Cheshire 177; 'Wolff§ 112; Beale § 30.l p 211; Goodrich§ 37;
Restatement Second§ 22. But it has been shown that there is no need for a rule
of·unity of domicile of father and child. In re Beaumont [1893] 3 Ch 490
establishes a contrary rul� in regard to the widow-mother and her minor child's
domicile. See below, n 603. Wolff § 113 says: 'This differentia.tion between the
father's and the mother's domicile is particularly startling because it seems
to grant the mother a "power"whic� it denies to th� father, though in both cases
the infant's interest is the .same. American laws have abolished such unjustifi-
able differentiation - which� for that matter, is not to be found in any law of
the European continent.'
598. (1866) 5 Searle 220 at 225-6.
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599. Bynkershoek Ouaest Jur Priv I 16 speaks in general terms of a father, widow­
mother or non-natural legal guardian having complete power to change the minor's
domicile. Though he does not put his mind specifically .to this issue, it must
be conceded that his approach seems against the view of Cloete J.
600. 
601. 
602. 
603. 
See the excel}ent analysis of Duncan op cit.
Dy Pollak in (1934) · 51 � 25nl62.
See above, text to n 577.
Se� Duqcan op cit 39. Dealing with a widow-mother, Stirling J said in In re
Beaumont [1893] 3 Ch 490 at 496-7 that she exercises her power to _change he •.
child's domicile 'vested in her for the welfare of the infants, which, in their
interest, she may abstain from exercising, even when she changes her own domicile'.
Why (Dicey & Morris 111) English law apparently does not adopt this view with
the father cannot be explained.
604. 5. 1. 100.
605. De jure conj 1 Prael 2 (paTs nlt) 1.6 pp 110-11 and 2.2,3 pp 112-13.
606. Coutumes d 1 0rleans I 18, 19.
607. Possibly the alleged rule finds support in Holl Cons I co�s 152 and II cons 21 1 
which,. however, are not at all clear, being interpreted by RD Kollewijn
Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse wetenschan van het Internatlonaal P.ivaatrecht tot
ill.Q (Groningen 1937) 169 to mean that the surviving parent-guardian cannot
change the child's domicile as far as the law of succession is concerned, and by
other writers to mean that the widow-mother cannot change the child's domicile
at all.
608� Ouaest Jur Priv I 16 pp 182-3. He adinits that the question had never been 
609. 
610. 
crisply decided t adduces no authority and argues merely in principle. 
Dictata ad Gr 2.26.ti (Th 341) (Pret ed III pp 8-9)� 
As Kollewijn op cit 168-9 rightly points out, it should apply equally to a 
maTriage in fraudem legis loci domicilii. Yet it was agreed by all that such a 
union was void. See Kahn in Hahlo on Husband and Wife 581-2. 
611. (1866) 5 Searle 220 at 225-&.
612. It is clear that the rights of children in their deceased mother's intestate
estate vest et the time of her death, At thnt time she was domiciled in the Cape.
A subsequent change of the father's domicile could not possibly, as Cloete J
thought it did, change those rights. It is noteworthy that Watermeyer J, who
also sat, did not advert to·the question of a change. of domicile.
613.. Potin�1er v Wightman (1817) 3 Mer 67 at 79-80 1 36 ER 26 at 30, per Sir William 
Grant l-ffi. 
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6 t4. While Dicey 6. Morris make no comment, in the sixth edition (1949) 106-_7 it 
was pointed out (by Z Cowen) that the rule, if it exists at all, must also 
extend to the father, which has never been suggested by the courts, and that, 
615. 
616. 
with the present equality of the sexes, it ought to disappear. 
hand Schrni tthoff 87 would apply the rule to both situations. 
Wolff§ l37_pp 144-5. 
Cons II cons 23 n 45. 
On the other 
617. {1934) 51 gJd 25-6.
618. (1951) 4 fil 198 and Law of Parent and Child 127-8.
619. Agreed that the law does not p1·event a husband from changing his domicile
even though his wife's interests (eg to be able to bring a divorce or annulment
p1:oceedings) ai:e thereby affected. See above, text to nn 537-8.
620. See Hahlo 6. Kahn South Africa 434-5 and Hahlo Husband and Wife 452, 456-8,
and author:i. ties there cited.
621. Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 s 5(4). Only if the father is given sole 
guardianship is t:he_mother 9 s consent unnecessary. 
622. Calitz v Calit� 1939 AD 56. In very special circumstances in granting a divorce 
or judicial separation the court may award custody to a third party. See Hahlo 
Husband and W:ife 455. 
623. See Spiro 247.
624. 37 of 1953.
625. 33 of 1960.
626. What distinguishes 'sole guardianship' from 'guardianship' at common law is that
it provides this exclusive power and in addition the power to appoint by will a
third party as sole guardian.
627. 
628. 
629. 
630. 
631. 
632. 
633. 
634. 
635. 
636. 
637. 
638. 
639. 
640. 
What distinguishes 1 sole custody' from 1 custody• at common law is that it provides 
the power to appoint by will a sole custodian. 
See Hahlo Husband and Wifo 451. 
56 of 1955. 
66 of 1965, 
Goodrich v Botha 1952 (4) SA 175 -(T) at 181. 
Cf September v Karriem 1959 (3) SA 687 (C) at 688. 
Cf Short v Naisby 1955 (3) SA 572 (D) at 574-5. 
Cf September v Karriem 1959 (3) SA 687 (C) at 688. 
See Short v Naisby 1955 (3) SA 572 (D) at 574-5. 
1944 OPD 59 at 65. 
1953 {3) SA 656 (SR). 
At 657. 
At 658. 
Parent and Child 1 ed (1950) 216, 218, 3 ed (1971) 275; (1951) 4 .!.!6l 201-2. 
641. (1934) 5l SALJ 26 esp n 170.
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642. See eg "fieale § 32.l; Restatement Second§ 22, esp note therein 'Alternating
domicil •.
643. Only Wolff(§ 112) appears to have dealt with the matter. He found himself
compelled, to his regret,to conclude that domicile did not go with custody.
'On this point American laws are well ahead of the English provisions.'
Dicey a. Morris (at 84) simply said that it is arguable that a legitimate
child born after the divorce of his parents should take his mother's do micile
at birth (which overlooks the present problem).
644. Cmd 9068 (1954) art 4(1).
645. Art 4(3).
646. (1965) SLT 3.30. It purported to consider English authorities. Anton at 171
is critical: 'It would follow that, when a father has been divorced on the ground
that he has deserted his wife in Scotland, his children, although remaining with
their mother, will nevertheless be domiciled wherever the father has chosen to 
establish his domicile. This widens the gap between the popular and the legal
concepts of domicile and is likely to lead to hardship.'
647. [1968] NI 1, Morris (at 28) approves of the decision.
648. At 5.
649. See Hahlo Husband and Wife 452££.
650. J Voet �.1.100; Dynkershoek Ouaest Jur Priv I 16; Pothier Coutumes d'Orleans I
18, 19; Van det' Keessel Th 341 and Dictata ad Gr 2.26.12 (Th 341) (Pret eel III
6-9); � v ].ill 1933 NPD 258 at 260. Holl Cons I cons 152 and II cons 21
can possibly be read to mean that the mother is not able to change the child's
domicile. But as Bynkershoek loc cit points out, the consultatien arc unsatis­
factory. They do not state whether tutors had been appointed, which might make
a difference, and they appear to hold that the domiciU.um ori,;inis is looked to,
which is manifestly incorrect.
651. Cf Pothier Coutumes d'Orl:eans I 18. Even if the view be taken - hardly feasible
today - that_a widow under 21 cannot be guardian of her children (see the old
authorities cited in R W Lee Commentary on 1 The Jurisprudence of Holland' bv Hugo 
Grotius (1936) ad Gr 1.7.6 (p 38)),- it is submitted th13-t since she is a major 
as far as the acquisition of a domicile is concerned, the -vinculum sanr,uinis 
between her and her child should be sufficient for her domicile to be attributed 
to her child. Cf the cases of the mother· of an illegitimate child, discussed 
below, text to n 667. 
652. (1893] 3 Ch 490. See too Lord Campbell in Johnstone v Beattie (1843) 10 Cl 6. Fin 
42 (HL) at 138, 8 ER 657 at 694, who goes out of his· way to say that the child 
follows the domicile of the widow"mother if he lives·with her. Duncan op cit 
40-1, 4.5- supports the decision, provided there is no fraudulent intent on the part
of the mother (eg in order to benefit from the law of succession: Potinger v
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Wightman (1817) 3 Mer 67 at 79-80, 36 ER 26 nt 30: see above text ton 612) J 
and the child is benefited and bas a substantial connection with the area (in 
order to meet the �rgument that domicile is not really a matter of choice but of 
fact). 
653. Implicit in Voet 5.1.100 and Bynkershoek Obs Tum II no 1259. There is no
suggestion that the child follo-ws the domicile of such a guardian.
654. Coutumes d'Orleans I 19.
655. s .. 1.100.
656. Wolff§ 114. See too Dicey and Morris 111.
657. Cheshire 178. Cf In re Beaumont [1893] 3 Ch 490.
658. Restatement Second§ 22 Comment b.
659. Precedent is not wanting in other legal systems too for looking at a married
woman's hypothetical domi�ile in this way (eg the Matrimonial Proceedings Act
1963 of New Zealand and the Divorce Act 1968 of Canada: see Kahn in Hahlo on
Husband and Wife 533n81) and it might be necessary to do so in our law to ground
jurisdiction on a plaintiff wife's assumed domicile in an action for annulment
of a void marri�ge (op cit 548)�
660. Quaest Jur Priv I 16.
661. Th 341 and Dicta ta ad Gr 2.26.12 (Th 341) (Pret ed III 8-9).
662. Dec Cur Bele II dee 166.
663. Coutumes d'Orleans I 17.
664. E Spiro 'Domicile of Minors without Parents' (1956) 5 ICLQ 196 and 'The Legal
Position of Minors without Parents' (1956) 19 Tl:!R-HR 90 at 97ff shares this view.
In his Law of Parent and Child 131 he add the qualification 'provided· that such
guardian did not by reason of the change of his (her) domicile cease to be
guardian'.
In English law the position is obsc·ure� Dicey 6.. Norris 112 point out that there
is no English authority� Possibly, ·they say, a guardian with a blood relation­
ship, such as a grandparent t will be able to change an infant's domicile, another
-guardian not. Or possibly a guardian may change an infant's domicile only to a
country in which he is recognized as a guardian. On balance, however, . they
conclude that the safe view is that the domicile of an infant without a surviving
parent (or of an illegitimate infant whose mother is dead) cannot change. In
Ge11I1an law the answe.r is in accordance with the submission made here: see BGB § 11,
as reworded from l July 1970. See Spiro 13ln58,
665. See Spiro 42, 125.
666. See D S0.1.9; Savigny System VIII § 353; � v Stuart (1903) 24 NLR 440 at
441-2.. The rule is the .same in English law (Dicey 6.. Morris 110..: 11) and American
·1aw (Restatement-Second§ 22 Comment£; Beale§ 34.1).
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66 7. Dhanabakium v Subramanian 191-13 AD 160 at 166. 
South Africa 389. 
668. Spiro 129n46 also ans:t-1ers in the affirmative.
See Spiro 421; Hahlo & Kahn 
669. This seems to be the effect of the decision of the court a guo in�
Wintzim;erode v �n Wintzinrwrode 1963 (2) PH B18 (T) - see (196Li) 81 SALJ 283,
670. Hahlo & Kahn South Africa 369.
671. See above, text following·n l32. See also Spiro 67, 125; Pollak in (i934) 51 �
26.
672. On the subject of a·mentally incompetent person's being able to acqui�e a domicile
because of sufficient intellect and·understanding for such pu_rpose, see Rest;.teme�
Second§ 23; Beale§ 40.l; Goodrich.§ 42�
673. Dicey & Morris 116; Cheshire 179; Schrnitthoff 93; ne·statement Second § 23; Beale
§ �0.4; Goodric:n § 42.
674. Dicey & Morris ·116, citing Sharne .and Sharpe v Crisoin (1869) LR l P & D : 611 t 
·which is not decisive, however; In re G [1966] NZLR 1028; Wolff·§ 120; Graveson.
226; Schrnitthoff 93; Beale§ 40,4. Cheshire p 179 .is critical, would look to
the interests of the mfoor and allow.the Court of Protect.ion to change the lunatic's
.domicile if this appears to be to his benefit. Article 5 of the Draft Code in the 
First Report of the Pt'ivate International Law Committee of England (Cmd 9068, 1954) 
provides that a lunatic retains his last domicile, but with the consent of the 
domiclliar-y: court his curator may be given the power to change it •. Restatement 
·Second § 423 'Comment c requires him to live with his parent ori who!n he is
dependent, otherwise he keeps his domicile at the time of separation. More
complex. rules, but resting on the same princi.ple, apply where the guardian is not
a pare� t: op cit § 2 2 Comment .h•
675. Above, text to nn 660££.
676. Sharpe and Sharpe v Crispin (1869) LR l P & D. 611 at 618 (obiter); Henning's
Executor v The Master (1885) 3 SC 235 at 238-9; E� parte Fletcher 1930 WLD
231 (obiter); Rifkin v Rifkin.1936 WLD 69 at 71; Kertesz v Kertesz (1954] VI,,R. - ---
195 at 197; Dicey & Morris 115-16; Schmitthoff 93.
677. Henning's Executor v The Master.(1885) 3 SC 235 at 239; Dicey & Morris 115-16;
Wolff § 120.
678. Sharpe and Sharpe v Crispi� (1869) LR 1 P & D 611 at 618.
679. Code Civil§ 108.2.
680. Civil Code§ 39.
681. Thus the German Civil Code§ 8.
662. Art 5 of the Draft Code of the First Report of the English Private International
Law Committee ·(supra).
683. The solution of some US jurisdictions: Restatement Second§ 23 Comment f•
684. Ex parte Berry: .!.11. re Berry 1961 (4) SA 79 (D), esp at 80,. See .also Dicey &
Morris 117.
t25 
685, Above, text to nn 184ff, 237ff. 
686. Above, text ton 541.
687. Above, text ton 135.
688. Above, text to nn 265ff.
689. See eg Van Leeuwen Cens For 1.3.12.5, EIB 3.12.10; J Voet 5.1.98.
690. Per De Villiers AJA in Hutchison's Executor v The Mast.er (Natal) l.919 AD 7l at 77.
691. Comraentaries on Colonial and Foreign Law 1 ed (1838) I 54,
6�2. Matter of Newcomb 192 NY 238, 84 NE 950 (1908) (Court of Appeals of New York). 
See Cheatham et al 15. 
693. Cf Huntly (Marchioness) v Gaskell (1906] AC 5_6 (BL (Sc)).
694. Drexel v Drexel (1916] l Ch 251� esp at 259.
695. � v � (1957] P 254 (CA), esp at 274. See generally Dicey & Morris 98;
. Cheshire 16 7. See too Note 'Evidentiary Factors in the Detennination of Domicil' 
(1948} 61 Hary LR 1232, where it is stated that in the US it is generally agreed that 
motiyation arising from a desire for· a temporary advantage based on domic_ile, 1 such 
as divoTce or npturalization'; should be regarded as a special purpose negativing 
a change of domicile. An intention to enjoy a continuous legal advantage t however, 
should not be found wanting as in some American jurisdictions, for the party's acts 
are 'explained by the motive rather than by an attitude of attachment'. The 
•stabilising acts' and the intention to obtain legal rights may show the requisite
state of mind. See further Restatement Second§ 18 Comment f - motive, good or.bad,
is i01I1aterial: it could even be to facilitate a life of sin and crime; but there
must be a bona fide intention to change home.
696. Per Kindersley V�C in Drevon v Drevon (1864) 10 LT 730 at 732 (the wording in 34 LJ
Ch 129 at 133 is different), cited with approval by Sutton Jin Ochber_g v Ochberg 1 s
Estate 1941 CPD 15 at 39.
697. Vromans De foro cotnpet I 4 p 133; Holl Cons ·ur(2) cons 138 n 22.
·698. Hutchison's Executor v The. Master (1-ta.tal) 1919 AD 71; Smith v Smith 1952 (4) SA
750 (0) at 756. Cf Eilon v Eilon 1965 (l) SA 703 (AD) at 719, 722, where failu1:e 
to do so and the investments of earnings in the new country in t.he purchase of land 
in the old was a contra indicium. 
699, Utr Cons I cons73 n�; Mills v Executors of Mills (1900) 18 SC 182 at 191; 
Ley v Ley 1 s Executors 1951 (3) SA 186 (AD) at 195 (non-acquisition in the case of 
a bachelor held not to signify). 
700. Van Zutphen Practyck Ned .sv domicilie; J Voet 5.1.97; Vromans De foro comoet •l 4
p 133; . Brunnema:nn Comm in Pand 50.1.31; Utr Cons I cons 73n 4, II cons 136 n 2;
Schomaker� V cons21 n5, Moreland v Moreland (1901) 22 NLR 385 at 387; Quayle v
_Quayle 1949 ·SR 203.
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701. See Eilon v Eilon 1965 (1) SA 703 (AD) at 722-3.
702. Ex parte P� 1951 (3) SA 793 (N). The eropositus was a United States seaman
who married a South African domiciliary but contimied in the service of the
shipping line plying between the United States and South Africa.
703. Pothier Coutumes d'Orleans l 20; Hutchison's Executor v The Master (Natal)
1919 AD 71...
704. Seebratan v Fak!ra (1907) 28 NLR 529 at 530; Hutchison's Executor v The Master
(Natal) 1919 AD 71.
705� 
706. 
707. 
708. 
709. 
710. 
711. 
712. 
713. 
Mason v Mason (1885) 4 EDC 330 at 337, 341, 356,.
Seebratan v Fakira (1907) 28 NLR-529 at 530; Quayle v Quayle 1949 SR 203 at 205.
Mills v Executors of Mills (1900) 18 SC 182 at-191.
Pothier Coutumes d'Orleans I 20; £Jilm v � 1910 'rPD 423 at 427.
Gunn v � 1910 TPD 423 at 428.
Deane v Deane 1922 OPD 41 at 46.
Hutchisori 1 s Executor v The Master (Natal) 1919 AD 71.
Kajee v Irnmizrants Apneal Board (1916) 37 NLR 42 at 48-9.
In (1948) 61 Harv LR 1236 it is pointed out that American courts heavily emphasize
membership of a local church, gifts to local charities and meinbership of a· local
club. But these facts probably signify more when the competition is between
domiciles in the same political unit.
71Lf. Cf J Voet 5.1.97;. Vromans De foro comoet 1 '• p 133; Schomaker Cons V cons 21n4; 
� v Gunn 1910 TPD 423 at 427-8; Johnson v Johnson 1931 AD 391 at 406. 
715. ln Smith v Smith 1970 (l} SA 146 (R) at 151 it was held that the sole reason for
the acquisition by a Rhodesian domiciliary of Australian citizenship was to obtain
an Australian passport, and that it did not establish the ·animus manendi.
716. Cf Pothier Coutumes d'Orleans I 20.
717. See Van Straaten v Van Straaten 1911 TPD 686 at 688.
718. Sav!gny System VIII§ 359. See Deane v Deane 1922 OPP 41 at 43 (obiter). 
719. Cf Van Leeuwen Cens For 1.3.12.5, � 3.12.10.
720. The inq.uiry then becomes largely one of credibility. Cf Webber v Webber 1915
AD 239 at 250; Muni�mmah v Kullu (1917) 38 NLR 352 at 358-9; British Ai:nerican
Assurance Co v l:!2� (1) 1936 CPD 543 at 545.
721. Vromans De foro comoet I 4 p 133; Holl Cons III(2) cons 138n 22; Utr Cons I
cons 73, !I cons 97 n 11 (express declaration sufficient even if nothing in the nature
of residence from which to infer animus, eg no moving of goods), tt cons 136 n 2f
Crystal v Colonial Secretary (1905) 22 S� 646 at 648.
722. Per SuttonJ in Ochberg v Ochberg 1 s Estate 1941 CPD 1.5 at 39-40. This passage is
lifted almost verbatim from the speech of Lora Buckmaster in Ross v � [1930] AC
1. at 6. 'Even if expressions of intention are clear and consistent, they cannot
prevail against a course of conduct inconsistent with them or leading to an opposite
inference': per Goldin Jin Howard v Howard 1966 (2) SA 718 (R) at 722. See too
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(1948) 61 Harv LR 1237-8; (1961) 73 Jur Rev 260-1. See too Beale§ 41C: 
'In any case of discrepancy between [a person's] declarations and his acts J his 
declared intention yieJ.ds to the conclusion drawn from his acts.• 
723. 1917 WLD 67.
724. Per Mason Jin �reland v Moreland (1901) 22 NLR 385 at 388. See too Wolff
§ 108. But cf Holl Cons 111(2) cons 138 n 22. 
725. �atement Second§ 20: Special Note on Evidence £or Establishmer.t of a Domicil
of Choice. Casual statements made on the spur of the moment as to one•s home may 
be entitled to great weight: ibid. 
726. Hawkes v Hawkes (1882) 2 SC 109; � v � (1907) 24 SC 441 at 443-6;
I!!_lksteiE_ v Von Falkstein 1917 WLD 67 at 68.
Von -�
727. In Smith v Smith, 1952 (4) SA 750 at 75.5.
at 179-80.
See too Ex parte StE..TI.�d.ng 1906 EDC 169 
